Marshall appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980). The Court granted Marshall's petition for certiorari.
Decided January 19, 1981 Pet. Docket No. 422 Petition granted January 19, 1981. Opinion of Court of Special Appeals reported: 46 Md. App. 695.
We held the trial court's admonishments were proper, stating that "the court below acted only to insure that the witness testified truthfully." Marshall v.State, 46 Md.App. 695, 701 (1980), rev'd, 291 Md. 205 (1981). However, the Court of Appeals reversed us, holding that:
We held the trial court's admonishments were proper, stating that "the court below acted only to insure that the witness testified truthfully." Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 701 (1980), rev'd, 291 Md. 205 (1981). However, the Court of Appeals reversed us, holding that:
We agree and hold that the State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that a trial is a search for truth and that Section 10-905(a) is neither an arbitrary nor disproportionate restriction on appellant's right to testify and right to a fair trial. Because appellant was not aware of Nance prior to oral argument, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he pointed out that a criminal defendant's right to testify on his or her behalf was not recognized until 1980, 11 years after Nance, in Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 702, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 291 Md. 205, 434 A.2d 555 (1981) and later in Mayfield v. State, 56 Md. App. 541, 468 A.2d 400 (1983). The conclusion that follows, according to appellant, is that at the time of our Nance "the constitutional right to testify had not been recognized in this State and could not have been addressed by" this Court in Nance.
There is yet another reason why we might have held that the appellant's right to testify was wrongfully precluded, i.e., because the right to testify in one's own behalf has been characterized as a constitutional right. This Court so stated, albeit indirectly, in Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 702, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 291 Md. 205, 434 A.2d 555 (1981). Unquestionably, a fundamental element of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the right of an accused to present a defense, to present his own witnesses, and to offer his own testimony.
The court could have then exercised its discretion and denied the requested preliminary hearing. Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 697, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 291 Md. 205, 434 A.2d 555 (1981). V. Other Crimes Question
In the absence of such requests, admonishment, or evidence of prejudice, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to exclude Katsus's testimony. Brown v. State, 272 Md. 450, 325 A.2d 557 (1974); Marshall v. State, 46 Md. App. 695, 420 A.2d 1266 (1980); Md. Rule 755 (d). (6) Sufficiency of the Evidence — Erman