Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Super. Ct. No. 06 C 0359
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Thomas DeSantos, Judge.
Alex Lamota Marti, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
A. L. Davidson, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Kane, J.
This is an appeal from an order denying relief to plaintiff and appellant Alex Lamota Marti and effectively terminating this litigation. We will affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant and respondent A. L. Davidson were fellow prison inmates. Appellant sued respondent for compensatory and punitive damages, claiming respondent falsely reported appellant was making a weapon to attack a prison guard. Appellant alleged respondent did this to cause appellant to be placed in administrative segregation so that respondent could steal his personal property. Appellant alleged the charges were untrue and were found to be untrue after investigation by prison authorities. Appellant alleged respondent then officially designated appellant an “enemy,” which caused appellant to be transferred to a prison far from his home, making it difficult for his family to visit.
Respondent failed to file a proper answer and his default was entered. Appellant filed a motion for entry of default judgment, together with a supporting evidentiary declaration. Appellant requested a telephonic hearing to prove up his damages.
Without holding such a hearing, the trial court entered the order from which appeal is taken. The order concluded that as a matter of law appellant was not entitled to damages from respondent. As relevant to this appeal, the court concluded respondent’s false communications concerning appellant were privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The order did not expressly dismiss appellant’s action, but held appellant was not entitled to judgment in the amount requested “or in any lesser sum.”
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
Appellant’s primary contention on appeal is that the trial court found unproven certain facts that were conclusively admitted by respondent’s default. (See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Proceedings Without Trial, § 176, p. 618.) It appears to some extent appellant is correct in this contention, but it avails him nothing.
After a default is entered, the trial court is required to accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint just as if those facts had been found true after trial. However, if the complaint still fails to state a cause of action or an entitlement to the relief demanded, “the plaintiff is no more entitled to that relief by default judgment than if the defendant had expressly admitted all the allegations. Such a default judgment is erroneous, and will be reversed on appeal.” (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Proceedings Without Trial, § 183, p. 622.)
The problem for appellant in the present case is that the operative facts alleged in the complaint affirmatively show that he is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, even if those facts are taken conclusively to be true, appellant is not entitled to damages against respondent.
In Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, the Supreme Court held that a person’s statements to law enforcement authorities “concerning suspected criminal activity of another person” cannot be the basis for a tort action against the speaker (except for malicious prosecution liability, not sought in this case). (Id. at p. 375.) Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) grants immunity for such statements even if they are made in bad faith or with malice. (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank, supra, at pp. 364-365.)
The trial court correctly concluded that, as a matter of law, appellant was not entitled to damages from respondent.
Disposition
The order denying judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.