Although all the parties to this case acknowledge this standard for interlocutory injunctions, the Registers rely as well on a line of cases in which this Court has said simply that the main purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo, without reference to the four factors identified in City of Waycross. See, e.g., Bailey v. Buck, 266 Ga. 405, 405-406 (1) (467 SE2d 554) (1996); Smith v. Mid-State Nurses, Inc., 261 Ga. 208, 209 (403 SE2d 789) (1991); West v. Koufman, 259 Ga. 505, 505 (384 SE2d 664) (1989); Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 305, 306 (1) (380 SE2d 265) (1989); Benton v. Patel, 257 Ga. 669, 672 (1) (362 SE2d 217) (1987); MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494 (3) (254 SE2d 822) (1979). Just as we said in those cases, the purpose of an interlocutory injunction generally is to maintain the status quo.
Although all the parties to this case acknowledge this standard for interlocutory injunctions, the Registers rely as well on a line of cases in which this Court has said simply that the main purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo, without reference to the four factors identified in City of Waycross. See, e.g., Bailey v. Buck, 266 Ga. 405 , 405-406 (1) (467 SE2d 554 ) (1996); Smith v. Mid-State Nurses, Inc., 261 Ga. 208 , 209 (403 SE2d 789 ) (1991); West v. Koufman, 259 Ga. 505 , 505 (384 SE2d 664 ) (1989); Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 305 , 306 (1) (380 SE2d 265 ) (1989); Benton v. Patel, 257 Ga. 669 , 672 (1) (362 SE2d 217 ) (1987); MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 , 494 (3) (254 SE2d 822 ) (1979). Just as we said in those cases, the purpose of an interlocutory injunction generally is to maintain the status quo.
Accordingly, it has been held that an interlocutory injunction should be refused where its grant would operate oppressively on the defendant's rights, especially in such a case that the denial of the temporary injunction would not work irreparable injury to the plaintiff or leave the plaintiff practically remediless in the event it should thereafter establish the truth of (its) contention. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494-495 (3) ( 254 SE2d 822) (1979) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, the grant of the preliminary injunction operated oppressively on not only the rights of the defendant County and the defendant Board but on the rights of the citizens of this State. It effectively enjoined, without apparent valid basis, the operation of a licensing law enacted by the General Assembly expressly, "in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare, to safeguard homeowners, other property owners, tenants, and the general public against faulty, inadequate, inefficient, and unsafe residential and general contractors."
"MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494 (3) ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979) (quoting 15 EGL 285, Injunctions, § 16 (1969)). Accord Bailey v. Burk, 266 Ga. 405 (1) ( 467 S.E.2d 554) (1996).Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assoc., 253 Ga. 322, 327 (6) ( 320 S.E.2d 170) (1984).
[Cit.]" MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494(3) ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). Here, the question which awaits a final adjudication is whether Bailey is the President of the Corporation.
[t]he purpose for granting an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final adjudication of the case. MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). Generally the trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction.
The purpose for granting an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final adjudication of the case. MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). Generally the trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction.
The "purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo of the parties pending a final adjudication of the case." MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 494 ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). The trial court should consider whether a denial of the petition for injunctive relief would work an "`irreparable injury' to the plaintiff or leave the plaintiff `practically remediless' in the event it `should thereafter establish the truth of its contentions.'"
1. "The grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 (3) ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). The purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo, as well as balance the conveniences of the parties, pending a final adjudication of the case.
(c) The grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491 (3) ( 254 S.E.2d 822) (1979). The purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo, as well as balance the conveniences of the parties, pending a final adjudication of the case.