Opinion
No. 3:03-CV-0847-P.
July 14, 2003.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:
I. BACKGROUND
On April 23, 2003, plaintiff filed this unspecified civil action against the City of Dallas. His entire complaint states "False Imprisonment / False Arrest — 1995." (Compl. at 1.) In answer to a Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire (MJQ), he states that murder charges were filed against him in 1995, and that on August 8, 1996, he "was found `Not Guilty'." ( See Answer to Question 1 of MJQ.) No process has been issued in this case.
Plaintiff's answers to the questions posed by the Court constitute an amendment to the filed complaint. See Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING
The Court has permitted plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. His complaint is thus subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). That section provides for sua sponte dismissal, if the Court finds the complaint "frivolous or malicious" or if it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A claim is frivolous, if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Smith v. Winter, 782 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1986); Henrise v. Horvath, 94 F. Supp.2d 768, 769 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Although plaintiff has not specified the jurisdictional basis for the instant action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 governs complaints relating to claims of false arrest and imprisonment. That statute "provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's `rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id.
In this instance, the alleged acts upon which the instant litigation is based occurred in 1995 and 1996. The lengthy delay between the date of the alleged acts and the date plaintiff filed the instant action in April 2003 prompts consideration of the timeliness of the instant action. "Where it is clear from the face of a complaint filed in forma pauperis that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, those claims are properly dismissed," pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court "may raise the defense of limitations sua sponte." Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999).
"The statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 820 (2001). In view of Texas' two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, plaintiff "had two years to file suit from the date" that his § 1983 claims (false arrest and imprisonment) accrued. Id.; see also, Hatchet v. Nettles, 201 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 2000).
Accrual of a § 1983 claim is governed by federal law:
Under federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run `the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured.' A plaintiff's awareness encompasses two elements: `(1) The existence of the injury; and (2) causation, that is, the connection between the injury and the defendant's actions.' A plaintiff need not know that she has a legal cause of action; she need know only the facts that would ultimately support a claim. Actual knowledge is not required `if the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to investigate further.'Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (citations omitted). In other words, "[t]he cause of action accrues, so that the statutory period begins to run, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998).
In this instance, plaintiff's claims fall well outside the applicable statutes of limitation. Plaintiff's complaint, as supplemented by his answers to the MJQ, establishes that he knew the facts that form the basis for his false arrest and imprisonment on August 8, 1996, when the jury acquitted him of the murder charges. However, plaintiff did not file the instant suit until April 2003 — more than six years later. Because it appears that this action is time-barred, the Court may summarily dismiss the action as untimely. See Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that court may summarily dismiss the complaint filed in forma pauperis, if it is "clear" that claims asserted are barred by limitations).
If not tolled, limitations generally continue "to run until the suit is commenced by the filing of the plaintiff's complaint in the clerk's office." Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff filed the complaint after the applicable statutes of limitations had expired. Nothing indicates that the limitations periods should be tolled. Plaintiff asserts no basis for equitable tolling under Texas law. Furthermore, nothing indicates that such tolling is warranted. Consequently, plaintiff's claims should be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for the failure of plaintiff to file them within the statutory periods of limitations.
"Because the Texas statute of limitations is borrowed in § 1983 cases, Texas' equitable tolling principles also control." Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 1998).
IV. SANCTIONS
The Court possesses the inherent power "to protect the efficient and orderly administration of justice and . . . to command respect for the court's orders, judgments, procedures, and authority." In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898,902 (5th Cir. 1993). Included in such inherent power is "the power to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices." Id. Sanctions may be appropriate when a pro se litigant has a history of submitting multiple frivolous claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11; Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195-97 (5th Cir. 1993). Pro se litigants have "no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets." Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358,359 (5th Cir. 1986). "Abusers of the judicial process are not entitled to sue and appeal without paying the normal filing fees — indeed, are not entitled to sue and appeal, period. Abuses of process are not merely not to be subsidized; they are to be sanctioned." Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989).
Since April 23, 2003, plaintiff has filed five federal civil actions. See Marshall v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-0847-P (N.D. Tex. 2003) (Compl. filed Apr. 23, 2003, that alleges false arrest and imprisonment in 1995); Marshall v. City of Mesquite, No. 3:03-CV-0854-G (N.D. Tex. 2003) (Compl. filed Apr. 23, 2003, that alleges false arrest in 1999); Marshall v. Dallas Morning News, No. 3:03-CV-1172-G (N.D. Tex. 2003) (Compl. filed May 27, 2003, that alleges defamation in 1998); Marshall v. Dallas Morning News, No. 3:03-CV-1373-N (N.D. Tex. 2003) (Compl. filed June 19, 2003, that alleges defamation in 1998); Marshall v. City of Mesquite/Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-1508-G (N.D. Tex. 2003) (Compl. filed July 3, 2003, that alleges theft, false arrest, and false imprisonment). Including the instant case, it has been recommended that two of these cases be dismissed as frivolous. Another has been dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. In view of the quick succession of filings (some duplicative), it appears prudent to warn plaintiff that abuses of the litigation process may result in sanctions, up to an including monetary sanctions and the prohibition of filing future cases except by leave of court.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS plaintiff's claims with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) for failure of plaintiff to file them within the statutory period of limitations. It is further recommended that the District Court warn plaintiff that sanctions may be imposed for abusive litigation practices.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation on plaintiff by mailing a copy to him. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file and serve written objections within ten (10) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).