The question is not whether the opinion would be more or less persuasive depending on the presence or absence of a given fact but rather whether the missing fact is such an essential part of the factual foundation for the opinion that its absence would rob the opinion of its persuasive force. Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 424, 133 A. 209 (1926). Luntz believed that a meaningful comparison could be made between the photographs of the bite mark and the photographs and models of the defendant's teeth.

"On the other hand, the plaintiff has a constitutional right to try to the jury the cause of action alleged in his [or her] complaint. Conn. Const. art. I 21; Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 422, 133 A. 209; Robinson v. Backes, 91 Conn. 457, 460, 99 A. 1057. This includes the right to have the jury, rather than the court, pass upon the factual issue of damages, when there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded [persons] as to the amount which should be awarded.

The unusual nature of the disposition to the defendant and his wife in disregard of the natural objects of his bounty was itself some evidence tending to show that the testator lacked testamentary capacity. Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 426, 133 A. 209; Crandall's Appeal, 63 Conn. 365, 28 A. 531. Moreover, substantial evidence was presented from which the jury could have found that the decedent was suffering from insane delusions and that those delusions influenced the making of the will. The question of testamentary capacity, therefore, was appropriately submitted to the jury, and the court's charge on that issue was correct in law and well adapted to the facts of the case.

Even if a court were to find that a bequest or devise was unjust or unwise, it would have no power, merely on the basis of that finding, to invalidate the disposition. See cases such as Billings' Appeal, 49 Conn. 456, 461 (gift for promotion of spiritualism), and Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 429, 133 A. 209. On the other hand, the right to dispose of property by will is a privilege and can be exercised only in accordance with the conditions and restrictions which the law places on the exercise of that privilege. Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 511, 65 A. 1058.

This was particularly harmful in the instant case, she says, because the will favored her individually over all her sisters and brothers and therefore the definition placed an undue burden upon her. Although the plaintiffs make no point of it, the exception taken by the defendant did not fully comply with the rule in that it did not distinctly state, or even refer to, the criticism of the charge advanced now. D'Addario v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 142 Conn. 251, 256, 113 A.2d 361; Practice Book 153. Regardless of that, it was proper for the court to charge in effect that the fact that a testator executes a will which in its terms is unjust or unreasonable in disregarding to a great extent the natural objects of his bounty is relevant evidence tending to prove undue influence or lack of mental capacity. Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 426, 133 A. 209; 2 Locke Kohn, op. cit., p. 164. This charge placed no undue burden upon the defendant, especially when read in connection with a further charge to the effect that a disposition by will different from the disposition which the law would have provided if there had been no will is not sufficient, alone, to establish undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity.

It is true that opinions lack persuasive force unless based on facts. The defendants rely on Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 424, 133 A. 209. The answer is that in the case at bar the opinions expressed find ample support in the unchallenged finding, which is replete with facts that were found to exist. The cumulative significance of the facts found is a sufficient backdrop for the events that took place in Slade's office on September 24, 1951. Miss Brennan testified that at that particular time Slade lacked the mental ability to comprehend what he was doing.

On the other hand, the plaintiff has a constitutional right to try to the jury the cause of action alleged in his complaint. Conn. Const. Art. 1 21; Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 422, 133 A. 209; Robinson v. Backes, 91 Conn. 457, 460, 99 A. 1057. This includes the right to have the jury, rather than the court, pass upon the factual issue of damages, when there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men as to the amount which should be awarded.

Collins v. Erdmann, 122 Conn. 626, 632, 191 A. 521. One of such facts may be an unjust or unreasonable disregard, implicit in the provisions of the will, for the natural objects of the testator's bounty. Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 426, 133 A. 209. In so far as motive and opportunity are concerned, the facts found in the instant case could in no event give the defendant reason to complain of the ultimate result reached by the court, for in these particulars they afford ample ground for a determination in the plaintiffs' favor.

The action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict should be upheld unless it appears that under the evidence the conclusion of the jury, either as to testamentary incapacity or undue influence, could be reasonably reached by fair and intelligent men acting reasonably. Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 423, 133 A. 209; Caldwell v. Danforth, 124 Conn. 468, 469, 200 A. 577; Knight Realty Co., Inc. v. Caserta, 126 Conn. 162, 10 A.2d 597; Schulte, Inc. v. Hewitt Grocery Co., 101 Conn. 750, 751, 125 A. 365. The test of testamentary capacity stated in its simplest terms is that the testator must have mind and memory sound enough to enable him to know and understand the business upon which he is engaged, that is, the execution of his will at the very time he executes it. Maroncelli v. Starkweather, supra, 424; Jackson v. Waller, 126 Conn. 294, 301, 10 A.2d 763; Kimberly's Appeal, 68 Conn. 428, 439, 36 A. 847. The jury could have found these facts: The testator was married in 1920.

If there could be no reasonable conclusion other than that the plaintiff's damages amounted at least to those so fixed, the plaintiff is entitled to recover them as a matter of law, and there is no invasion of the proper function of the jury. Robinson v. Backes, 91 Conn. 457, 460, 99 A. 1057; Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 422, 133 A. 209. Thanks to the memorandum, we have "a deliberate appraisal of compensatory damages made by an experienced trier who heard and saw the witnesses." Monczport v. Csongradi, 102 Conn. 448, 455, 129 A. 41; Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 579, 150 A. 692. Our examination of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the verdict ought to be reduced to the amount of $2500, and no further analysis is called for. A plaintiff is not obliged to file a remittitur ordered either by the trial court or this court and in fixing the amount a court should be just rather than generous.