Opinion
23868.
February 14, 2001.
Appeal from the First Circuit Court (Civ. No. 97-1972).
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, RAMIL, and ACOBA, JJ.
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Upon review of the record, it appears that entry of the October 4, 2000 stipulated dismissal of claims did not give rise to a right to appeal the August 8, 2000 order denying the motion to certify individuals as Doe Defendants 1 and 2 inasmuch as the stipulated dismissal with prejudice is not appealable. See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 41.34[7][b] (Matthew Bender 3d. ed.) ("A party may not appeal from a stipulated dismissal with prejudice because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment.").
Insofar as the October 4, 2000 stipulated dismissal of claims purports to preserve the plaintiffs' right to appeal the August 8, 2000 order denying the motion to certify individuals as Doe Defendants, appellate jurisdiction cannot be invoked by agreement of the parties. Francone v. McClay, 40 Haw. 475, 477 (1954).
It further appears that the October 4, 2000 stipulated dismissal of claims purports to except the claims against Doe Defendants 1 and 2 from the dismissal by stating that those claims are "not dismissed." In that case, absent entry of judgment on the claims against Doe Defendants 1 and 2, the appeal of the August 8, 2000 order relating to those claims is an appeal of an interlocutory order that was not certified for appeal pursuant to HRS § 641-1(b). Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.