Opinion
No. CV-05-4001822-S
May 17, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PETITION FOR DISCHARGE OF LIENS AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
The plaintiff, Dr. Alan Maris, has petitioned the court pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 49-13 to discharge a judgment lien on his real property located in Clinton, Connecticut. The lien was filed in connection with a judgment in the amount of $15,218.86 rendered against Maris in favor of the defendant, Pamela Mauldin, formerly, Pamela J. McGrath, on January 27, 1998. In July of 2004 after unsuccessfully appealing that judgment to the Appellate Court and then to the Supreme Court, Maris tendered the amount of $15,218.86 with no interest to the defendant and requested a satisfaction of judgment. The defendant would not release the lien or another lien filed on property of the plaintiff located in Waterford, Connecticut, until the plaintiff paid the full amount of the legal interest owed on the original judgment amount. Thereafter rather than pay the interest, Dr. Maris took the position that he did not owe it, and commenced this action in an attempt to force the defendant to release the judgment liens. The defendant seeks interest on the judgment and attorneys fees under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-400c on the grounds that this action is frivolous.
Factual and Procedural History
Dr. Maris is an orthodontist with a penchant for bringing lawsuits against former friends and associates. The Appellate Court in Maris v. McGrath, 58 Conn.App. 183, 753 A.2d 390 (2000), summarized the facts of the action underlying this case as follows:
In 1985, the defendant [McGrath] began working as a dental assistant at the orthodontic offices of the plaintiff [Maris] and his partner, Kenneth Carlough. She eventually began dating the plaintiff. After they agreed to live together, the parties worked out a financial arrangement in which the defendant transformed her individual credit union account into a joint account with the plaintiff. Both parties deposited moneys into the joint account and the defendant paid out moneys from that account to cover expenses. The parties lived two weeks a month at the defendant's home and two weeks a month at the plaintiff's home.
By the summer of 1990, the parties' relationship had caused a problem at the orthodontic offices. Carlough was uncomfortable supervising a woman who was the equivalent of his partner's wife. The plaintiff promised the defendant that if she left her employment in his orthodontic practice, he would provide for her material wants and needs for the remainder of her life.
When the relationship ended in 1992, the defendant transformed the joint account into a personal account and returned to the plaintiff $3,500 from the account that belonged to him. The plaintiff claimed that all the moneys he had deposited into the joint account had been loans. Of the twenty-three checks deposited into the account, nineteen were made payable to the financial institution and four to the defendant. The plaintiff had made various notations in the memorandum section of the checks. The court found that [t]he most significant of "[the plaintiff's] notations is on exhibit [eleven], a check . . . on which [the plaintiff] wrote the word `loan' in the memorandum section. The check was not deposited until five days after it was dated; [the defendant] denies having seen the word `loan' on the check when she signed it. The court finds that [the plaintiff] wrote the word into the memorandum section after [the defendant] had signed the check but before [the plaintiff] had deposited it." 58 Conn.App. at 184-86.
Here, the court found that there was no contract between the parties as to the moneys deposited in the joint account and expended on the defendant's house. As the court sagely pointed out, "[m]uch of the case hinges on credibility. [The plaintiff] asserts that [the defendant] made an oral promise to repay the moneys which [the plaintiff] was depositing into their joint account and amounts which he expended on her house and that she promised that she would execute a document providing that those moneys would be paid back from the proceeds of the sale of her home whenever she should sell it. [The defendant] denies that [the plaintiff's] deposits . . . were loans.
"The defendant has offered testimony from four people who, other than his daughter, know [the plaintiff] best: the orthodontist with whom [the plaintiff] began his practice . . . his partner during most of his career . . . his former best friend . . . and the [defendant] with whom he had a long-term romantic relationship . . . Each has testified that [the plaintiff's] character for veracity is miserable; some have testified that his reputation for veracity in the community of orthodontists is miserable . . . The court finds that their shared view that [the plaintiff] cannot be trusted is compelling evidence indeed. The plaintiff himself has offered no evidence to contradict this character evidence."
"The plaintiff seeks to blunt the force of this compelling testimony by pointing out that each of the witnesses has been involved in financial disputes with him . . . That is, the plaintiff claims that these witnesses described him as untrustworthy as a result of a bias against him. These people have spent years suffering from [the plaintiff's] duplicity; they do not trust him; their ill feeling toward [the plaintiff] is not based on bias, but rather on the very fact about which they testified: they bear ill will toward [the plaintiff] because he cannot be trusted."
The court further found that the plaintiff's testimony was contradicted on a number of points, sometimes by his own words. The court accepted the testimony of the plaintiff's accountant that the plaintiff had a practice of keeping careful records and documenting transactions. The court therefore found that the plaintiff "was being untruthful when he testified that he and [the defendant] agreed that the amounts of money that he was depositing into their joint checking account were loans and that they simply never got around to producing any written loan document."
The Appellate Court, describing Maris' suit against McGrath as "purely recreational litigation brought by a plaintiff against a woman with whom he had had a long-term relationship," Id. at 190, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Dr. Maris then appealed to the Supreme Court which again affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The trial court awarded McGrath attorneys fees in the amount of $15,218.86 based on the following rationale:
[Dr. Maris] claims his action was colorable and that the defendant failed to prove that the claims were brought for improper purpose. On the contrary, the court in its decision found that the plaintiff's claims were totally false and that his testimony was not truthful. This was not a matter of two good faith litigants as claimed by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court must agree with the defendant that the facts in this case require an award of attorneys fees.
Memorandum of Decision, 1/26/98 at 2.
On July 12, 2004, James Mattern, Dr. Maris' attorney, wrote to Jeremiah Donovan, Ms. Mauldin's attorney, informing him that he had received a check from Dr. Maris in the amount of the judgment without any accrued interest and offering to forward the check if Ms. Mauldin executed a satisfaction of judgment and a general release to Dr. Maris.
On July 29, 2004 Attorney Donovan filed judgment liens on the real property of Dr. Maris in Waterford and Clinton. The judgment liens state that the amount of the judgment is $15,218.86 and the purpose of the lien is to "secure said unsatisfied sum, and the lawful interest thereon . . ."
On August 29, 2004 Attorney Donovan sent Attorney Mattern copies of the judgment liens along with a letter noting that Dr. Maris had tendered only the amount of the judgment but not the interest from the date of the judgment. The letter also stated that Ms. Mauldin would release the liens when she received payment of the amount of the judgment plus accumulated interest.
Thereafter Attorney Mattern forwarded a check for $15,218.86 to Attorney Donovan, stated that Ms. Mauldin is not entitled to interest and demanded release of the liens and a satisfaction of judgment. Attorney Donovan responded on the same day that it was black letter law that interest runs from the entry of judgment and the taking of an appeal does not stay the running of interest. Attorney Donovan returned the check, stating that there would be no release of liens or satisfaction of judgment until the payment of the judgment with accrued interest.
On September 17, 2004 Attorney Mattern returned the check to Attorney Donovan, authorizing him to cash it. In the letter Attorney Mattern argued that one lien should be released because the equity in the other property was sufficient to secure Ms. Mauldin. Neither that letter nor any evidence admitted at the hearing on the Petition contained any evidence that either property had any equity.
On October 5, 2004, Attorney Donovan advised Attorney Mattern that Ms. Mauldin intended to apply the $15,218.86 payment first to interest which had run from the date of judgment, January 27, 1998, to the date of the letter conveying the check, September 3, 2004, six years and 220 days, and then to principal. Applying the payment to the interest resulted in the amount of $5,170.24 remaining available to reduce the principal amount of the judgment. After applying that amount, $10,048.62 remained owing on the judgment and Ms. Mauldin claims that interest began running on that amount on September 3, 2004 at the rate of $2.7530 per day.
Discussion of the Law and Ruling
Dr. Maris argues that in order for interest to run on a judgment, a party must move to reopen judgment so that the court can order the interest be added to the judgment. Ms. Mauldin maintains that the foregoing argument is incorrect. The court agrees.
Connecticut General Statutes § 52-350f provides:
A money judgment may be enforced against any property of the judgment debtor unless the property is exempt . . . The money judgment may be enforced, by execution or by foreclosure of a real property lien, to the amount of the money judgment with (1) all statutory costs and fees as provided by the general statutes, (2) interest as provided by chapter 673 on the money judgment and on the costs incurred in obtaining the judgment, and (3) any attorneys fees allowed pursuant to section 52-400c.
"Interest as provided by chapter 673," is a reference to Connecticut General Statutes § 37-3a, which provides:
(a) Except as provided in sections 37-3b, 37-3c and 52-192a, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.
Unless a judgment is set aside, judgment is entered as a matter of course and interest runs from the date of verdict. Clime v. Gregor, 145 Conn. 74, 76, 138 A.2d 794 (1958). In Little v. United National Investors Corp., 160 Conn. 534, 280 A.2d 890 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that Connecticut has provided for interest on judgments since 1860:
Connecticut has by statute long provided for interest on judgments. The first enactment appears to be chapter 34 of the Public Acts of 1860. This is the predecessor of the present 52-349 and provided that "lawful interest upon the amount of the judgment upon which such execution is issued shall form a part of the amount to be collected by the officer to whom such execution or executions may be directed and delivered." In the light of the continuance of this statutory direction down to the present General Statutes 52-349, the common-law impediment to interest on judgments does not exist in Connecticut.
There is no authority to support Dr. Maris' contention that interest is not due on a judgment unless the plaintiff moves to reopen judgment for the purpose of adding interest. This contention is a continuation of Dr. Maris' recreational litigation.
As set forth above, as of the date hereof, $10,742.38 is due from Dr. Maris to Ms. Mauldin on the judgment. This amount is composed of $10,048.62, the amount of the judgment remaining after applying Dr. Maris' payment to interest and then principal, and $693.76, interest from September 3, 2004, the date of the payment, until the date hereof. Interest will continue to run under § 37-3a until the judgment is paid in full. The defendant is not required to release the lien until she has been paid in full. Therefore, the court denies the Petition.
The defendant, Ms. Mauldin, is also seeking attorneys fees under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-400c, which provides, in pertinent part:
In the discretion of the court, a reasonable attorneys fee may be allowed to the prevailing party . . . (3) for counsel at any other hearing that is reasonable and necessary for the enforcement of rights pursuant to a postjudgment procedure that is held on a claim or defense that the court determines was made for the purpose of harassment or solely for the purpose of delay.
The court finds that the Petition has no legal basis and was made solely for the purpose of continuing the plaintiff's harassment of the defendant and to delay full payment to the defendant on the original judgment. Attorney Donovan has submitted an invoice for 5 hours of legal service. However, that invoice makes no charge for the many letters that Attorney Donovan wrote to the plaintiff's attorney, preparation of the Judgment Liens or for Attorney Donovan's court appearance on this matter. Therefore, the court awards the defendant the amount of $5,000 in attorneys fees. Interest will run on that amount at the rate of 10% per annum from the date hereof.
By the court,
Aurigemma, J.