Marta v. Wallace

17 Citing cases

  1. Green Bull Georgia Partners, LLC v. Register

    301 Ga. 472 (Ga. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    Although all the parties to this case acknowledge this standard for interlocutory injunctions, the Registers rely as well on a line of cases in which this Court has said simply that the main purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo, without reference to the four factors identified in City of Waycross. See, e.g., Bailey v. Buck, 266 Ga. 405, 405-406 (1) (467 SE2d 554) (1996); Smith v. Mid-State Nurses, Inc., 261 Ga. 208, 209 (403 SE2d 789) (1991); West v. Koufman, 259 Ga. 505, 505 (384 SE2d 664) (1989); Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 305, 306 (1) (380 SE2d 265) (1989); Benton v. Patel, 257 Ga. 669, 672 (1) (362 SE2d 217) (1987); MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494 (3) (254 SE2d 822) (1979). Just as we said in those cases, the purpose of an interlocutory injunction generally is to maintain the status quo.

  2. Green Bull Ga. Partners, LLC v. Register

    301 Ga. 472 (Ga. 2017)   Cited 9 times

    Although all the parties to this case acknowledge this standard for interlocutory injunctions, the Registers rely as well on a line of cases in which this Court has said simply that the main purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo, without reference to the four factors identified in City of Waycross. See, e.g., Bailey v. Buck, 266 Ga. 405 , 405-406 (1) (467 SE2d 554 ) (1996); Smith v. Mid-State Nurses, Inc., 261 Ga. 208 , 209 (403 SE2d 789 ) (1991); West v. Koufman, 259 Ga. 505 , 505 (384 SE2d 664 ) (1989); Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 305 , 306 (1) (380 SE2d 265 ) (1989); Benton v. Patel, 257 Ga. 669 , 672 (1) (362 SE2d 217 ) (1987); MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 , 494 (3) (254 SE2d 822 ) (1979). Just as we said in those cases, the purpose of an interlocutory injunction generally is to maintain the status quo.

  3. Georgia State Licensing Board for Residential & General Contractors v. Allen

    286 Ga. 811 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 5 times

    Accordingly, it has been held that an interlocutory injunction should be refused where its grant would operate oppressively on the defendant's rights, especially in such a case that the denial of the temporary injunction would not work irreparable injury to the plaintiff or leave the plaintiff practically remediless in the event it should thereafter establish the truth of (its) contention. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494-495 (3) ( 254 SE2d 822) (1979) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, the grant of the preliminary injunction operated oppressively on not only the rights of the defendant County and the defendant Board but on the rights of the citizens of this State. It effectively enjoined, without apparent valid basis, the operation of a licensing law enacted by the General Assembly expressly, "in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare, to safeguard homeowners, other property owners, tenants, and the general public against faulty, inadequate, inefficient, and unsafe residential and general contractors."

  4. Poe & Brown of Georgia, Inc. v. Gill

    268 Ga. 749 (Ga. 1997)   Cited 9 times
    Stating company would suffer irreparable harm due to former employee's solicitation of customers because loss of customer results in injury that cannot be quantified

    "MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494 (3) ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979) (quoting 15 EGL 285, Injunctions, § 16 (1969)). Accord Bailey v. Burk, 266 Ga. 405 (1) ( 467 S.E.2d 554) (1996).Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assoc., 253 Ga. 322, 327 (6) ( 320 S.E.2d 170) (1984).

  5. Bailey v. Buck

    266 Ga. 405 (Ga. 1996)   Cited 15 times

    [Cit.]" MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494(3) ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). Here, the question which awaits a final adjudication is whether Bailey is the President of the Corporation.

  6. Smith v. Mid-State Nurses, Inc.

    261 Ga. 208 (Ga. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    In Smith, the former employer urged that its customer lists were a "trade secret" but, at the hearing on the interlocutory injunction, the only evidence as to efforts to maintain secrecy did not relate to the customer lists, but to other written forms which the former employer had developed.

    [t]he purpose for granting an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final adjudication of the case. MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). Generally the trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction.

  7. West v. Koufman

    259 Ga. 505 (Ga. 1989)   Cited 25 times

    The purpose for granting an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final adjudication of the case. MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). Generally the trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction.

  8. Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta

    259 Ga. 305 (Ga. 1989)   Cited 6 times

    The "purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo of the parties pending a final adjudication of the case." MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494 ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). The trial court should consider whether a denial of the petition for injunctive relief would work an "`irreparable injury' to the plaintiff or leave the plaintiff `practically remediless' in the event it `should thereafter establish the truth of its contentions.'"

  9. Benton v. Patel

    257 Ga. 669 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 19 times

    1. "The grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 (3) ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). The purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo, as well as balance the conveniences of the parties, pending a final adjudication of the case.

  10. Jackson v. Delk

    257 Ga. 541 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 20 times
    In Jackson v. Delk, 361 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. 1987), the Georgia Supreme Court stated that "the issuance of a building permit, as well as various other forms of administrative approval, vests the right of the permittee to develop his or her property in accordance with existing zoning or regulatory laws."

    (c) The grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 (3) ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). The purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo, as well as balance the conveniences of the parties, pending a final adjudication of the case.