Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc.

8 Citing cases

  1. Marshall v. Van Matre

    634 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1980)   Cited 33 times
    Recommending "injunctive relief, even if the employer is in present compliance, unless the district court is soundly convinced that there is no reasonable probability of a recurrence of the violations"

    The trial court's belief that the employer desires to comply with the Act in the future might not be sufficient reason to deny the injunction.Brennan v. Correa, 513 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (child labor provisions) (footnote and citations omitted); see Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 519 (8th Cir. 1979) (child labor provisions), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 3013, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1980); Goldberg v. Kickapoo Prairie Broadcasting Co., 288 F.2d 778, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1961) (minimum wage, overtime compensation and recordkeeping provisions). Where the Secretary has established violations of the Act, the district court should ordinarily grant injunctive relief, even if the employer is in present compliance, unless the district court is soundly convinced that there is no reasonable probability of a recurrence of the violations.

  2. Martin v. Funtime, Inc.

    963 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1992)   Cited 51 times
    Affirming admissibility of personnel files as business records under Rule 803

    Id. Furthermore, the court must look at evidence of current compliance; however, "current compliance alone, particularly when achieved by direct scrutiny of government, is not a sufficient ground for denying injunctive relief." Big Bear, 825 F.2d at 1383 (citing Dunlop, 524 F.2d at 1281); Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 519 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922, 100 S.Ct. 3013, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1980). Appellant argues that the injunction was improper because Funtime had taken "substantial steps to prevent child labor violations" and that it promised to "eliminate future violations through the imposition of additional, significant procedures" demonstrating "the likelihood of future compliance."

  3. Brock v. Big Bear Market No. 3

    825 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1987)   Cited 46 times
    Holding that a district court's discretion is not "unbridled" and that it must weigh finding of violation against factors indicating reasonable likelihood that violations will not recur, such as intent to comply, extraordinary efforts to prevent recurrence, absence of repetitive violations, and absence of bad faith

    A district court should, in considering whether to grant an injunction, look at evidence of current compliance, especially if compliance has continued for a long period of time. But current compliance alone, particularly when achieved by direct scrutiny of the government, is not sufficient ground for denying injunctive relief. Davis, 524 F.2d at 1281; see also Chala, 645 F.2d at 804 ("present compliance is only one of the factors relevant to the exercise of an informed judicial discretion to determine whether an injunction against future violations is appropriate") (quoting Wirtz v. Milton J. Wershow Co., 416 F.2d 1071, 1072 (9th Cir. 1969)); Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 519 (8th Cir. 1979) (though employer in present compliance, presence of other factors support issuance of injunction), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922, 100 S.Ct. 3013, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1980). In deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, a district court must weigh the finding of violations against factors that indicate a reasonable likelihood that the violations will not recur. A dependable, bona fide intent to comply, or good faith coupled with extraordinary efforts to prevent recurrence, are such appropriate factors.

  4. Marshall v. Truman Arnold Dist. Co., Inc.

    640 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1981)   Cited 29 times
    Finding that, while the district court did not err in its holding, the factual determination was "a close one" when the plaintiff "hired, supervised, trained, kept time on, and paid employees to work for him at the station he leased," while "perform[ing] other managerial duties, including bookkeeping, and order[ing] various sundry items"

    See Marshall v. Van Matre, 634 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1980); Tobin v. Anthony-Williams Manufacturing Co., supra, 196 F.2d at 551. See also Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 519 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922, 100 S.Ct. 3013, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1980). Should Truman Arnold attempt to circumvent the injunction rendered against the company, the Secretary will be free to seek an injunction against Arnold personally.

  5. Hugler v. Legend of Asia, LLC

    No. 4:16-CV-00549-DGK (W.D. Mo. Jun. 22, 2017)

    A district court does not abuse its discretion by granting an injunction even when the employer is in present compliance. See Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 519-20 (8th Cir. 1979) (remanding for district court to issue an injunction even though employer was in present compliance); McComb v. Wyandotte Furniture Co., 169 F.2d 766, 770 (8th Cir. 1948) (same). "Where the Secretary has established violations of the [FLSA], the district court should ordinarily grant injunctive relief, even if the employer is in present compliance, unless the district court is soundly convinced that there is no reasonable probability of a recurrence of the violations."

  6. McLaughlin v. McGee Bros. Co., Inc.

    681 F. Supp. 1117 (W.D.N.C. 1988)   Cited 16 times
    Holding an employer's incomplete calculation of its employees' regular rate — the employer omitted their monthly production bonuses — to be a violation of the FLSA's overtime provision

    Other courts have similarly not hesitated to enter injunctions restraining child labor violations. E.g., Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 519 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922, 100 S.Ct. 3013, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1980); Goldberg v. Fritschy, supra, 198 F. Supp. 743; Lenroot v. Kemp, supra, 153 F.2d 153; Gulf King Shrimp v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 516 (5th Cir. 1969). In view of Defendants' continued violations, despite the entry of the Preliminary Injunction specifically prohibiting such conduct, the issuance of a permanent injunction is clearly mandated.

  7. U.S. v. Hopkins Dodge Sales, Inc.

    661 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Minn. 1987)   Cited 1 times

    SEC v. First Amer. Bank and Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673, 681-82 (8th Cir. 1973); FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (D.Minn. 1985). Because defendants' minimal measures for ensuring compliance have failed to prevent violations, thus making defendants' promises of future compliance undependable, a permanent injunction is required in order to accomplish the objectives of TILA and Regulation Z, Brennan v. Correa, 513 F.2d 161, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1975), particularly where, as here, the constant policing by the FTC has proven to be unsuccessful in preventing violations, Marshall v. Lane Processors, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1979). The absence of current violations does not rebut the inference, from past violations, that future violations are reasonably likely.

  8. Donovan v. Elca of N.H., Inc.

    615 F. Supp. 106 (D.N.H. 1984)   Cited 1 times

    In determining whether to enjoin an employer from further violation of the Child Labor provisions of FLSA, a Court must exercise its discretion to accomplish the statutory objective of the abolition of oppressive child labor, and in so proceeding, a fundamental criterion in making such determination is previous noncompliance on the part of the employer. Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 319 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922, 100 S.CS. 3013, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1980). Accordingly, within ten days of receipt of this Order, counsel for plaintiff shall prepare and forward to the Court for execution an order of judgment for the injunctive relief hereinafter sought.