Taking all the evidence most favorable to plaintiff the Court finds no evidence to indicate any superior awareness on the part of the defendants. "The Court is of the opinion the case of Draper v. Louisville N.R. Co., 17 Tenn. App. 213, 66 S.W.2d 1003 and, to a lesser extent, Marsh v. Fowler, 207 Tenn. 377, 340 S.W.2d 881, are controlling." We concur with the finding of the trial court.
Accordingly, we will presume, as would a Tennessee court, that the law of California is the same as the law of Tennessee. Marsh v. Fowler, 207 Tenn. 377, 340 S.W.2d 881 (Tenn. 1960). Finding no Tennessee authorities on the question of the application of this exclusion provision to the judgment obtained against Worsham, we look to the general law.
To the extent that the letter mentions additional obligations, it only gives Mrs. MacPherson's attorneys a cause of action against Mr. MacPherson and does not alter the separation agreement. The parties are in agreement, and our research shows, that Connecticut has never passed on the question of whether a bigamous remarriage is sufficient to terminate support payments under a separation agreement. Under Tennessee conflicts law, there is a presumption that Connecticut law would be the same as Tennessee law. Marsh v. Fowler, 207 Tenn. 377, 381-382, 340 S.W.2d 881 (1960); Shepard Gluck v. Thomas, 147 Tenn. 338, 347, 246 S.W. 836 (1922). Normally, we would follow that presumption.
When Kentucky law is silent as to the subject at hand, the Court can presume that Kentucky law would not differ from the law in Tennessee. See Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Templeton, 362 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962) (citing Marsh v. Fowler, 340 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tenn. 1960) and Hamilton v. Peoples, 274 S.W.2d 630, 633-34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)). The Court has reviewed Kentucky law to determine if Kentucky courts have ever addressed the narrow issue of whether the terms of the original or renewal insurance policy control when the insurer has imposed changes to coverage.
Since the contract of insurance involved in this litigation was delivered in the State of Texas, it is a Texas contract and this appeal must be determined under the laws of the State of Texas. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Greene, 1936, Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 93 S.W.2d 1241. Under the authority of T.C.A. Sections 24-607 and 24-608 this court takes judicial notice of the common law and the statutes of every other state. Where no Texas law is proven or found on the particular subject, it will be presumed that the law of Texas on such subject is the same as the law of Tennessee. Marsh v. Fowler, 207 Tenn. 377, 340 S.W.2d 881; Hamilton v. Peoples, 38 Tenn. App. 385, 274 S.W.2d 630; Schenk v. Gwaltney, 43 Tenn. App. 459, 309 S.W.2d 424. The appellant relies very strongly upon Article 21.04 of Vernon's Insurance Code of Texas which is as follows: