Opinion
2011-08-9
Christine MARINO, et al., respondents,v.LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SALIBURY & CAMBRIA, LLP, et al., appellants.
Abrams, Gorelick, Friedman & Jacobson, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Barry Jacobs and Shari D. Sckolnick of counsel), for appellants.Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, New York, N.Y., for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), entered November 1, 2010, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
“To state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the attorney ‘failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession,’ and (2) that the attorney's breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiff actual and ascertainable damages” ( Dempster v. Liotti, 86 A.D.3d 169, 924 N.Y.S.2d 484, 489–490, quoting Leder v. Spiegel, 9 N.Y.3d 836, 837, 840 N.Y.S.2d 888, 872 N.E.2d 1194, cert. denied 552 U.S. 1257, 128 S.Ct. 1696, 170 L.Ed.2d 354; see Rudolf v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 N.Y.3d 438, 442, 835 N.Y.S.2d 534, 867 N.E.2d 385).
“To establish the element of causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages but for the attorney's negligence” ( Snolis v. Clare, 81 A.D.3d 923, 925, 917 N.Y.S.2d 299, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 702, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 74720, 2011 WL 2183766 [2011]; see Rudolf v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 N.Y.3d at 442, 835 N.Y.S.2d 534, 867 N.E.2d 385; Kluczka v. Lecci, 63 A.D.3d 796, 797, 880 N.Y.S.2d 698; Wray v. Mallilo & Grossman, 54 A.D.3d 328, 329, 863 N.Y.S.2d 228).
“On a motion for summary judgment in the legal malpractice context, the defendant must ‘demonstrate that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one of the essential elements of a legal malpractice cause of action’ ( Greene v. Sager, 78 A.D.3d 777, 779, 910 N.Y.S.2d 546; see Eisenberger v. Septimus, 44 A.D.3d 994, 845 N.Y.S.2d 102; Kotzian v. McCarthy, 36 A.D.3d 863, 827 N.Y.S.2d 875). Once a defendant makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise an issue of fact requiring a trial ( see Siciliano v. Forchelli & Forchelli, 17 A.D.3d 343, 345, 793 N.Y.S.2d 102; Schadoff v. Russ, 278 A.D.2d 222, 717 N.Y.S.2d 284)” ( Dempster v. Liotti, 86 A.D.3d at 178–81, 924 N.Y.S.2d 484, 491–492).
Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the first cause of action alleging legal malpractice by demonstrating that the plaintiffs would be able to prove neither of the essential elements of that cause of action. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718). Thus, the Supreme Court should have awarded the
defendants summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action.
Further, the Supreme Court should have awarded the defendants summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action alleging breach of contract as duplicative of the legal malpractice cause of action ( see Scartozzi v. Potruch, 72 A.D.3d 787, 789, 898 N.Y.S.2d 252; Kvetnaya v. Tylo, 49 A.D.3d 608, 609, 854 N.Y.S.2d 425; Campbell v. Tamsen, 37 A.D.3d 636, 637, 830 N.Y.S.2d 338; Town of N. Hempstead v. Winston & Strawn, LLP, 28 A.D.3d 746, 749, 814 N.Y.S.2d 237; Ferdinand v. Crecca & Blair, 5 A.D.3d 538, 539, 774 N.Y.S.2d 714).
SKELOS, J.P., BELEN, HALL and ROMAN, JJ., concur.