Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2018-0040-FC
08-20-2018
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOSHANN BISHOP, Petitioner/Appellant, and AARON CLARK, Respondent/Appellee.
Joshann Bishop, Coolidge In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. DO201401023
The Honorable Richard T. Platt, Judge
AFFIRMED
Joshann Bishop, Coolidge
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
BREARCLIFFE, Judge:
¶1 Joshann Bishop appeals from the trial court's order modifying its orders on legal decision-making authority, parenting time, and child support. We affirm.
Issues
¶2 The issue on appeal is whether, as Bishop contends, the trial court abused its discretion in granting her ex-husband, Aaron Clark, sole legal decision-making authority and substantially all parenting time, and in ordering her to pay Clark child support for the parties' two children. Appellee Clark did not file an answering brief.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶3 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's order and "will affirm the judgment if reasonable evidence supports it." Boyle v. Boyle, 231 Ariz. 63, ¶ 8 (App. 2012). Bishop and Clark were married in June 2009, and their marriage was dissolved in February 2015. They had two children during the marriage. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the court awarded Bishop sole legal decision-making authority of the minor children, awarded Clark three hours of supervised parenting time twice per week, and ordered Clark to pay Bishop $389.36 per month in child support. In the dissolution decree, the court set a review hearing in June 2015 to determine whether to expand Clark's parenting time and to allow it to be unsupervised. The court also appointed a best interests attorney for the children. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 10(A)(1)(a).
¶4 At the June 2015 review hearing, the trial court modified its order by granting Clark unsupervised parenting time of six hours twice per week, but left its other orders unchanged. The court set another review hearing for July 2015. At the July 2015 review hearing, the court, on a temporary basis, ordered Clark to have parenting time with the children
from 10:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturdays and every other Sunday from 2:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. The court then set a bench trial for August 2015, for the purpose of establishing permanent orders for legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support.
¶5 At the August 2015 trial, Clark did not appear. The best interests attorney gave her recommendations to the trial court and Bishop made statements to the court and expressed her agreement with the best interests attorney's recommendations. The court affirmed its order granting Bishop sole legal decision-making authority, named Bishop as the primary residential parent, and granted Clark parenting time "at [Bishop's] discretion." No change was made to the child support order.
¶6 In May 2017, Clark filed a Petition to Modify Legal Decision-Making, Parenting Time and Child Support, requesting sole legal decision-making authority and a reduction in child support to "0." He asserted that the change in orders was in the best interests of the children because of "alleged abuse." Clark also filed a petition seeking "temporary emergency legal decision-making" authority claiming "[t]here [was] a file in motion from D.C.S. and Coolidge Police from date 5-18-17, for abuse towards [his] minor child." By its order dated May 31, 2017, after a hearing held in conjunction with a juvenile dependency proceeding, the judge assigned to the dependency case issued temporary orders granting Clark sole legal decision-making authority and limiting Bishop to supervised parenting time only "upon law enforcement's approval." The trial court then set a return hearing before the judge assigned to the family law case for June 2017.
¶7 At the June 2017 return hearing, the trial court affirmed the temporary orders, suspended Bishop's child support obligation, and appointed a best interests attorney for the minor children. The court set a review hearing for August 2017. At the August 2017 review hearing, the court heard recommendations of the best interests attorney and heard from the parties. The court set another review hearing for September 2017, but otherwise left its temporary orders in place. At the September 2017 review hearing, the court again left the temporary orders substantially in place and set a "Final Orders Hearing" in November 2017.
¶8 At the November 2017 hearing, the trial court took testimony from the parties and other witnesses, admitted exhibits, and heard argument from the best interests attorney. The court took the matters under advisement and issued its ruling in December 2017. In that ruling, the court stated that it had "since considered the evidence, including the demeanor
of the witnesses, reviewed the exhibits as well as the case history, and considered the parties arguments." The court found, among other things, that Bishop's child with a different father had been declared dependent and placed in the custody of the Arizona Department of Child Safety (DCS). It also found that "[a]fter consideration of the evidence presented during he the hearing and recommendations made by the Best Interest[s] Attorney, it is in the children's best interests to affirm the previous order concerning sole legal decision-making" for Clark.
¶9 The trial court in its ruling listed its findings with regard to the children's best interests, pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403(B). The court found that, since the children were removed from Bishop by DCS in May 2017, they had been residing with Clark, and were "well adjusted to their home." It found that "[t]he children suffered from physical abuse from [Bishop's] boyfriend which caused the children to be removed from her care by the [s]tate" and that the children were attending counseling. The court also found that Clark was more likely to allow the children frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with Bishop. The court then granted Clark sole legal decision-making authority and awarded Bishop unsupervised parenting time with the children every Tuesday and Friday from 2:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., and every other weekend from after school on Friday until Sunday at 5:00 p.m. Finally, Bishop was ordered to pay Clark $241.12 per month in child support. This appeal followed and we have jurisdiction in accordance with A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21 and 12-2101(A)(1).
Analysis
¶10 "We review the trial court's decision regarding child custody for an abuse of discretion." Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, ¶ 7 (App. 2003). On appeal, Bishop argues that, because she was "cleared" of any child abuse allegations and maintains a household fit for her children, the original orders concerning legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support should be reinstated. Bishop essentially argues that evidence did not support the court's rulings. Bishop, however, did not provide this court with the transcripts of any of the hearings below. As the appellant, it is her duty to order and provide the transcripts of the underlying proceedings where relevant to her arguments on appeal. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11(c)(1)(A) (appellants are responsible for ordering any transcripts on which the appeal relies). Without the transcripts, we assume that the record reflected in transcripts would support the trial court's decision. See Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486, ¶ 11 (App. 1998). Thus, we cannot say the court abused its discretion regarding legal decision-making authority, parenting time, or child support.
¶11 In addition to failing to provide the trial court transcript, Bishop has failed to offer a legal argument or to provide any legal authority in support of her arguments as required by the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(6), (7). "[O]pening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an appellant's position on the issues raised. Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim." State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989). As a consequence of these failures, Bishop has waived any arguments. See Rice v. Brakel, 233 Ariz. 140, ¶ 28 (App. 2013) (If a party fails to cite relevant portions of the record or address the basis of the trial court's decision, then he waives claim on appeal.).
Disposition
¶12 We do recognize that Bishop is not represented by counsel in this matter; however, "a party who conducts a case without an attorney is entitled to no more consideration from the court than a party represented by counsel, and is held to the same standards expected of a lawyer." Kelly v. NationsBanc Mortg. Corp., 199 Ariz. 284, ¶ 16 (App. 2000). Because Bishop failed to provide a trial court transcript, or to comply with the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, we affirm the decision of the trial court.