However, the Sund court declared: "The weight of authority inclines to the view that surface water, which has joined the course of a stream and has become subject to its current, ceases to possess the characteristics of diffused or vagrant surface waters and becomes part of the stream." Sund, 43 Wn.2d at 42; accord Halverson, 139 Wn.2d at 14-15; Marshland Flood Control Dist. of Snohomish County v. Great N. Ry., 71 Wn.2d 365, 369-70, 428 P.2d 531 (1967). Under the facts in Sund, the court held that the law of riparian water imposed liability to a landowner whose excavation near the bank of a stream caused the stream to change its course.
Although early Washington cases applying the common enemy doctrine broadly classified floodwaters as surface waters, Harvey, 63 Wn. at 674-76; Cass, 14 Wn. at 78, later cases have modified this broad statement. See Sund v. Keating, 43 Wn.2d 36, 42-46, 259 P.2d 1113 (1953); see also Marshland Flood Control Dist. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 71 Wn.2d 365, 428 P.2d 531 (1967). Sund held that floodwaters still flowing within a defined "flood channel" cannot be diverted out of the channel without incurring liability for resulting damages, thus, partially limiting those earlier cases which classified any floodwaters as surface waters.
The "common enemy" element of the doctrine stems from the idea that surface water "is regarded as an outlaw and a common enemy against which anyone may defend himself; if damages thereby result to another, it is damnum absque injuria." Marshland Flood Control Dist. v. Great N. Ry., 71 Wn.2d 365, 369, 428 P.2d 531 (1967). Surface waters are ordinarily those "vagrant or diffused waters produced by rain, melting snow, or springs."
Liability for damages is not limited to the property appropriated, but also includes injury to the remainder of the property not actually taken or damaged. See Marshland Flood Control Dist. v. Great Northern Ry., 71 Wn.2d 365, 428 P.2d 531 (1967). [3] The City's argument that B W failed to prove injury to its property appears to boil down to a contention that there was insufficient evidence to support certain factual assumptions made by John F. Boucher, a real estate appraiser whose opinions were essential to plaintiff's proof of damages.
Indeed, they remained within the confines of the flood channel which was designed to accommodate overflow from Ward's Lake. Accordingly, we must consider that both Wilber and Western were riparian owners along a drainway. Marshland Flood Control Dist. v. Great Northern Ry., 71 Wn.2d 365, 428 P.2d 531 (1967); Ronkosky v. Tacoma, 71 Wn. 148, 128 P. 2 (1912). Before reviewing the applicable law, we should dispose of Wilber's cross-appeal from Tacoma's dismissal of all liability.