Opinion
2d Civil No. B234356
09-26-2011
MARK E., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA COUNTY, Respondent; VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.
Mark E., in pro. per., for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Leroy Smith, County Counsel, Patricia McCourt, Assistant County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. Nos. J067640, J067641) (Ventura County)
Mark E. (Father) seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating family reunification services and setting the matter for a permanent plan hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) We deny the petition for extraordinary writ.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
M.L. (Mother) and Father have a longstanding relationship and have two children together--six-year-old S.E. and four-year-old C.E. C.E. was born with a congenital heart defect (supra ventricular tachycardia); he requires medication and close monitoring by his physician.
On December 10, 2009, C.E., then two years old, consumed two bottles of his prescription heart medication. At the time, Mother and Father were asleep under the influence of methamphetamine, heroin, and a prescription pain reliever. They awoke to find C.E. unresponsive and moribund. Mother summoned emergency medical assistance, and C.E. was taken to the Ojai Hospital and placed on life support systems. When his condition stabilized, C.E. was admitted to UCLA Hospital and treated for approximately one month. UCLA Hospital discharge notes state that C.E. may suffer permanent cognitive impairment from the drug overdose and that he will require significant rehabilitation.
On December 14, 2009, the Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA) filed a dependency petition alleging that Mother and Father had failed to protect C.E. and S.E. and that the children suffer a serious risk of substantial harm due to their parents' drug abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b), (j).) HSA also alleged that Father had been arrested for domestic violence.
On December 15, 2009, HSA submitted a detention report to the juvenile court stating that Mother and Father had not followed through with earlier medical treatment recommendations for C.E. The report also stated that Mother and Father had criminal charges pending regarding being under the influence of drugs. Following a hearing, the court detained C.E. and S.E., ordered Mother and Father to participate in a 12-step program and submit to random drug testing, and it set the matter for a jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
The Ventura County sheriff later arrested Mother and Father for felony child abuse and felony child endangerment, and for being under the influence of illegal drugs. These charges arose from C.E.'s overdose of prescription medicine.
On January 11, 2010, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Although in custody, Mother and Father attended the hearing and were represented by counsel. Following advisement of their hearing rights by the court, Mother and Father waived their rights and submitted the matter based on the written HSA jurisdiction report. The court then sustained the allegations of the dependency petition, continued the children as dependent children, and ordered HSA to provide the parents with family reunification services.
The family reunification services plan required Mother and Father to participate in drug treatment, randomly test for drug use, participate in counseling and a 12-step program, and attend parent education classes, among other things. In April 2010, Mother and Father were released from confinement in county jail and commenced participating in the services plan. Father entered a residential drug treatment program for six months and then moved into a sober-living residence. He also attended classes regarding anger management, domestic violence, and parent education. Mother entered a residential treatment program, "Sunlight of the Spirit," and submitted to random drug testing. She also attended parent education classes and participated in counseling and a 12-step program.
During the dependency, HSA social workers and the children's foster parents observed that C.E. and S.E. displayed hyperactive and aggressive behaviors. C.E. also exhibited speech and balance deficits as well as self-injurious behaviors, such as pulling out his hair and eyelashes. The juvenile court ordered that the children receive medication to treat their behavioral problems. After C.E.'s discharge from UCLA Hospital, HSA placed him in a foster home. Subsequently, HSA placed S.E. in the same foster home.
Despite Mother's initial success with her services plan, she relapsed in March 2011, and again used illegal drugs. During that month, she had a positive drug test, a missed drug test, and a diluted drug test. The drug treatment program dismissed her from the program, but allowed her to resume participation two months later.
By May 2011, Father had full-time employment and an apartment. Despite Mother's relapse into use of illegal drugs, Father permitted her to stay in the apartment. Mother's name was also stated as lessee on the apartment lease.
On July 6, 2011, the juvenile court held a contested 18-month review hearing. The court received evidence of an HSA report and testimony from the HSA social worker and Father. Father stated that Mother was a party to the lease of his apartment and that he had permitted her to stay there despite knowing that she had relapsed into heroin use. Father testified: "We were going to be together." A week prior to the contested review hearing, Father removed Mother's name from the apartment lease.
Following argument by the parties, the juvenile court terminated family reunification services to Mother and Father and set the matter for a permanent plan hearing pursuant to section 366.26. In ruling, the trial judge stated: "I think [Father] did participate regularly [in reunification services]. I think he did make progress. . . . My biggest concern is [Father's] relationship with [Mother] and how he dealt with her significant relapse in March. It's not what I would have expected, not with somebody who's been in treatment for as long as he has been. . . . It seems clear to me that he, even after knowing that [Mother] had relapsed, had a plan that they would live together in the apartment. . . . That's why they both signed onto the rental agreement and why she was living there. . . . I'm not satisfied that [Father] will keep these children safe from someone who's abusing drugs . . . ."
In propria persona, Father seeks an extraordinary writ vacating the juvenile court's order. HSA responds in part that the petition is inadequate because it does not provide citation to the record or argument with supporting authorities.
Mother is not a party to the writ petition.
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DISCUSSION
Father asserts that he now has severed his relationship with Mother, and he desires the return of his children.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.452(b) requires a writ petition to contain a summary of the significant facts, limited to matters in the record, stating each point separately with support by written argument and citation of authority. Father's petition states that he has complied with specific requirements of his reunification services program and that he has "cut ties" with Mother. The petition does not state significant facts or legal argument with citation to the record and to authority. The petition also refers to evidence outside the record. We deny the petition for these reasons. (Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 579; Cresse S. v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 947, 955.)
In view of the importance of the rights at stake, however, we determine Father's petition for extraordinary writ on its merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(B).)
At a permanency review hearing, the juvenile court must return the dependent child to parental custody unless the court finds that return would create "a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) Compliance with a reunification services plan is not the sole concern with considering return of a child to parental custody. (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 704; id. at p. 703 [although parent had substantially complied with services plan, court determined that return of children would create substantial risk of harm to them].) The court may consider the evidence and decide that return would be detrimental to the child. We review the court's decision at a section 366.22 hearing for sufficient evidence. (Id. at p. 705.)
Sufficient evidence supports the decision of the juvenile court. Although Father received 18 months of reunification services, he fails to appreciate the significant risk posed to his children by Mother's addiction to heroin. Indeed, Father testified at the section 366.22 review hearing that he would consider Mother as a daycare provider for the children. Father and Mother commenced living together following Mother's drug relapse until an HSA social worker recommended that Father ask Mother to leave. There is sufficient evidence that return of the children to Father would present a substantial risk of harm to them in view of his continued relationship with Mother.
We deny the petition for extraordinary writ.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P.J. We concur:
YEGAN, J.
PERREN, J.
Tari L. Cody, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
Mark E., in pro. per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Leroy Smith, County Counsel, Patricia McCourt, Assistant County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.