Opinion
No. 4:19-CV-59-D
07-15-2020
JOHNNY RAY MARSLENDER, Plaintiff/Claimant, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the court on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings [DE-16, -18] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Claimant Johnny Ray Marslender ("Claimant") filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") payments. Claimant responded to Defendant's motion, and the pending motions are ripe for adjudication. [DE-20]. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the motions and memoranda submitted by the parties, it is recommended that Claimant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be allowed, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be denied, and the case be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the Memorandum and Recommendation.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimant protectively filed an application for SSI on November 23, 2015, alleging disability beginning July 16, 2010. (R. 10, 216-21). Claimant later amended his alleged onset date to November 23, 2015. (R. 10, 248). His claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 10, 95-129). A video hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") was held on February 21, 2018, at which Claimant, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (R. 10, 32-63). On May 14, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Claimant's request for benefits. (R. 7-31). On February 13, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review. (R. 1-6). Claimant then filed a complaint in this court seeking review of the now-final administrative decision.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The scope of judicial review of a final agency decision regarding disability benefits under the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). "The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). While substantial evidence is not a "large or considerable amount of evidence," Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988), it is "more than a mere scintilla . . . and somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996), superseded by regulation on other grounds, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)). Rather, in conducting the "substantial evidence" inquiry, the court's review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed the relevant evidence and sufficiently explained his or her findings and rationale in crediting the evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).
III. DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS
The disability determination is based on a five-step sequential evaluation process as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 under which the ALJ is to evaluate a claim:
The claimant (1) must not be engaged in "substantial gainful activity," i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a "severe" impairment that (3) meets or exceeds [in severity] the "listings" of specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity to (4) perform . . . past work or (5) any other work.Albright v. Comm'r of the SSA, 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). "If an applicant's claim fails at any step of the process, the ALJ need not advance to the subsequent steps." Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the claimant. Id. At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show that other work exists in the national economy which the claimant can perform. Id.
When assessing the severity of mental impairments, the ALJ must do so in accordance with the "special technique" described in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(b)-(c). This regulatory scheme identifies four broad functional areas in which the ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation resulting from a claimant's mental impairment(s): understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. Id. § 416.920a(c)(3). The ALJ is required to incorporate into his written decision pertinent findings and conclusions based on the "special technique." Id. § 416.920a(e)(3).
In this case, Claimant alleges the following errors: (1) the ALJ failed to incorporate non-exertional limitations in Claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") determination; and (2) the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical opinion of Dr. Nina Ward. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 6-24.
IV. ALJ'S FINDINGS
Applying the above-described sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Claimant "not disabled" as defined in the Act. At step one, the ALJ found Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since November 23, 2015, the application date. (R. 12). Next, the ALJ determined Claimant had the following severe impairments: status-post traumatic brain injury, status-post lumbar fusion L4-L5 moderate degenerative disk disease, chronic pain syndrome, and headaches. Id. The ALJ also found Claimant had the nonsevere impairment of alcohol abuse. (R. 13). However, at step three, the ALJ concluded these impairments were not severe enough, either individually or in combination, to meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 16). Applying the technique prescribed by the regulations, the ALJ found that Claimant's mental impairments have resulted in moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. (R. 13-15).
Prior to proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Claimant's RFC, finding Claimant had the ability to perform light work requiring the following restrictions:
Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If an individual can perform light work, he or she can also perform sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as the loss of fine dexterity or the inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).
He requires the availability of a sit/stand option with the ability to change positions at 30 minutes intervals if needed. He can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He can occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. He cannot have driving as a job duty. He occasionally can be exposed to extreme cold, wetness, and humidity. He should avoid all exposure to excessive vibration and workplace hazards, such as unprotected heights.
He is limited to simple, routine tasks. There can be occasional changes in the work setting, with changes introduced gradually. He can occasionally interact with the public, supervisors, and coworkers.(R. 16-24). At step four, the ALJ concluded Claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work as an iron worker, construction industry. (R. 24-25). At step five, upon considering Claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined Claimant is capable of adjusting to the demands of other employment opportunities that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 25-26).
V. DISCUSSION
A. The ALJ erred in Formulating Claimant's RFC.
Claimant contends that the ALJ erred in formulating his RFC by failing to incorporate non-exertional limitations addressing Claimant's ability to stay on task. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 6-18. An individual's RFC is the capacity he possesses despite the limitations caused by physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1); see also S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). "[T]he residual functional capacity 'assessment must first identify the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions' listed in the regulations." Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting S.S.R. 96-8p). The RFC is based on all relevant medical and other evidence in the record and may include a claimant's own description of limitations arising from alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3); see also S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. Where a claimant has numerous impairments, including non-severe impairments, the ALJ must consider their cumulative effect in making a disability determination. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); see Hines v. Brown, 872 F.2d 56, 59 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[I]n determining whether an individual's impairments are of sufficient severity to prohibit basic work related activities, an ALJ must consider the combined effect of a claimant's impairments.") (citations omitted). The ALJ has sufficiently considered the combined effects of a claimant's impairments when each is separately discussed by the ALJ and the ALJ also discusses a claimant's complaints and activities. Baldwin v. Barnhart, 444 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (citations omitted). The RFC assessment "must include a discussion of why reported symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence." S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. The RFC "assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations)." Id.; see also Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000) (observing that the ALJ "must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion").
The Fourth Circuit held in Mascio that "an ALJ does not account 'for a claimant's limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work.'" 780 F.3d at 638 (quoting Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011) (joining the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits)). The court explained that "the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task" and that "[o]nly the latter limitation would account for a claimant's limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace." Id. The court acknowledged there could be instances where a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace at step three does not require a limitation in the RFC; however, the failure to explain such a result is error requiring remand. Id. ("Perhaps the ALJ can explain why Mascio's moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace at step three does not translate into a limitation in Mascio's residual functional capacity. . . . But because the ALJ here gave no explanation, a remand is in order."); see also Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that ALJ decision comported with Mascio where ALJ explained why evidence supported mental limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and included limitations in hypothetical to VE); Iva K. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:19-CV-02954-JMC, 2020 WL 3060752, at *4 (D. Md. June 9, 2020) ("This is because pursuant to Mascio, once the ALJ made a step three finding that a claimant suffers from moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ must either include a corresponding limitation in the RFC assessment, or explain why no such limitation is necessary.").
Here, the ALJ found Claimant moderately limited in his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. (R. 14). In reaching this determination, the ALJ noted Claimant's status-post traumatic brain injury, and Claimant's testimony about his comprehension issues and requirement for assistance at the grocery store to ensure he "remains on list." (R. 14). The ALJ noted that state agency medical consultants opined that Claimant has no more than a moderate difficulty in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (R. 14, 107, 125).
Notwithstanding her determination of Claimant's limitations in an ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, the ALJ did not explain how the RFC she formulated addresses those limitations. As noted, Mascio makes clear that absent explanation, a limitation to simple, routine tasks does not account for an individual's ability to stay on task. Here, the RFC also included a limitation that there can be "occasional changes in the work setting, with changes introduced gradually" and occasional interaction with the public, supervisors, and coworkers. (R. 16). But nowhere in the decision does the ALJ provide any explanation as to how those limitations would enable Claimant to stay on task and concentrate throughout the workday. It is conceivable that those restrictions, coupled with the simple, routine tasks, were intended to address Claimant's limitations with concentration, persistence, and pace, but the court cannot trace the ALJ's reasoning on that point in the absence of an express explanation that ties the restrictions to Claimant's limitations. See Sizemore v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 72, 81 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 2017) (holding that limitations to working in a low stress, non-production job with no public contact were sufficient to account for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace); Lee v. Colvin, No. 5:15-CV-142-D, 2016 WL 816784, at * 1-2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 2016) (finding a hypothetical limiting the individual to no fast paced or quota based work and limiting contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public comported with Mascio and the claimant's mental restrictions in concentration, persistence, or pace).
This case is similar to the Fourth Circuit's recent decisions in Perry v. Berryhill, 765 F. App'x 869 (4th Cir. 2019), and Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019). In Perry, the court questioned an RFC limitation to a "non-production oriented work setting" for a claimant with limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace because the phrase was undefined in the regulations, and the ALJ offered no explanation as to what was meant. 765 F. App'x 869, 872 (4th Cir. 2019) ("[W]e do not know what the ALJ intended when she used that phrase. As a result, it is difficult, if not impossible to evaluate whether restricting [claimant] to a 'non-production work setting' properly accounted for [claimant's] well-documented limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace."). In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit held that an RFC precluding a claimant from performing work "requiring a production rate or demand pace" did not provide enough information to understand what the terms meant and to assess whether their inclusion in the RFC addressed claimant's limitations. 916 F.3d at 312. Here, the same difficulty is presented by the ALJ's restriction to only occasional changes in the work setting, with a requirement that changes be introduced gradually, without any additional information as to what this restriction means or how it addresses plaintiff's limitations. See Linda S. v. Saul, No. DLB-19-661, 2020 WL 3268535, at *2 (D. Md. June 17, 2020) (holding that ALJ's restriction to work free from "fast-paced production requirements" without explanation or definition of that term warranted remand); Hernandez v. Saul, No. 3:19-CV-337-FDW, 2020 WL 3259802, at *5 (W.D.N.C. June 16, 2020) (remanding where "without any explanation, the Court cannot partake in any meaningful review of the ALJ's usage of the term 'non-production work setting' and any purported limitations imposed regarding Plaintiff's moderate limitations in concentration, pace, or persistence").
Similarly, the ALJ's addition of a limitation on the frequency of contact with the public, supervisors, and coworkers does not explain the ALJ's reasoning or satisfy her obligation to provide enough descriptors for the court to meaningfully assess the adequacy of the RFC formulation. Other cases hold similarly. For example, in Huff v. Berryhill, the court remanded the case where the ALJ restricted a claimant to "low-stress" work with "only occasional interaction with the public or co-workers," but "failed to explain how these additional limitations sufficiently accommodate plaintiff's moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace," and did not address plaintiff's ability to complete job requirements for a full workday. No. 7:18-CV-54, 2019 WL 2193860, at *3 (W.D. Va. May 21, 2019). In Washington v. Saul, the court reversed and remanded where the ALJ,
declined to explain how the assessed restrictions accommodated Plaintiff's ability to focus attention on his work or stay on task over a sustained period. It might be that the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could focus attention and stay on task over a sustained period to perform simple, repetitive tasks with low production quotas, provided he had no interaction with the general public, only occasional interaction in proximity with others, and no work in coordination with others. However, in the absence of an explanation for such a conclusion, the undersigned is constrained to find the ALJ did not account for all of the claimant's medically-determinable impairments as required pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).No. CV 1:19-1825-SVH, 2020 WL 3428852, at *15 (D.S.C. June 22, 2020).
In some cases, an ALJ's reliance on an opinion from a state agency medical consultant may sufficiently account for a claimant's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace in accordance with Mascio. See Sizemore v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 72, 80-81 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding ALJ's crediting of agency consultant's opinion that the claimant "would generally be able to maintain [attention] for at least two [hours] at a time as needed to do simple, routine tasks" satisfied the requirements of Mascio). Here, while the ALJ did assign significant weight to the opinions of the state agency medical consultants who opined that Claimant had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ noted that he found Claimant to be "slightly more limited in adapting or managing himself" than they had. (R. 20). Yet, the state agency medical consultants both indicated Claimant's moderate limitations in sustained concentration and persistence and ability to complete a normal workday at a consistent pace was explained by indicating that "[t]he claimant has the ability to carry out short and simple instructions at a non-rapid to semi-rapid pace." (R. 107, 125). It is not clear if the ALJ's requirement for occasional changes in the work setting is intended to address this explanation and the court will not speculate that it was.
The same is true here. The ALJ's limitations do not provide sufficient context to explain the intended restrictions and to allow the court to conduct a meaningful review. See Perry, 765 F. App'x at 872 n.1. Accordingly, the ALJ erred in formulating the RFC as it relates to Claimant's moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace, warranting remand.
B. The ALJ erred in weighing medical opinions.
Claimant contends the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical opinion of Dr. Ward. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 18-24. When assessing a claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). Regardless of the source, the ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion received. Id. § 416.927(c). In general, the ALJ should give more weight to the opinion of an examining medical source than to the opinion of a non-examining source. Id. § 416.927(c)(1). Additionally, more weight is generally given to opinions of treating sources, who usually are most able to provide "a detailed, longitudinal picture" of a claimant's alleged disability, than non-treating sources such as consultative examiners. Id. § 416.927(c)(2). When the opinion of a treating source regarding the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence," it is given controlling weight. Id. However, "[i]f a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Craig, 76 F.3d at 590.
If the ALJ determines that a treating physician's opinion should not be considered controlling, the ALJ must then analyze and weigh all of the medical opinions in the record, taking into account the following non-exclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). An ALJ may not reject medical evidence for the wrong reason or no reason. See Wireman v. Barnhart, No. 2:05-CV-46, 2006 WL 2565245, at *8 (W.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2006). "In most cases, the ALJ's failure to consider a physician's opinion (particularly a treating physician) or to discuss the weight given to that opinion will require remand." Love-Moore v. Colvin, No. 7:12-CV-104-D, 2013 WL 5350870, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 2013) (citations omitted). However, "[a]n ALJ's determination as to the weight to be assigned to a medical opinion generally will not be disturbed absent some indication that the ALJ has dredged up 'specious inconsistencies,' or has failed to give a sufficient reason for the weight afforded a particular opinion." Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App'x 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Dr. Ward, a primary care physician, saw Claimant every three months for over a year prior to her completion on December 22, 2017, of a mental medical source statement for him. (R. 684-89). In it, she indicated that Claimant suffers from memory impairment and cognitive impairment with a poor prognosis for any improvement. (R. 684). She identified his signs and symptoms to include: difficulty thinking or concentrating; change in personality; psychological or behavioral abnormalities associated with a dysfunction of the brain with a specific organic factor judged to be etiologically related to the abnormal mental state and loss of previously acquired functional abilities; perceptual or thinking disturbances; easy distractibility; memory impairment—short, intermediate, or long term; and loss of intellectual ability of 15 IQ points or more. (R. 685). Dr. Ward opined that Claimant would be unable to meet the following competitive work standards for unskilled work: remember work-like procedures; understand and remember very short and simple instructions; carry out very short and simple instruction; make simple work-related decisions; and respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. (R. 686). Dr. Ward noted that Claimant reported being able to function normally at work prior to his accident but afterwards felt "not right in the head" and now is only able to work for his cousin who understands his limitations and will accommodate them. (R. 687).
The ALJ summarized Dr. Ward's evaluation and gave it partial weight for two reasons: first, her "treatment notes . . . fail to provide support for more than moderate limitations in the claimant's functioning due to the claimant's history of traumatic brain injury"; and that "the claimant reported to Dr. Ward significant activities and tasks that are inconsistent with marked or extreme limitations in mental functioning." (R. 21).
The court cannot trace the ALJ's reasoning with respect to her first rationale for discounting Dr. Ward's opinion. In support of her conclusion that Dr. Ward's opinion is not consistent with her treatment notes, the ALJ points to treatment records from June 15, 2017, March 14, 2017, August 16, 2016, and September 15, 2016 that reflect notations indicating that Claimant has no neurologic or memory deficits and that his cognition and mentation appear baseline. (R. 21, 351, 352, 354, 359). As an initial matter, each of these visits with Dr. Ward related to care for Claimant's back pain and to obtain prescription refills for pain medicine for back pain. Dr. Ward's notations regarding Claimant's mental limitations are therefore generally secondary to the treatment indicated in those records. Notwithstanding that fact, the records do contain notations that are consistent with the medical source statement submitted. Specifically, at his August 16, 2016 visit, Dr. Ward noted that Claimant "has been emphasizing his back pain but I think the traumatic brain injury is where his disability truly is." (R. 359). Similarly, at his September 15, 2016 visit, Dr. Ward noted that Claimant "attempted to get disability and Medicaid based on his back pain although I feel the traumatic brain injury is more to the point." (R. 354). These notations, not mentioned by the ALJ, reflect Dr. Ward's opinions that Claimant has serious limitations resulting from his traumatic brain injury and refute the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Ward's "treatment notes fail to provide support for more than moderate limitations in the claimant's functioning due to the claimant's history of traumatic brain injury." (R. 21). The ALJ gave significant weight to the notated findings contained within these medical records, (R. 20), and her failure to acknowledge their consistency with the mental medical source statement calls into question her conclusion that the medical source statement is in conflict with the information in the treatment notes.
Further, the parties dispute whether Dr. Ward's repeated indication that Claimant's "cognition and mentation appear baseline," (R. 351, 352, 355, 357), reflects a finding that it remained unchanged and stable at Claimant's impaired level of functioning or conversely, whether it documents a finding by Dr. Ward that his cognition and mentation were normal, as the ALJ appears to have concluded. See Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 18-24; Comm'r Mem. [DE-19] at 6-10; Pl.'s Reply [DE-20] at 1-10. Because it is recommended that this matter be remanded, the court need not resolve this ambiguity at this time, particularly when a fair inference can be made for the interpretation Claimant urges. See, e.g., Davisson v. Astrue, No. 1:10-CV-2411, 2011 WL 2461883, at *10 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 2011) ("A person can have a condition that is both 'stable' and disabling at the same time.") (citations omitted).
Finally, the ALJ's second reason that the claimant reported significant activities and tasks that are inconsistent with marked or extreme limitations in mental functioning is a proper reason to discount a medical opinion. In this case, however, the ALJ does not explain how the fact that Claimant spent quite a bit of time getting a camper on his parent's property ready to live in and helped a friend put in hardwood floors and paint at a rental property, necessarily reflect tasks that are inconsistent with marked or extreme limitations in mental functioning. Indeed, Dr. Ward's mental medical source statement mentioned that Claimant was only able to do work for his cousin because the cousin understood Claimant's limitations and accommodated them. (R. 687).
Accordingly, the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge from the evidence to her reasons for discounting Dr. Ward's opinion, and on remand, the ALJ should more thoroughly explain the weight given to Dr. Ward's opinion.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that Claimant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE-16] be ALLOWED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE-18] be DENIED, and the case be REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the Memorandum and Recommendation.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on each of the parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have until July 29, 2020 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C. Any response to objections shall be filed by within 14 days of the filing of the objections.
If a party does not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, the party will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, the party's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar the party from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
Submitted, this the 15th day of July 2020.
/s/_________
Robert B. Jones, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge