Opinion
No. 1819 C.D. 2013
06-11-2014
Jack S. Marinos, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
Jack S. Marinos (Claimant) petitions for review of the September 6, 2013 order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming the decision of a referee and holding that Claimant is ineligible for benefits under section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law). We affirm.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(b). Section 402(b) of the Law provides that an employee shall be ineligible for benefits for any week in which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.
Claimant was employed at Collegiate Furnishings, Inc. (Employer), as a full-time production team member beginning December 12, 2005. In November 2011, Claimant suffered a work-related injury to his left shoulder for which he underwent surgery in March 2012. After the surgery, Claimant returned to work with restrictions, and he performed light duty work for periods of time. On July 18, 2012, Claimant suffered a knee injury but Employer's insurance carrier did not accept liability. Claimant last worked for Employer on August 4, 2012. In November 2012, Claimant underwent a second surgery for his shoulder. (Findings of Fact Nos. 1-4.)
On April 5, 2013, Claimant signed a compromise and release agreement (Agreement) with Employer, which provided Claimant with a $55,000.00 settlement for his workers' compensation claims minus $11,000.00 paid to Claimant's attorney. In relevant part, the Agreement states: "Claimant is not currently employed with [Employer]. Further, claimant confirms that he has no right of reemployment with [Employer]." (C.R. at Item No. 9, Claimant's exhibit 1.)
The record reflects that Claimant was represented by counsel throughout the settlement negotiations. On April 15, 2013, the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) approved the Agreement. (Certified Record (C.R.) at Item No. 9, Claimant's exhibit 1.) Before a WCJ approves a compromise and release agreement, section 449 of the Workers' Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, added by section 22 of the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, as amended, 77 P.S. §1000.5, provides that the WCJ must hold a hearing and determine "that the claimant understands the full legal significance of the agreement." Id.
Thereafter, Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The local service center determined that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under section 402(b) of the Law because, although he voluntarily quit his employment due to cause of a necessitous and compelling reason, he did not exhaust all alternatives prior to quitting.
Claimant appealed, and a referee held a hearing on June 14, 2013. Claimant testified that he sustained a work-related shoulder injury in November 2011, which required him to undergo two surgeries. Claimant stated that he has not physically worked for Employer since August 2012 and that Employer never informed him that work was available following his November 2012 surgery. He stated that he believed he could have resumed his employment in February 2013. Claimant acknowledged that he signed the Agreement with Employer on April 5, 2013, resolving his workers' compensation claim. However, Claimant testified that he never signed a letter of resignation and had not previously quit or resigned from his employment. Claimant stated that, when he signed the Agreement, he was acknowledging that he could not force Employer to rehire him. According to Claimant, he never informed Employer he was quitting his employment and he signed the Agreement so that he could resume working. Claimant testified that he was not informed prior to signing the Agreement nor by the Agreement itself that he had the option of resuming his employment. However, Claimant acknowledged that Employer's insurance carrier informed him that if he did not sign the Agreement, he could find another job and continue to receive benefits for any difference in his earnings. (Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 5-6, 8-10, 12-13, 15.)
Tom Meade (Meade), Employer's owner, testified that Claimant suffered two work-related injuries and did not resume his light-duty work after his second surgery. Meade stated that he was not personally involved in negotiating the Agreement and had no first-hand knowledge of the negotiations other than what was reported to him. Meade testified that he talked to the insurance carrier's attorney on the phone during the negotiations but said he was not present at the meeting to hear the parties' discussion. He stated that he assured Claimant that there was work available to him and that he informed counsel for Employer's insurer prior to negotiations that work was available to Claimant in lieu of a settlement. Meade also stated that Employer never hired a replacement for Claimant and that other employees had covered Claimant's responsibilities during his absence. (N.T. at 13-17.)
By decision and order dated July 3, 2013, the referee affirmed the local service center's determination, stating that it is well settled that employees who resign from their employment in order to settle a workers' compensation claim are not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits under section 402(b) of the Law.
Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the referee's decision and adopted the findings and conclusions summarized above. The Board relied on Lee v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 33 A.3d 717 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), and concluded that, because Claimant quit his employment in order to settle his workers' compensation claim, he did not have a necessitous and compelling reason to quit. The Board characterized Claimant's argument that the Agreement merely stated that Claimant could not force Employer to rehire him and not that he was severing his ties with Employer as being "without merit and def[ying] reason." (C.R. at Item No. 13.)
On appeal to this Court, Claimant argues that the Board erred in determining that he resigned from his employment.
Our scope of review in an unemployment compensation appeal is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §704.
Whether a claimant has quit voluntarily or has been discharged is a question of law subject to this Court's review. Port Authority of Allegheny County v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 955 A.2d 1070, 1074 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). When an employee resigns, leaves, or quits without action by the employer, the employee has voluntarily quit for purposes of unemployment compensation benefits. Davila v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 926 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). In determining whether a claimant has quit voluntarily, this Court considers the totality of the circumstances. Port Authority, 955 A.2d at 1074. When a claimant executes a resignation/release in consideration of a workers' compensation claim settlement, the claimant voluntarily quits his employment without necessitous and compelling cause. Lee, 33 A.3d at 721.
In Lee, the claimant sustained a work-related injury and received workers' compensation benefits while working in a light-duty position with the employer. Subsequently, the claimant and the employer's insurance carrier settled the workers' compensation claim. In consideration for the settlement agreement, the claimant signed a separate resignation/release, resigning from her light-duty position with the employer. The referee determined that the claimant was eligible for benefits because she did not voluntarily quit but was forced to resign from her employment. The Board reversed the referee's decision, finding that the claimant voluntarily quit her employment as part of the settlement agreement, and, thus, held that the claimant was ineligible for benefits under section 402(b) of the Law.
On appeal to this Court, the claimant argued that she had a necessitous and compelling reason for quitting her employment due to pressure from the employer's insurance carrier for her to resign as part of her settlement. We determined that the claimant's testimony supported the Board's conclusion that she voluntarily quit her employment in order to settle her workers' compensation claim. We held that "when a claimant agrees to execute a resignation/release in order to settle a workers' compensation claim, the claimant terminates her employment voluntarily without necessitous and compelling cause." Id. at 721.
Claimant contends that he never resigned from his employment and that Lee is distinguishable from the present case, because, unlike the facts in Lee, Claimant refused to sign a letter of resignation. However, although Claimant never signed a separate letter of resignation, we agree with the Board that, based on the Agreement's specific language acknowledging the termination of Claimant and Employer's employment relationship, Claimant resigned from his employment as consideration for the settlement of his workers' compensation claim. Claimant testified that he understood Employer had no obligation to rehire him, indicating that he understood he was separating from employment with Employer. (N.T. at 6.) Moreover, the Board specifically found that Claimant understood he was no longer employed by Employer when he signed the Agreement and rejected Claimant's testimony to the contrary as not credible.
A voluntary quit to settle Claimant's claim with Employer is in no way equivalent to a voluntary withdrawal from the entire labor market.
We do not hold that merely because Claimant signed a compromise and release agreement he is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits but that Claimant is ineligible because the Agreement he signed contains language recognizing that "Claimant is not currently employed with [Employer]. Further, claimant confirms that he has no right of reemployment with [Employer]." (C.R. at Item No. 9, Claimant's exhibit 1). A claimant can settle a workers' compensation claim and then return to employment with the same employer where the compromise and release agreement does not mention termination of the claimant's employment. However, if the compromise and release agreement includes language acknowledging the end of the employment relationship, the claimant no longer works for the employer upon the execution of the compromise and release agreement.
The Agreement in this case specifically acknowledges that the employment relationship is over between Claimant and Employer. Significantly, the Board specifically rejected Claimant's testimony that, when he voluntarily signed the Agreement, he did not understand that he was severing his employment relationship with Employer. Claimant was not forced to settle his workers' compensation claim; he could have remained employed and collected workers' compensation benefits until Employer returned him to work or established that work was available elsewhere. In addition, Claimant offered no evidence or argument that Employer discharged him.
In unemployment cases, the Board is the ultimate fact-finder, empowered to make all determinations as to witness credibility and evidentiary weight. Peak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 501 A.2d 1383, 1385 (Pa. 1985). The Board's findings are conclusive and binding on appeal where the record contains substantial evidence to support them. Brannigan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 887 A.2d 841, 843 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Based on those findings and consistent with our holding in Lee, the Board properly concluded that by executing the Agreement settling his workers' compensation claim and acknowledging the termination of the working relationship with Employer, Claimant voluntarily quit his employment without a necessitous and compelling reason, and, thus, Claimant is ineligible for benefits pursuant to section 402(b) of the Law.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 2014, the September 6, 2013 order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is affirmed.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
DISSENTING OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Because I conclude that Jack S. Marinos (Claimant) did not voluntarily terminate his employment under section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), 43 P.S. §802(b), I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that this case is controlled by Lee v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 33 A.3d 717 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). In Lee, the claimant signed a "resignation/release" in which she specifically agreed to resign from her position in exchange for a lump-sum settlement of her workers' compensation claim. Id. at 718. Here, however, Claimant refused to sign a letter of resignation from his employment with Collegiate Furnishings Inc. (Employer). (N.T., 6/14/13, at 8.) Although Claimant signed a compromise and release agreement (Agreement) to settle his workers' compensation claim, the Agreement did not contain a resignation clause as did the agreement in Lee. Here, the Agreement stated, "Claimant is not currently employed with [Employer]. Further, [C]laimant confirms that he has no right of re-employment with [Employer]." (Agmt. at 3.) I cannot conclude, based on this language, that Claimant intended to voluntarily resign from his employment when he settled his workers' compensation claim.
In interpreting the Agreement, the majority relies on Claimant's testimony that he understood that Employer was not obligated to rehire him and the finding of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that Claimant knew he "was severing his ties with [Employer]" when he signed the Agreement. (Board's Op. at 1.) A claimant's acknowledgement that he is not employed by his employer and has no right of re-employment does not necessarily equate to a voluntarily resignation. Even though Claimant knew he was severing ties with Employer by signing the Agreement, he did not intend to voluntarily resign, as evidenced by his refusal to sign a letter of resignation. (See N.T., 6/14/13, at 8.) Therefore, I believe this case is distinguishable from Lee in a key respect.
Rather, Claimant's confirmation that he has no right of re-employment was an acknowledgement of his at-will employment status with Employer.
Claimant's last day of work was August 4, 2012. (Board's Findings of Fact, No. 1.) Thus, when he signed the Agreement in April 2013, Claimant's only "tie" to Employer was his receipt of workers' compensation benefits. --------
Accordingly, because I conclude that Claimant did not voluntarily resign from his employment under section 402(b) of the Law, I would reverse.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge