Marshall v. State

8 Citing cases

  1. Marshall v. State

    291 Md. 205 (Md. 1981)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that "[it] is a far more prudent practice for the judge to allow counsel to clear up disputed points on cross-examination, unassisted by the court. In this manner, the judge is most likely to preserve his role as an impartial arbiter, because he avoids the appearance of acting as an advocate."

    Marshall appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980). The Court granted Marshall's petition for certiorari.

  2. Marshall v. State

    289 Md. 737 (Md. 1981)

    Decided January 19, 1981 Pet. Docket No. 422 Petition granted January 19, 1981. Opinion of Court of Special Appeals reported: 46 Md. App. 695.

  3. Johnson v. State

    No. 0025-2020 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jun. 3, 2021)

    We held the trial court's admonishments were proper, stating that "the court below acted only to insure that the witness testified truthfully." Marshall v.State, 46 Md.App. 695, 701 (1980), rev'd, 291 Md. 205 (1981). However, the Court of Appeals reversed us, holding that:

  4. Johnson v. State

    No. 0025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jun. 3, 2021)

    We held the trial court's admonishments were proper, stating that "the court below acted only to insure that the witness testified truthfully." Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 701 (1980), rev'd, 291 Md. 205 (1981). However, the Court of Appeals reversed us, holding that:

  5. Passamichali v. State

    81 Md. App. 731 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)   Cited 20 times
    In Passamichali, the appellant challenged on appeal the constitutionality of Md. Code (1973), § 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides that prior convictions of infamous crimes are per se admissible.

    We agree and hold that the State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that a trial is a search for truth and that Section 10-905(a) is neither an arbitrary nor disproportionate restriction on appellant's right to testify and right to a fair trial. Because appellant was not aware of Nance prior to oral argument, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he pointed out that a criminal defendant's right to testify on his or her behalf was not recognized until 1980, 11 years after Nance, in Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 702, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 291 Md. 205, 434 A.2d 555 (1981) and later in Mayfield v. State, 56 Md. App. 541, 468 A.2d 400 (1983). The conclusion that follows, according to appellant, is that at the time of our Nance "the constitutional right to testify had not been recognized in this State and could not have been addressed by" this Court in Nance.

  6. Mayfield v. State

    56 Md. App. 541 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983)   Cited 6 times
    In Mayfield we held that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to permit a defendant who had waived his right to testify to re-open his case and give testimony in his defense.

    There is yet another reason why we might have held that the appellant's right to testify was wrongfully precluded, i.e., because the right to testify in one's own behalf has been characterized as a constitutional right. This Court so stated, albeit indirectly, in Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 702, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 291 Md. 205, 434 A.2d 555 (1981). Unquestionably, a fundamental element of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the right of an accused to present a defense, to present his own witnesses, and to offer his own testimony.

  7. Thomas v. State

    50 Md. App. 286 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)   Cited 16 times
    In Thomas v. State, 50 Md. App. 286, 437 A.2d 678 (1981), we upheld the sufficiency of a warrant against an allegation that where an eleven story complex was involved and appellant's name was not included, the warrant was too general.

    The court could have then exercised its discretion and denied the requested preliminary hearing. Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 697, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 291 Md. 205, 434 A.2d 555 (1981). V. Other Crimes Question

  8. Erman v. State

    49 Md. App. 605 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to exclude testimony of a witness, for an alleged sequestration violation, where "no impermissible harmonization of testimony could be inferred from [the witness's] reading of the newspaper, in the absence of any evidence that this testimony was based on what he read"

    In the absence of such requests, admonishment, or evidence of prejudice, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to exclude Katsus's testimony. Brown v. State, 272 Md. 450, 325 A.2d 557 (1974); Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980); Md. Rule 755 (d). (6) Sufficiency of the Evidence — Erman