Summary
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all federal claims
Summary of this case from Franklin v. City of SlidellOpinion
CIVIL ACTION No: 01-1576 SECTION: "J" (5)
May 22, 2002
MINUTE ENTRY
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 17) filed by defendants Lance Williams and Harry Lee, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson Parish. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on Wednesday, May 22, 2002, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument.
BACKGROUND
The factual recitation is a synthesis of facts as alleged by plaintiff in her Complaint, and as set forth by movants in their Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, which plaintiff did not traverse. Local Rule LR5G.2E requires that: "Each copy of the papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine issue to be tried. All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless controverted as required by this rule."
On May 27, 2000, plaintiff went to the Harvey, Louisiana Wal-Mart to exchange merchandise she had purchased there a few days earlier. In the course of the exchange, she became involved in an argument with store personnel. When the conflict escalated, Wal-Mart employees called on the services of Deputy Lance Williams, a Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office deputy who was working a paid detail at the Harvey Wal-Mart.
Deputy Williams arrested Marshall and placed her in handcuffs. She was charged with criminal trespass, resisting an officer and disturbing the peace. Following a trial on August 22, 2001, Marshall was found guilty of disturbing the peace in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 14, section 103. That conviction has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed suit against movants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and excessive force. She has also alleged state law damages against Wal-Mart and its employee, Ron Hamilton. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that this action must be DISMISSED.
DISCUSSION
1. False Arrest claim
Despite the fact that plaintiff's May 27, 2000 arrest was vindicated by her conviction for disturbing the peace on August 22, 2001, plaintiff maintains that movants are liable to her under § 1983 for false arrest. However, as the Supreme Court has prescribed, if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of [her] conviction or sentence . . .the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 113 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994)
In this case, plaintiff's conviction has not been reversed or otherwise declared invalid. Thus, the only way that plaintiff can prevail on her false arrest claim would be for this Court to determine that her state law conviction was invalid. Accordingly, under Heck v. Humphrey, this claim must fail.
2. Excessive Force claim
Plaintiff's factual allegations in support of her excessive force claim are as follows: "Defendant Williams then arrested plaintiff, forcibly handcuffing her in front of her family; and booked her accordingly." Complaint, ¶ 5. "As a result of the wrongful conduct of defendant Williams, plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer painful and disabling injuries to her wrists, hands, and arms. These injuries require painful and costly medical treatment and physical therapy." Id., ¶ 6.
Thus, plaintiff's sole allegation concerning the nature of the "excessive force" used against her is that she was handcuffed at the scene of her Wal-Mart arrest. As the Fifth Circuit has recently held, "hand cuffing tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive force."Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, based on the controlling law in this Circuit, plaintiff has failed to state an excessive force claim under § 1983.
3. State law claims
Plaintiff's state law claims are presently before the Court by virtue of this Court's pendent, or supplemental, jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides in part that federal "district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] claim . . . if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. . . ." As the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court have held, the "justification for pendent jurisdiction lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to them." Guzzino v. Felterman, 191 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (1966)).
Because by the instant order all federal claims will have been dismissed, and because no other justification stemming from judicial economy concerns or issues of convenience or fairness to litigants is present, the Court finds that it should not needlessly make decisions concerning state law, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 17) filed by Lance Williams and Harry Lee, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson Parish should be and is hereby GRANTED, and plaintiff's § 1983 claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's state law claims are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)