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Marshall v. Soares

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Apr 12, 2012
94 A.D.3d 1258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

Opinion

2012-04-12

In the Matter of Eddie MARSHALL, Appellant, v. David SOARES, as District Attorney of Albany County, Respondent.

Eddie Marshall, Dannemora, appellant pro se. Craig A. Denning, County Attorney, Albany (John E. Maney of counsel), for respondent.


Eddie Marshall, Dannemora, appellant pro se. Craig A. Denning, County Attorney, Albany (John E. Maney of counsel), for respondent.

Before: MERCURE, J.P., ROSE, MALONE JR. and GARRY, JJ.

MERCURE, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McNamara, J.), entered February 18, 2011 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to compel respondent to return certain money seized in the course of a prior criminal investigation.

In the course of an investigation into petitioner's involvement in the narcotics trade, the City of Albany Police Department executed a search warrant and seized numerous items from his residence, including over $25,000 in cash. Petitioner was thereafter convicted of multiple drug-related offenses and, while we affirmed that conviction upon appeal, we expressly found that currency lay beyond the warrant's scope and was not “a permissible item to be seized” ( People v. Marshall, 57 A.D.3d 1163, 1165, 869 N.Y.S.2d 652 [2008]; see People v. Marshall, 65 A.D.3d 710, 884 N.Y.S.2d 494 [2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 940, 895 N.Y.S.2d 330, 922 N.E.2d 919 [2010] ). Petitioner then demanded that respondent return the seized monies, and this CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued when respondent did not do so. Respondent served an answer, in which he indicated that the funds previously had been turned over to the United States Department of Justice pursuant to court order ( see 21 USC § 881; CPL 690.55). Supreme Court dismissed the petition as moot, and petitioner now appeals.

We affirm. While this CPLR article 78 proceeding was an appropriate vehicle for petitioner to seek the return of his property ( see Boyle v. Kelley, 42 N.Y.2d 88, 91, 396 N.Y.S.2d 834, 365 N.E.2d 866 [1977]; Matter of Caggiano v. Frank, 44 A.D.2d 828, 355 N.Y.S.2d 170 [1974] ), Supreme Court nevertheless properly dismissed it. The transfer of the seized monies to federal authorities terminated any control that respondent had over them and, as such, the present dispute is moot ( see Public Serv. Commn. v. International Ry. Co., 224 N.Y. 631, 631–632, 120 N.E. 727 [1918]; Matter of Daily News v. Teresi, 275 A.D.2d 812, 813, 712 N.Y.S.2d 704 [2000]; Matter of Kimball v. Luyster, 196 App.Div. 679, 680–681, 188 N.Y.S. 97 [1921] ). Moreover, the issues presented herein do not typically evade review ( see e.g. Matter of DeBellis v. Property Clerk of City of N.Y., 79 N.Y.2d 49, 58–59, 580 N.Y.S.2d 157, 588 N.E.2d 55 [1992]; Matter of Lipscomb v. Property Clerk of City of Newburgh Police Dept., 188 A.D.2d 993, 993–994, 592 N.Y.S.2d 96 [1992]; Matter of Caggiano v. Frank, 44 A.D.2d at 828, 355 N.Y.S.2d 170) and, therefore, we reject petitioner's argument that this case falls within the narrow exception to the mootness doctrine ( see generally Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714–715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980] ).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

ROSE, MALONE JR. and GARRY, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Marshall v. Soares

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Apr 12, 2012
94 A.D.3d 1258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
Case details for

Marshall v. Soares

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of Eddie MARSHALL, Appellant, v. David SOARES, as District…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Date published: Apr 12, 2012

Citations

94 A.D.3d 1258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
941 N.Y.S.2d 894
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 2732

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