Marshall Huschart Co. v. Rev. Dept

5 Citing cases

  1. Federal-Bryant Machinery v. Rev. Dept

    241 N.E.2d 857 (Ill. 1968)   Cited 3 times
    In Federal-Bryant Machinery Co. v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill.2d 64, 241 N.E.2d 857, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a middleman is a retailer subject to the retailers' tax.

    Plaintiff guaranteed the credit of each prospective purchaser whose order plaintiff forwarded to the out-of-state manufacturer, and if the purchaser did not pay, plaintiff was obligated to, and did, pay the purchase price, less commission, to the manufacturer. The administrative hearing officer found that the transactions in question were sales to the plaintiff by the out-of-state manufacturers for resale by the plaintiff to the Illinois customers, and that the issues in this case were the same as those raised in Marshall Huschart Machinery Co. v. Department of Revenue (1960), 18 Ill.2d 496. He also found that the plaintiff's operations were the normal operating procedures of a seller, and that the addressing of purchase orders to plaintiff as agent was fictitious and done for the purpose of avoiding taxation under the Department's 1946 ruling which had been revoked. The circuit court affirmed.

  2. Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer

    2013 IL 115130 (Ill. 2013)   Cited 78 times   8 Legal Analyses

    Id. at 451–52, 100 N.E.2d 591. In determining whether the business of selling has taken place in the state, courts may look through the form of a putatively interstate transaction to its substance, in determining whether enough of the business of selling took place within the state to subject it to the retail occupation tax. Marshall & Huschart Machinery Co. v. Department of Revenue, 18 Ill.2d 496, 501, 165 N.E.2d 305 (1960). ¶ 32 In sum, there is a wealth of precedent that, under the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act, whether the taxable “business of selling” is being carried on requires a fact-intensive inquiry, to determine “each case according to the facts.”

  3. Young v. Hulman

    234 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. 1968)   Cited 4 times

    When considering the taxpayer's alternative contention relating to the tax liability demonstrated by the audit, we note that the Department of Revenue establishes a prima facie case that its assessment is correct by examining and correcting the taxpayer's return. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 120, par. 443; Novicki v. Department of Finance, 373 Ill. 342; Marshall Huschart Machinery Co. v. Department of Revenue, 18 Ill.2d 496.) "The taxpayer, thus, has the burden of proving by competent evidence that the proposed assessment is not correct, and when such evidence is not so inconsistent or improbable in itself as to be unworthy of belief, the burden then shifts to the Department which is required to prove its case by competent evidence. [Citations.

  4. Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer

    2012 Ill. App. 3d 110144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 4 times

    Under these circumstances, I would conclude that Hartney's situs for ROTs was the Forest View office. See Marshall & Huschart Machinery Co. v. Department of Revenue, 18 Ill.2d 496, 501–02, 165 N.E.2d 305 (1960) (ROT liability upheld where seller had merely created a complicated subterfuge to avoid the application of the ROT). In my opinion, the trial court erred in reaching the opposite conclusion.

  5. International-Stanley Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue

    352 N.E.2d 272 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 1 times

    The Illinois Supreme Court has looked beyond the form of an allegedly interstate transaction to find that it actually constituted an intrastate sale, taxable under the ROTA. In Marshall Huschart Machinery Co. v. Department of Revenue (1960), 18 Ill.2d 496, 165 N.E.2d 305, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820, 4 L.Ed.2d 1517, 80 S.Ct. 1259, and Federal-Bryant Machinery v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill.2d 64, 241 N.E.2d 857, the plaintiff corporations structured their sales so that they were ostensibly interstate in nature, thereby avoiding payment under ROTA in Illinois. Depending upon the actuality of the situation rather than the externalities of corporate activity, the Supreme Court held plaintiffs liable for payment of the tax.