Marsh v. Byrd

6 Citing cases

  1. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Phillips

    236 N.C. 470 (N.C. 1952)   Cited 24 times

    Templeton, v. Kelley, 215 N.C. 577, 2 S.E.2d 696; Lewis v. Watson, 229 N.C. 20, 47 S.E.2d 484. See also Sebastian v. Motor Lines, 213 N.C. 770, 197 S.E. 539; Marsh v. Byrd, 214 N.C. 669, 200 S.E. 389; Stephens v. Johnson, 215 N.C. 133, 1 S.E.2d 367; Annotations: 14 A.L.R. 1176, p. 1197 et seq.; 67 A.L.R. 313, p. 333 et seq. Here, upon consideration of the entire record, we think the evidence tending to show that intestate failed to yield the right of way as required by statute, together with the evidence relating to the question of proximate cause, was for the jury.

  2. Hill v. Lopez

    45 S.E.2d 539 (N.C. 1947)   Cited 19 times

    However, such evidence standing alone would be insufficient to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant. Templeton v. Kelley, 215 N.C. 577, 2 S.E.2d 696; Groome v. Davis, supra; Marsh v. Byrd, 214 N.C. 669, 200 S.E. 389. It is the duty of the operator of a motor vehicle to exercise that degree of care for his own safety and the safety of others, which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.

  3. Smart v. Rodgers

    8 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 1940)   Cited 2 times

    Instructions to juries couched in language similar to that excepted to here have been held erroneous and new trials awarded in several recent cases. Morris v. Johnson, 214 N.C. 402, 199 S.E. 390; Fleeman v. Coal Co., 214 N.C. 117, 198 S.E. 596; Marsh v. Byrd, 214 N.C. 669, 200 S.E. 389; Woods v. Freeman, 213 N.C. 314, 195 S.E. 812; Latham v. Bottling Co., 213 N.C. 158, 195 S.E. 372; Sebastian v. Motor Lines, 213 N.C. 770, 197 S.E. 539; S. v. Webber, 210 N.C. 137, 185 S.E. 659; S. v. Spencer, 209 N.C. 827, 184 S.E. 835. See, also, Wooten v. Smith, 215 N.C. 48, 200 S.E. 921, and Exum v. Baumrind, 210 N.C. 650, 188 S.E. 200. The fact that the court properly charged as to proximate cause did not remove the injurious effect of the instruction quoted.

  4. Templeton v. Kelley

    216 N.C. 487 (N.C. 1939)   Cited 10 times

    Notwithstanding the fact the conduct of the defendant may have constituted negligence per se, this, of itself, does not require an affirmative answer to the issue. Woods v. Freeman, 213 N.C. 314, 195 S.E. 812; Fleeman v. Coal Co., 214 N.C. 117, 198 S.E. 596; Morris v. Johnson, 214 N.C. 402, 199 S.E. 390; Marsh v. Byrd, 214 N.C. 669, 200 S.E. 389. Non constat the testimony of the plaintiff may establish conduct on the part of the defendant which constitutes negligence per se or Prima facie evidence of negligence, the question of proximate cause still remains to be determined by the jury. Proof of negligence per se does not, as a matter of law, require an affirmative answer to an issue of negligence.

  5. Templeton v. Kelley

    2 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. 1939)   Cited 19 times

    In this connection it is again appropriate to refer to section 135 of chapter 407, Public Laws 1937, relating to "pedestrian's rights and duties." If the plaintiff, as pedestrian, violated the provisions of the statute relating to crossing between adjacent intersections at which traffic control lights are operated, this would be evidence of negligence, Sebastian v. Motor Lines, supra; Marsh v. Byrd, 214 N.C. 669, 200 S.E. 389; Stephens v. Johnson, ante, 133, 1 S.E.2d 367, to be considered with other evidence in the case in determining whether the plaintiff is actually guilty of negligence which proximately caused or contributed to his injury. Upon the evidence in this record, we are of opinion that the question is for the jury.

  6. McAnally v. Drainage District

    28 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1930)   Cited 18 times

    Section 4399 is the only section which creates a lien and is evidently the lien referred to in Section 4400-a, Laws 1927, page 181. (9) Liens for special assessments must be created by a statute. Marsh v. Byrd, 22 F. 180; Fisher v. Brower, 159 Ind. 139; State v. Bellin, 79 Minn. 134; Philadelphia v. Anderson, 142 Pa. 357. (10) The laws under which special liens exist must be strictly construed. 37 C.J. 309; Salem v. Smith, 22 Wn. 397; Jeffry Company v. Anderson, 66 Iowa 718. (11) Section 4395, which provides for the levy of the amount of the annual installment of the total taxes levied under Section 4394, does not create or attempt to create any lien. The purpose and only purpose of this section is to provide a method whereby the lien created by Section 4395 may be enforced.