(See Manes v. Wiggins (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 756, 758 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 120]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 237, pp. 674-675; but see Mueller v. J.C. Penney Co., supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at pp. 719-722, fn. 8.) (14b) Even assuming arguendo, the appellate department resolved this issue of the constitutionality of section 1603 in reversing Rutherford's conviction, the trial court's refusal to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion is justified as to this predominately legal issue where a new determination is warranted in order to avoid the inequitable administration of the laws (Rest.2d, Judgments, § 28(2); Katz v. State Tax Assessor (Me. 1984) 472 A.2d 428, 431, fn. 3; City of Plainfield v. Public Service, Etc. (1980) 82 N.J. 245 [ 412 A.2d 759, 766]; Marsland v. Int. Soc. For Krishna Consc. (1983) 66 Haw. 119 [ 657 P.2d 1035, 1039]; Young v. Edwards (1973) 389 Mich. 333 [ 207 N.W.2d 126, 127]), and the inevitably adverse impact upon the public interest which itself demonstrates a convincing need for a new determination of the issue ( City of Plainfield v. Public Service, Etc., supra, 412 A.2d at p. 766; see Moore v. Panish, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 540, fn. 5; City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 230). The Restatement Second of Judgments section 28 pertinently provides: "Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances: . . . [¶] (2) The issue is one of law and . . . (b) a new determination is warranted in order to . . . avoid inequitable administration of the laws; or [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of

In Rogers I, the issue of whether the interest on the Man Roland debt was arbitrable was decided solely by the judge who determined the legal effect to be given the Settlement Agreement. Thus, the issue was a question of law and we must now inquire whether a new determination is warranted to avoid inequitable administration of the law. In Marsland v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 123, 657 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1983), the district court found the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) not guilty of violating a provision of the City and County of Honolulu Comprehensive Zoning Code (CZC); however, the circuit court subsequently held that ISKCON was in violation of the same provision. ISKCON argued that the district court's acquittal precluded relitigation in the second action. Id. at 123-124, 657 P.2d at 1038.

This court has explicitly adopted the reasoning of portions of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 with regard to exceptions to issue preclusion. See Marsland v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 124-25, 657 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (1983) (recognizing the Restatement exception to issue preclusion when "[t]he issue is one of law and . . . a new determination is warranted . . . to avoid inequitable administration of the laws"); Kaho'ohanohano v. Dep't of Human Servs., 117 Hawai'i 262, 303-05, 178 P.3d 538, 579-81 (2008) (determining that the Restatement exception regarding a "potential adverse impact of the determination on the public interest [,]" or "because the party sought to be precluded . . . did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain full and fair adjudication in the initial action" did not apply to the facts of the case). Finally, we address the ICA's holding that it does not have jurisdiction after remand to review an order entered by a bankruptcy court based on the proposition that bankruptcy courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and, accordingly, that "bankruptcy court orders are not subject to collateral attack in other courts."

"Collateral estoppel is an aspect of res judicata which precludes the relitigation of a fact or issue which was previously determined in a prior suit on a different claim between the same parties or their privies." Marsland v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 124, 657 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1983) (citation omitted). In order to establish a claim of collateral estoppel, the party asserting the claim has the burden of establishing that:

This assumption was patently unreasonable. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) (observing that "an acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt" and that a jury's verdict acquitting a defendant "in [a] criminal action d[oes] not negate the possibility that a preponderance of the evidence could show" that the defendant had engaged in the activity for which he or she was criminally prosecuted and, thus, holding that "the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel); accord State v. Tuipuapua, 83 Hawai`i 141, 152 n. 27, 925 P.2d 311, 322 n. 27 (1996) (observing that HRS § 712A-11 (1993) "provides that '[a]n acquittal or dismissal in a criminal proceeding shall not preclude civil proceedings under this chapter'" (emphasis omitted));Marsland v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 125-26, 657 P.2d 1035, 1039-40 (1983) (agreeing with other courts that had addressed the issue sub judice and holding that "an acquittal in a criminal prosecution for violation of a zoning ordinance is notresjudicata in a civil proceeding for the enforcement of the zoning ordinance"); and Mew Sun Leong v. Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., Ltd, 42 Haw. 138, 144, 472 P.2d 505, 509 (1970) (observing that "[t]he fact that [a civil defendant] was acquitted in the criminal proceedings (brought against him in connection with the accident [that was the basis of the civil proceeding]) is not admissible in evidence, nor should [it] be mentioned by counsel to the jury"). On the basis of its unreasonable assumption, the DOE believed that any further investigation that it might undertake was without purpose or justification and, thus, summarily reinstated Norton without conducting any further inquiry into the matter.

Collateral estoppel has been defined by this court as "an aspect ofres judicata which precludes the relitigation of a fact or issue which was previously determined in a prior suit on a different claim between the same parties or their privies." Marsland v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 124, 657 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1983). To successfully establish that AIG was estopped from relitigating issues, Flores had the burden of establishing that:

Further support is found in more recent cases from other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Hawaii found the use of a two-story residence and smaller buildings on the premises qualified as a church within the meaning of a zoning ordinance, when the use of the buildings included daily religious ceremonies, prayers, lectures, and a public feast held each Sunday. Marsland v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 657 P.2d 1035 (1983). In Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 17 Conn. App. 53, 549 A.2d 1076 (1988), construction of a convent and chapel in conjunction with a religious book and audiovisual center was held to constitute a use as a church within the meaning of the applicable zoning restriction.

In so holding, we join the many jurisdictions which have cited Restatement (Second) § 28(2)(b) with approval. See Brock v. Williams Enter. of Ga., Inc., 832 F.2d 567, 574 (11th Cir. 1987); Stewart v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 730 F.2d 1552, 1557 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834, 105 S.Ct. 127, 83 L.Ed.2d 68 (1984); Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 718 F.2d 533, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1983); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 476 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1983); Segal v. American Tel. Telegraph, Co., 606 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1979); Rutherford v. State, 188 Cal.App.3d 1267, 1283-84, 233 Cal.Rptr. 781, 789-90 (1987); Marsland v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 657 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1983), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 805, 104 S.Ct. 52, 78 L.Ed.2d 72 (1983); State v. Anderson, 338 N.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Iowa 1983); Settle by and through Sullivan v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288, 292 (1983); Katz v. State Tax Assessor, 472 A.2d 428, 431 n. 3 (Maine 1984); Riley v. Northland Geriatric Center, 425 Mich. 668, 391 N.W.2d 331, 340 (1986); Young v. Edwards, 389 Mich. 333, 207 N.W.2d 126, 127-28 (1973); Fielder v. Fielder, 671 S.W.2d 408, 411-12 (Mo. App. 1984); In re Estate of Biddle, 487 Pa. 616, 410 A.2d 782, 786 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. DeCosta v. DeCosta, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 84, 66 L.Ed.2d 27 (1980); Keystone Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 81 Pa. Commw. 312, 474 A.2d 368, 372-73 (1984); Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 215-16 (Wyo. 1984). Our conclusion that issue preclusion does not apply here is consistent with the rule's traditional purpose.

We note that other courts have recognized that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may not be invoked when adherence to the prior decision through preclusion of the issue as a matter of law results in inequitable administration of the law. See Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 147, 99 S.Ct. at 970; Marsland v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Hawaii, 657 P.2d 1035 (1983); City of Plainfield v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, supra; Torres v. Village of Capitan, 92 N.M. 64, 582 P.2d 1277 (1978); and Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 28(2) and comment (c), § 29(7), and § 29(8) (1982). Still other courts have denied any preclusive effect to judgments which are inconsistent or ambiguous. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Henderson v. Bardahl International Corporation, supra. Preclusion also has been denied in instances in which the judgment relied upon was rendered in circumstances indicating that it was the product of a compromise.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, "precludes the relitigation of a fact or issue which was previously determined in a prior suit in a different claim between the same parties or their privies[, or] . . . [the] relitigation of facts or issues previously determined when it is raised defensively by one not a party in a prior suit against one who was a party in that suit and who himself raised and litigated the fact or issue."Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 55-56, 451 P.2d 814, 822 (1969) (citations omitted). See also Marsland v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 124, 657 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (1983); Santos v. State, 64 Haw. 648, 652-53, 646 P.2d 962, 965-66 (1982); Silver v. Queen's Hosp., 63 Haw. 430, 435-36, 629 P.2d 1116, 1121-22 (1981); Morneau v. Stark Enters., Ltd., 56 Haw. 420, 422-23, 539 P.2d 472, 474-75 (1975). Collateral estoppel may also be used offensively.