In Gray v. State ex rel. Garrison, 231 Ala. 229, 231, 164 So. 293, 295 (1935), the Court held that a county commissioner's statutory duty to sign a warrant on appropriation for a public library was "a legal duty in which there was such public interest as warranted a proceeding by mandamus in the name of the state." And in Marshall County Board of Education v. State ex rel. Williams, 252 Ala. 547, 551, 42 So.2d 24, 27 (1949), the Court held that a petition for mandamus to a county board of education to compel its performance of a statutory duty to allow school enrollment only to students of a certain age "was for the enforcement of a public duty by respondents and, therefore ... was properly brought in the name of the State on the relation of the petitioners." Whereas in Rodgers the petitioner lacked standing to bring the action in his own name because he had no particularized injury (and he failed to invoke public standing through an on-relation action in the name of the State), in each of the other cases discussed above the relator properly invoked public standing.
50 Am.Jur., Statutes, ยง 27. A mandamus proceeding to compel a public officer to perform a legal duty in which the public has an interest, as distinguished from an official duty affecting a private interest merely, is properly brought in the name of the state on the relation of one or more persons interested in the performance of such duty to the public, but if the matter concerns the sovereign rights of the state, it must be instituted on the relation of the Attorney General. Code 1940, Tit. 13, ยง 198; Marshall Co. Bd. of Education v. State, 252 Ala. 547, 42 So.2d 24; Gray v. State, 231 Ala. 229, 164 So. 293; Kendrick v. State, 256 Ala. 206, 54 So.2d 442; Homan v. State, 265 Ala. 17, 89 So.2d 184; 14 Ala. Dig., Mandamus, 146, 147. COLEMAN, Justice.
See also State ex rel. Chilton County v. Butler, 225 Ala. 191, 142 So. 531. Where a right pertains to the sovereignty of the State, proceedings for the enforcement of such right are to be instituted by the Attorney General. We need but reiterate the oft-stated principle on this question: A mandamus proceeding to compel a public officer to perform a legal duty in which the public has an interest, as distinguished from an official duty, affecting a private interest merely, is properly brought in the name of the State on the relation of one or more persons interested in the performance of such duty to the public, unless the matter concerns the sovereign rights of the State, in which event it must be instituted on the relation of the Attorney General, the law officer of the State. Gray v. State, ex rel. Garrison, 231 Ala. 229(1), 164 So. 293, and cases cited; Marshall County Board of Education v. State ex rel. Williams, 252 Ala. 547(4), 42 So.2d 24; Kendrick v. State ex rel. Shoemaker, 256 Ala. 206 (4), 54 So.2d 442; Homan v. State of Alabama ex rel. Smith, 265 Ala. 17, 89 So.2d 184. We find no error in the rulings below.
In Estill, this court concluded that because the term "school year" and the term "school term" are used in different parts of the Alabama Code under the Teacher Tenure Act, the legislature intended the terms to have different meanings. The foregoing distinction between "school year" and "school term" is consistent with an earlier opinion of our Supreme Court, Marshall County Board of Education v. State, 252 Ala. 547, 42 So.2d 24 (1949), wherein the Supreme Court held that "school year" under ยง 298, tit. 52, Ala. Code 1940 (now ยง 16-28-4, Ala. Code 1975), meant "scholastic year" as defined under ยง 1, tit. 52, Ala. Code 1940 (now ยง 16-1-1). InMarshall County, the Supreme Court stated:
School years in Alabama run from July 1 to June 30. Id. ยง 16-1-1; Marshall County Board of Education v. State, 252 Ala. 547, 42 So.2d 24 (1949); Johnson v. Cain, 430 F. Supp. 518, 519 (N.D.Ala. 1977). Section 16-24-2 appears to plainly state that a teacher employed under contract as a teacher for three consecutive school years in the same school system who is thereafter reemployed in the same school system for the succeeding school year acquires continuing service status or tenure.
The plaintiff also contends, "that his termination occurred prior to the end of his yearly contract and the failure to afford him procedural protections violated his right to due process and equal protection." The testimony in this case shows that the original employment of the plaintiff by the defendants was effective September 1, 1971, and was for the remainder of the school year ending June 30, 1972. School years in Alabama run from July 1 to June 30. Section 1, tit. 52, Code of Alabama (1940 as recomp. 1958); Marshall County Board of Education v. State, 252 Ala. 547, 42 So.2d 24 (1949). It is expressly stated in the pretrial order that on May 31, 1974, the plaintiff was a nontenured teacher, and that on that date he received a letter from the defendants stating that his contract of employment would not be renewed for the school year commencing July 1, 1974. Therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to be given any reason for the nonrenewal of his contract, and was not entitled to a hearing on the action taken.
This statute is not " 'so incomplete, so conflicting, or so vague and indefinite that the court is unable, by the application of the accepted rules of construction, to determine what the legislature intended.' " Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 161, 313 So.2d 518, 523 (1975) (quoting Marshall County Board of Education v. State, 252 Ala. 547, 550, 42 So.2d 24, 26 (1949)). III. Conclusion
A court should declare a legislative enactment null and void for uncertainty in meaning where it is incomplete, vague, conflicting in provisions, or indefinite, so that the court is unable to determine what the legislature intended. Mims v. Blanton, 272 Ala. 457, 131 So.2d 861; Marshall County Board of Education v. State, 252 Ala. 547, 42 So.2d 24; Carter v. State, 243 Ala. 575, 11 So.2d 764. Zoning ordinances are in derogation of the Common Law and operate to deprive an owner of property or a use thereof which would otherwise be legal, and should be strictly construed in favor of the property owner so that the provisions of said zoning ordinance not be extended by implication. Murphy Motor Sales v. 1st National Bank, 122 Vt. 121, 165 A.2d 341, 82 A.L.R.2d 985; Little Rock v. Andes, 237 Ark 658, 375 S.W.2d 370; City of New Orleans v. Buffa, La. App., 69 So.2d 140; 101 C.J.S. Zoning ยง 129; Andersons Law of American Zoning, Section 12.02.
". . . to declare legislative enactments inoperative and void for uncertainty in meaning where they are so incomplete, so conflicting, or so vague and indefinite that the court is unable, by the application of the accepted rules of construction, to determine what the legislature intended. . . ." Marshall County Board of Education v. State, 252 Ala. 547, 550, 42 So.2d 24, 26 (1949). See also: Opinion by the Justices, 249 Ala. 88, 30 So.2d 14 (1947); Dewrell v. Kearley, 250 Ala. 18, 32 So.2d 812 (1947); and Mims v. Blanton, 272 Ala. 457, 131 So.2d 861 (1961).
The "six months following discovery" saving clause does not of itself render this four year provision a procedural period of limitation under the tort context here applicable for the reason that these two provisions can not be intermeshed without vagueness, indefiniteness and uncertainty. See Mims v. Blanton, 272 Ala. 457, 131 So.2d 861 (1961); Marshall County Board of Education v. State, 252 Ala. 547, 42 So.2d 24 (1949); Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 88, 30 So.2d 14 (1947). There may be circumstances under which the act does operate as a valid procedural statute of limitations.