See Antonio Gidi, "Class Actions in Brazil — A Model for Civil Law Countries," 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 311, 384-86 and n. 233 (2003). Nor whether, though under federal law Illinois's law of collateral estoppel would determine the preclusive effect of a federal judgment rendered in a diversity case governed by Illinois substantive law, see Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508-09, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001); Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2001); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 120-21 (Minn.App. 2001); In re Armstrong, 294 B.R. 344, 357-58 (10th Cir. BAP 2003), Brazil has a similar rule. If it does not, or if, as Professor Gidi suggests, Brazil does not have a doctrine of collateral estoppel, Case Brasil may have little to fear from the outcome of the present litigation. There is another point that the district judge did not address, and that is the significance of the fact that Case Brasil is a wholly owned subsidiary of Case. Even so, because Extra does not argue that Case Brasil is an alter ego of Case, it will be treated by the law for most purposes as an independent entity.

, this issue was not “necessary and essential” to the resulting judgment, which found the “John Doe” semi-truck driver negligent and the sole cause of the accident. See Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837; see also Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 121 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001). Once all fault was assessed to that unidentified semi-truck driver, the jury's “school-activity” finding became unessential, and neither defendant to the state-court action had any incentive to appeal the verdict in their favor.

See Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 129 Nev. 15, 17, 293 P.3d 869, 870 (2013)(“When the federal court decides a case under its diversity jurisdiction, we recognize that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 . . . (2001), governs the treatment of claim and issue preclusion.”); Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824, 841 (Del. 2018)(recognizing that, if the original complaint was brought under a district court's diversity jurisdiction, the preclusion law of the State in which the diversity court sits would apply); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 120-21 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001)(applying Semtek to issue preclusion, “[b]ecause the Semtek holding rests on the constitutional obligation of state courts to respect federal judgments . . . federalism principles apply equally to claim preclusion and issue preclusion”). RELEVANT NEW MEXICO LAW REGARDING ISSUE PRECLUSION (“COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL”)

Similarly, courts applying Semtek have held that in determining whether a judgment by a federal court sitting in diversity has res judicata effect, a subsequent court must look to the state res judicata rules of the state in which the court that made the judgment sits. See, e.g., Gulf Mach. Sales Eng'g v. Hublein, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (applying Mississippi law to determine the preclusive effect of "the Mississippi federal district court's statute-of-limitations dismissal of the contract-related claims"); Smolensky v. McDaniel, 144 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614-15 (E.D. La. 2001) (stating that "when a court must decide the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by a federal court in a diversity case, the federal common law of res judicata requires the deciding court to adopt the claim-preclusive rules of the forum state that provided the substantive rules of decision in the first action") (emphasis in original); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W. 2d 113, 119 (Minn.App. 2001) (holding that under Semtek, Wisconsin law applied to determine whether previous Wisconsin judgment had res judicata effect on subsequent Minnesota action).

Accordingly, we join other state and federal courts in concluding that the Semtek claim preclusion rule applies to issue preclusion as well.For examples of state courts extending the claim preclusion choice-of-law analysis to issue preclusion, see Garcia v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 129 Nev. 15, 293 P.3d 869, 872 (2013) (reasoning that Semtek applied to issue preclusion because Taylor discussed Semtek "in light of issues regarding both claim and issue preclusion"), and Marshall v Inn on Madeline Island, 631 NW 2d 113, 120-21 (Minn, Ct. App. 2001) (extending the Semtek rule to issue preclusion claims because "the Semtek holding rests on the constitutional obligation of state courts to respect federal judgments" and "federalism principles apply equally to claim preclusion and issue preclusion"), For examples of federal courts extending the claim preclusion choice-of-law analysis to issue preclusion, see Taco Bell Corp.v. TBWA Chiat/Day Inc., 552 F.3d 1137, 1144-46 (9th Cir. 2009), NAS Electronics, Inc. v. Transtech Electronics PTE Ltd., 262 F. Supp. 2d 134, 143-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), and Cannonv. Armstrong Containers Inc., 92 F.4th 688, 706 (7th Cir. 2024).

For examples of state courts extending the claim preclusion choice-of-law analysis to issue preclusion, see Garcia v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 293 P.3d 869, 872 (Nev. 2013) (reasoning that Semtek applied to issue preclusion because Taylor discussed Semtek "in light of issues regarding both claim and issue preclusion"), and Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 120-21 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001) (extending the Semtek rule to issue preclusion claims because "the Semtek holding rests on the constitutional obligation of state courts to respect federal judgments" and "federalism principles apply equally to claim preclusion and issue preclusion"). For examples of federal courts extending the claim preclusion choice-of-law analysis to issue preclusion, see Taco Bell Corp. v. TBWA Chiat/Day Inc., 552 F.3d 1137, 1144-46 (9th Cir. 2009), NAS Electronics, Inc. v. Transtech Electronics PTE Ltd., 262 F.Supp.2d 134, 143-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), and Cannon v. Armstrong Containers Inc., 92 F.4th 688, 706 (7th Cir. 2024).

The district court stated "[appellant's] argument that the issuance of a B-card to [appellant] by the Commissioner violated the [ADA] has already been litigated in federal court where [appellant]'s claims were dismissed." In general, collateral estoppel applies even though the previous case was litigated in federal court. Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 121 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001).

1977). Collateral estoppel applies even though the previous case was litigated in federal court. Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 121 (Minn.App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001).

Applying the doctrine of res judicata in state appellate court to a prior federal court decision is proper. See Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 119-20 (Minn. App. 2001) (applying res judicata analysis), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001).

Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in a prior action and essential to the resulting judgment. Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 631 N.W.2d 113, 120 (Minn.App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001).