Because there was a storm in progress and plaintiffs failed to raise questions of fact regarding any exception to that doctrine, we affirm. A landowner's duty to take reasonable measures to remedy a storm-created snow or ice condition does not commence until a reasonable time after the storm has ceased ( see Sanders v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 9 AD3d 595, 595). While defendant had no obligation to remove any snow or ice during the storm, liability may result if the efforts it did take created a hazardous condition or exacerbated the natural hazards created by the storm ( see Marrone v Verona, 237 AD2d 805, 805, lv dismissed 90 NY2d 885). Defendant submitted sufficient proof that a snow storm was in progress at the time of plaintiffs fall; plaintiffs concede this. The burden then shifted to plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of fact, specifically regarding their allegations that defendant's snow-removal efforts either created a dangerous condition or exacerbated the storm-created condition ( see Mangieri v Prime Hospitality Corp., 251 AD2d 632, 633; see also Sanders v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra at 595).

"[E]ven if there was a lull or break in the storm around the time of plaintiff's accident, this does not establish that defendant had a reasonable time after the cessation of the storm to correct hazardous snow or ice-related conditions" ( Krutz v. Betz Funeral Home, 236 AD2d 704, 705, lv denied 90 NY2d 803, citing Jensen v. Roohan, 233 AD2d 587, 588). The further contention of plaintiff in opposition to the cross motion that defendant's snow removal efforts either created a hazardous condition or worsened the conditions then existing is based on mere speculation and thus is insufficient to raise an issue of fact to defeat the cross motion ( see Nadel v. Cucinella, 299 AD2d 250; Marrone v. Verona, 237 AD2d 805, lv dismissed 90 NY2d 885, rearg denied 91 NY2d 849; see also Roesch v. Hillick, 247 AD2d 927, lv denied 92 NY2d 808).

ose portions of the parking lot that she had not previously salted indeed were icy. Yaddow was not questioned, however, regarding the specific condition of the lot upon her arrival at work that day, i.e., she never was asked whether ice already had accumulated in the parking lot and/or around the gas pump island and, if so, how much or, to her knowledge, how long it had been there. Moreover, even assuming that Yaddow possessed a general awareness of any icy condition and the corresponding need to salt the area, such knowledge would be insufficient to impute actual or constructive notice of the specific hazardous condition allegedly existing in the area where Convertini fell (see, id.; Lyons v. Cold Brook Realty Corp., 268 A.D.2d 659, 660). Nor is there anything in the record to support a finding that Yaddow's decision to salt the area in front of the store and around the gas pump island somehow exacerbated an already hazardous condition (see, Micheler v. Gush, 256 A.D.2d 1051, 1052; Marrone v. Verona, 237 A.D.2d 805, 806, lv dismissed 90 N.Y.2d 885). In light of the foregoing, we are of the view that plaintiffs failed to come forward with sufficient admissible proof to defeat defendant's motion and, therefore, Supreme Court's order is affirmed.

There is no duty to remove snow and ice while a storm is in progress. A party in possession or control of real property may be held liable for the failure to remove accumulated snow and ice only after a reasonable time subsequent to the ending of the storm (see, Grau v. Taxter Park Assocs., 283 A.D.2d 551; Tilman v. J. DeBenedictis Sons Bldg. Corp., 237 A.D.2d 593, 594). Snow or ice removal undertaken during a storm may be actionable if performed negligently, i.e. the removal either creates a hazardous condition or exacerbates the naturally hazardous condition created by the storm (see, Grau v. Taxter Park Assocs., supra; Marrone v. Verona, 237 A.D.2d 805). The record is clear that it was still snowing at the time of the plaintiff's accident, and is devoid of any evidence indicating that a hazardous condition was either created or exacerbated by any acts of the defendants. Thus, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

There is no duty to remove snow and ice while a storm is in progress. Liability for the failure to remove accumulated snow and ice can attach only a reasonable time after the storm has ended (see, Tillman v. DeBenedictis Sons Bldg. Corp., 237 A.D.2d 593). Snow or ice removal actions undertaken during a storm may be actionable if performed negligently, i.e., they either create a hazardous condition or exacerbate the naturally hazardous condition created by the storm (see, Marrone v. Verona, 237 A.D.2d 805). Here, the record is devoid of evidence indicating that a hazardous condition was either created or exacerbated by NRC's efforts and therefore neither Taxter Park, as the property owner, nor NRC, as a snow removal contractor, can be held liable under this theory.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. On February 6, 1995, the infant plaintiff, Melanie Fassler (hereinafter the plaintiff), was injured when she slipped and fell in a roadway abutting a sidewalk in New City. The plaintiff alleges that the efforts of the defendant Town of Clarkstown to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk rendered the area more dangerous and, as a result, she was compelled to divert her path and walk in the adjacent street which was also icy. The Town admits that as a result of a storm commencing on February 3, 1995, it had ordered both the street and the sidewalk in question to be plowed, and that this was done on February 4. Under the circumstances of this case, there is a question of fact as to whether the Town's affirmative action exacerbated the natural hazard, and whether that was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries (see generally, Verdino v. Alexandrou, 253 A.D.2d 553;Marrone v. Verona, 237 A.D.2d 805; Jimenez v. Cummings, 226 A.D.2d 112). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the Town's motion for summary judgment. The Town's remaining contentions are without merit.

Initially, we note that while the wet condition of the floor was the direct result of snow that had been tracked in from outside, the record does not indicate when the storm subsided, thus precluding any findings concerning the reasonableness of defendant's efforts in abating the hazard ( compare, Zonitch v. Plaza at Latham, 255 A.D.2d 808, 808-809). Likewise, absent further detail concerning the amount of moisture on the floor, the manner in which the floor was mopped and the condition of the mats, it is impossible to determine whether the store employee may have, in fact, exacerbated the dangerous condition by removing the mats ( compare, id., at 809; Marrone v. Verona, 237 A.D.2d 805, 806, lv dismissed 90 N.Y.2d 885). Inasmuch as the record leaves unresolved questions of fact, Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Mercure, Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur.

An owner of property is under no duty to pedestrians to remove ice and snow that naturally accumulates upon the sidewalk in front of its premises. To incur liability, the owner's snow removal attempt must have made the sidewalk more dangerous (Jimenez v. Cummings, 226 A.D.2d 112). Even during an ongoing storm, while ordinarily there would be no duty to remove snow, if one takes steps to remove snow and ice, liability may result if those efforts create a hazardous condition or exacerbate a natural hazard created by the storm (Marrone v. Verona, 237 A.D.2d 805). Upon this motion for summary judgment, defendant 226 West 75th St. Inc. clearly demonstrated that while it was the owner of the premises abutting the sidewalk, it was an out-of-possession landlord.

progress" doctrine ( see, e.g., Downes v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy., 209 A.D.2d 769, 769-770; Fusco v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co., 203 A.D.2d 667, 668) is inapplicable, merely because plaintiff fell inside the mall entrance rather than outside, is unpersuasive ( cf., Kovelsky v. City Univ., 221 A.D.2d 234, 235; Keir v. State of New York, 188 A.D.2d 918, 919). It is undisputed that the slippery condition that brought about plaintiffs fall was a direct consequence of the ongoing inclement weather; like icy sidewalks and snow-covered parking lots, a wet, slippery entranceway, caused by tracked-in snow and slush, is a reality of winter weather which a landowner ordinarily is not required to rectify until the underlying weather condition has abated ( see, Goldman v. State of New York, 158 A.D.2d 845, 846, appeal dismissed 76 N.Y.2d 764). Nor is there any proof that defendants' mopping and vacuuming efforts "created or aggravated a hazardous condition in the area where [plaintiff] fell" ( Marrone v. Verona, 237 A.D.2d 805, 806, lv dismissed 90 N.Y.2d 885) such that liability might be predicated on that ground ( see, Zima v. North Colonie Cent. School Dist., 225 A.D.2d 993, 994). Although a nonparty eyewitness to the incident stated, in his written statement, that the custodians' clean-up activities "spread the water around over a bigger area", there is no probative evidence that their efforts actually increased the danger in the particular place where plaintiff fell ( cf., Gentile v. Rotterdam Sq., 226 A.D.2d 973, 974). Notably, the same witness also testified, in his deposition, that at the time of the accident, that portion of the floor was covered with "slush from people's boots that they were walking in", belying any suggestion that the fall was precipitated by water deposited there during defendants' efforts to remedy the situation. Mercure, J. P., Crew III, Carpinello and Graffeo, JJ., concur.

The plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the shoveling and/or plowing operations allegedly undertaken by the defendants prior to the cessation of the storm either created a hazardous condition or exacerbated the naturally hazardous condition created by the storm. Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed ( see, Marrone v. Verona, 237 A.D.2d 805; Gentile v. Rotterdam Sq., 226 A.D.2d 973; Zima v. North Colonie Cent. School Dist., 225 A.D.2d 993; Kay v. Flying Goose, supra). The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.