When a case is remanded from an appellate court to the trial court, the trial court reacquires jurisdiction of a case on the date that its clerk files the remittitur of the appellate court. Marsh v. Way , 255 Ga. 284 (1), 336 S.E.2d 795 (1985). Although the trial court may be initially without jurisdiction to entertain a motion that is filed before the trial court is re-invested with jurisdiction by the filing of the remittitur, however, this does not mean that such a prematurely-filed motion may not be considered by the trial court.

After remittitur, a court may act upon motions filed pending remittitur. See Marsh v. Way , 255 Ga. 284, 284 (1), 336 S.E.2d 795 (1985). Furthermore, "there is precedent in the law for treating a premature filing as ripening into effectiveness."

Instead, the scope of the [lower] court's authority to act on remand is limited to the specific purpose of making the applicable findings and conclusions. Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284, 285 (2) ( 336 S.E.2d 795) (1985). Consequently, the habeas court had no authority to disregard this Court's order.

After default judgment was entered against her, Marsh made several attempts to open the default judgment on the ground of the alleged fraud of an agent of her insurer in deliberately failing to forward the original complaint to her insurer's attorney. See Marsh v. Way, 170 Ga. App. 300 ( 316 S.E.2d 599) (1984) (in which the appeal was remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law as to damages); Marsh v. Way, 173 Ga. App. 399 ( 326 S.E.2d 499) (1985) (in which it was held that, when the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for findings, conclusions and entry of a new judgment, the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the motion to open default made upon the remand, and that her remedy apparently lies in a different cause of action from OCGA § 9-11-55 (b)); and Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284 ( 336 S.E.2d 795) (1985) (in which we held that, under the facts of this case, the motion to open default was properly before the trial court at the time it was ruled upon; held that the scope of the trial court's authority to act on remand was limited to the specified purpose of making the applicable findings and conclusions, and hence that the motion to open default was not timely; and affirmed the judgment for the appellee). After the ruling of this court, supra, the appellant filed a complaint in equity to set aside the default judgment, also praying for an interlocutory injunction against enforcement of the default judgment and the supersedeas bond filed in conjunction with her appeal of that judgment, pending the complete and final resolution of these proceedings.

See Grantham, supra (remanding case with direction that the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law which will allow meaningful appellate review of its decision); Sanders v. Stone, 255 Ga. 704, 706, 342 S.E.2d 318 (1986) (vacating judgment and remanding case for trial court to enter findings and conclusions of law, where an intelligent review of the merits of the appeal was precluded by lack thereof); In the Interest of D.L.G., supra. See generally Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284, 285(2), 336 S.E.2d 795 (1985) (when an appellate court vacates a trial court's judgment and remands for findings of fact and conclusions of law on a specific issue, this does not permit the trial court to reopen the case for other purposes; instead, the scope of the trial court's authority to act on remand is limited to the specific purpose of making the applicable findings and conclusions). Alternatively, the superior court may upon remand dismiss the action if it determines that re-entry of judgment (with mandated findings of fact and conclusions of law) would serve no purpose. This is because: (a) DAFC has briefed this court that the bonds have not been issued, that it has no intent to issue the bonds authorized by the trial court's judgment, and that the case should be remanded so that it (DAFC) may “petition the Fulton County Superior Court for an order withdrawing the bond validation Order” as moot; (b) the State of Georgia represents to this court that it is “merely a nominal par

We transmitted the remittitur to the trial court on December 9, 2010, in accordance with OCGA § 5-6-10.Chambers v. State, 262 Ga. 200, 201 (1) ( 415 SE2d 643) (1992); cf. Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284 (1) ( 336 SE2d 795) (1985) (trial court reacquired jurisdiction when remittitur was filed with clerk of trial court); Hagan v. Robert Co. Assoc., 222 Ga. 469, 470-471 (1) ( 150 SE2d 663) (1966) (same); Knox v. State, 113 Ga. 929, 930 ( 39 SE 330) (1901) (same); Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 133 (1) ( 279 SE2d 264) (1981) (trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary judgment prior to receipt of remittitur, but reentry of order after remittitur was issued cured error). See Court of Appeals Rule 39 (a):

We did not direct the trial court to [resentence as to Count 3], and the trial court was not authorized to do so. Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284, 285 (2) ( 336 SE2d 795) (1985).Esenyie v. Udofia, 236 Ga. App. 155, 156 (1) ( 511 SE2d 260) (1999).

Under those circumstances, the procedures of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55 (b) were inapplicable, and O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60 (d) applies. Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284, 285 (2) ( 336 S.E.2d 795) (1985). Further, Conseco does not argue on appeal that it is otherwise entitled to have the trial court exercise its inherent authority to set aside or modify a judgment within the same term of court in which the judgment was rendered.

We did not direct the trial court to hold a new trial, and the trial court was not authorized to do so. Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284, 285 (2) ( 336 S.E.2d 795) (1985). 2.

The trial court was to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings and conclusions on specific issues. See Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284 ( 336 S.E.2d 795). It is implicit in such direction that the findings derive from the evidence presented at the mandated hearing. It was the duty of the parties to present at the evidentiary hearing any evidence they wished to rely on with regard to the specified issues and it was not the duty of the trial court to comb the entire record below in search of relevant evidence. The trial court did not err in sustaining the objection to defense counsel's argument.