Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. TED006074, Angel M. Bermudez, Judge. Affirmed.
Lisa Hunt, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minor.
OPINION
MILLER, J.
The trial court denied Lisa Hunt-Nocero’s (Mother’s) application for an order to show cause re a modification of a child visitation and custody order. Mother appeals, contending that the trial court erred by not considering Family Code sections 2030, 2031, and 2032, which authorize trial courts to order one party to pay another party’s attorney’s fees in proceedings concerning divorce, annulment, and legal separation. We affirm the judgment.
On the cover of Mother’s opening brief she wrote, “Lisa Hunt-Pro Per.” The reporter’s transcript refers to Mother as “Ms. Hunt.” The trial court documents, in the clerk’s transcript refer to Mother as “Lisa Hunt-Nocero.” Mother signed her trial court applications and declarations as “Lisa Hunt-Nocero.” Based upon the foregoing we infer that “Lisa Hunt” and “Lisa Hunt-Nocero” are the same person.
All further statutory references will be to the Family Code, unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 4, 2001, the superior court issued an order declaring John Marsh (Father) to be the natural father of Mother’s daughter, A.H., and granting Father’s petition to establish a parental relationship with A.H. Since that time, Mother and Father have filed a multitude of applications for orders to show cause re modification of the child support, child custody, and child visitation orders.
At a hearing on March 21, 2006, the trial court ordered Father to pay $5,000 for minor’s counsel’s fees; and the court ordered Mother to pay $8,970 for minor’s counsel’s fees, plus $8,142 in attorney’s fees to Father’s trial counsel. On September 6, 2006, the superior court ordered Mother and Father to each pay half of minor’s counsel’s fees.
At the trial court hearing on March 26, 2008, Mr. Cristiano, minor’s counsel, requested that the court order Mother to pay him $8,000 in attorney’s fees forthwith. Mr. Cristiano said that Father had already paid $5,000 of minor’s counsel’s attorney’s fees. Mr. Cristiano cited section 2030 as the legal authority for the court ordering Mother to pay his fees. The court ordered Mother to pay Mr. Cristiano $8,000, due and payable immediately.
At a hearing on October 15, 2008, Father’s trial attorney told the court that Mother had not paid any of the attorney’s fees that the court previously ordered her to pay him. Father’s attorney informed the court that Father had been financially “decimated” by the constant filings in the instant case. Father’s trial attorney stated that Father owed his attorney “a tremendous amount of money.” Further, Father’s trial attorney pointed out that on Mother’s prior “income and expense declaration,” Mother wrote that she had paid her attorneys $35,076, and was paying $700 per hour to her attorney and his associate. Additionally, Father’s trial attorney filed bank records with the court reflecting an average of $18,968.18 of monthly deposits in Mother’s accounts. Mother disputed Father’s attorney’s assertion that she deposited $18,000 per month into her bank accounts. Mother said her coffee shop grossed $8,000 per month, but her expenses were $5,000 to $6,000 per month.
When the court made its ruling on child support, it imputed Mother’s gross earnings as $8,000 per month, although the court said that it was “very close to i[m]puting” $18,000 per month. The court ordered Mother to pay $1,341 per month in child support.
Minor’s counsel informed the court that Mother had paid $900 of the $8,900 she owed to him, and Father had paid $2,800 of the $5,000 he owed. In total, minor’s counsel claimed that he was owed $32,006.09 in attorney’s fees. Father’s trial attorney argued that minor’s counsel’s fees were incurred due to Mother’s repetitive motions and applications. The court ordered Mother to pay two-thirds of the $32,006.09 in minor’s counsel’s fees, and ordered Father to pay the remaining one-third.
Mother filed a motion to augment the record on appeal. The documents included in the proposed augmented record concern proceedings from May, June, and July 2009. The trial court order from which Mother is appealing was entered on March 4, 2009. We deny Mother’s motion to augment because the documents relate to proceedings that occurred after entry of the order from which Mother is appealing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 909.)
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the trial court erred because “[n]othing in the record of this case demonstrates that the trial court considered, even for a moment, the absolute requirements of section[s] 2030, 2031, or 2032.” We disagree.
The application of a statute is a legal question, which we review de novo. (Birl v. Heritage Care, LLC (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1318.)
A. SECTION 2030
We begin by addressing Mother’s argument as it concerns section 2030.
Section 2030, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or legal separation of the parties, and in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related judgment, the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party, except a governmental entity, to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.”
Nothing in the register of actions reflects that this case involved a dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or legal separation of the parties. The register of actions reflects that on May 4, 2001, the trial court declared Father to be A.H.’s natural father, and the trial court granted Father’s petition to establish a parental relationship with A.H. In May 2002, the trial court addressed issues of child support. Beyond that date, most of the court hearings addressed support, custody, and visitation. Mother does not assert that she was married to Father. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by not applying section 2030, subdivision (a)(1), because the instant case did not involve a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or legal separation of the parties.
As noted in the “Facts” section, the trial court ordered Mother and Father to pay minor’s counsel’s fees under the authority of section 2030. We have concluded that section 2030 is not applicable to the instant case; however, we do not disturb the trial court’s award of fees to minor’s counsel, because the fees could properly be awarded pursuant to section 3150, subdivision (a) and section 3153, subdivision (a). Section 3150, subdivision (a) provides: “If the court determines that it would be in the best interest of the minor child, the court may appoint private counsel to represent the interests of the child in a custody or visitation proceeding.” Section 3153, subdivision (a) provides: “If the court appoints counsel under this chapter to represent the child, counsel shall receive a reasonable sum for compensation and expenses, the amount of which shall be determined by the court. Except as provided in subdivision (b), this amount shall be paid by the parties in the proportions the court deems just.” Subdivision (b) of section 3153 addresses situations in which the parties are unable to pay all or a portion of the cost of counsel.
B. SECTION 2031
We now turn to Mother’s contention relating to section 2031.
Section 2031, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (b), during the pendency of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, for legal separation of the parties, or any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related judgment, an application for a temporary order making, augmenting, or modifying an award of attorney’s fees, including a reasonable retainer to hire an attorney, or costs or both shall be made by motion on notice or by an order to show cause.” Subdivision (b) of section 2031 describes when motions concerning attorney’s fees may be made orally.
As we explained ante, Mother does not assert that she was married to Father. The register of actions does not reflect that this case involved a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or for legal separation of the parties. Further, Mother does not assert that she made a motion pursuant to section 2031. In sum, the trial court did not err by not applying section 2031, because the instant case did not involve a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or legal separation of the parties.
C. SECTION 2032
Next, we address Mother’s argument concerning section 2032.
Section 2032, subdivision (a) provides: “The court may make an award of attorney’s fees and costs under Section 2030 or 2031 where the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.” As we explained ante, sections 2030 and 2031 are not applicable to the instant case, because it does not appear that Mother and Father were granted a divorce, annulment, or legal separation during these proceedings. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by not applying section 2032 subdivision (a).
Section 2032, subdivision (d) provides, in relevant part: “Either party may, at any time before the hearing of the cause on the merits, on noticed motion, request the court to make a finding that the case involves complex or substantial issues of fact or law related to property rights, visitation, custody, or support. Upon that finding, the court may in its discretion direct the implementation of a case management plan for the purpose of allocating attorney’s fees, court costs, expert fees, and consultant fees equitably between the parties.”
Mother does not contend that she made a noticed motion requesting the trial court to find that the case involves complex or substantial issues of fact or law related to property rights, visitation, custody, or support. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by not applying section 2032, subdivision (d).
D. MOTHER’S ARGUMENTS
Mother contends that, “[t]o prevent justice from becoming a commodity, the [trial] court must provide the indigent litigant the same type of court access as the litigant able to afford representation.” Mother’s argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, the record does not reflect that Mother is indigent; rather, the record reflects that Mother is depositing $8,000 or $18,000 per month into her bank accounts. Second, section 2030 does not provide for court funded attorneys. Rather, section 2030 allows the court to order one party to pay for another party’s attorney. For example, in this case, Mother was ordered to pay for Father’s attorney’s fees, and both parents were ordered to pay A.H.’s attorney’s fees.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., RICHLI J.