Marshall v. State

3 Citing cases

  1. Bly v. State

    283 Ga. 453 (Ga. 2008)   Cited 21 times
    Reviewing bolstering testimony "within its context," including strength of other evidence of guilt and that the testimony was "deliberate" and witness "never retreated from the bolstering testimony," to determine that its admission was not harmless error

    Contrary to the State's argument, the cases on which it relies do not support an opposite conclusion inasmuch as they involved opinions based on matters personally observed by the testifying officer. E.g., Marshall v. State, 270 Ga. App. 663 ( 607 SE2d 258) (2004) (experienced officers involved in arrest could give opinion that packaging of marijuana discovered in car was consistent with preparing it for sale); Grant v. State, 195 Ga. App. 463 (1) ( 393 SE2d 737) (1990) (officer, based on professional experience and personal observation of intoxicated driver, could testify whether driver was less safe to drive); Owens v. State, 161 Ga. App. 184 ( 288 SE2d 262) (1982) (officer who personally interrogated defendant authorized to give opinion whether statement was knowingly and voluntarily made). Equally distinguishable are cases involving expert testimony by officers regarding their analyses of physical evidence, e.g., Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 731 (2) ( 620 SE2d 816) (2005) (blood spatter); Bacon v. State, 178 Ga. App. 546 (2) ( 343 SE2d 774) (1986) (accident reconstruction), because Harvey's opinion as to the propriety of Hawk's behavior was derived solely from his interviews with the witnesses for the State and the tran

  2. Florence v. State

    282 Ga. App. 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 5 times

    ]" Kimbrough v. State, 215 Ga. App. 303 (1) ( 450 SE2d 457) (1994). An officer's opinion as to whether the amount of contraband found was for distribution or sale has been found repeatedly to be sufficient. See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 270 Ga. App. 663 ( 607 SE2d 258) (2004); Livingston v. State, 221 Ga. App. 630, 631 (1) ( 472 SE2d 163) (1996). And this is true even in cases where no drug paraphernalia, baggies, or large amounts of cash were also found. See, e.g., Barrow v. State, 269 Ga. App. 635, 636 (1) ( 605 SE2d 67) (2004); Howard v. State, 262 Ga. App. 198, 199 (1) ( 585 SE2d 164) (2003).

  3. Copeland v. State

    273 Ga. App. 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 26 times
    Explaining that “[w]here the State seeks to establish probable cause with information from an unidentified source, the informant's veracity and basis of knowledge are major considerations in the probable cause analysis” (punctuation omitted)

    Lieutenant Carroll testified that he charged Copeland with possession with intent to distribute based on the amount of cocaine in Copeland's pocket, the electronic scale, items containing a white residue, the baggies, and the large amount of cash in multiple denominations. See Marshall v. State, 270 Ga. App. 663 ( 607 SE2d 258) (2004). See id.