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Marine Trust Co. v. Reynolds
308 Ill. App. 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941)4 Citing cases
Wallace v. Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc.
300 N.E.2d 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) Cited 8 timesWe are mindful of the accepted rule established by a long line of Illinois cases that the reviewing court does not disturb findings of fact and the resolving of conflicts in evidence by the trial court unless the judgment or order appealed from is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of this principle appellee cites Croft v. Lamkin, 112 Ill. App.2d 321, 251 N.E.2d 88; and Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo v. Reynolds, 308 Ill. App. 595, 32 N.E.2d 366. But our Illinois courts have also recognized that though a strong presumption exists in favor of the trial court's findings, it is a rebuttable presumption. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(b)(1) (ii) (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110A, sec. 366(b)(1)(ii)) states:
Cline v. Cline
139 N.E.2d 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957) Cited 4 timesWe have reviewed the evidence as presented on appeal and cannot agree with such contention. Where a Chancellor has heard the testimony of witnesses in open court, his findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless clearly and palpably against the weight of the evidence (People ex rel. White v. Underwood, 1 Ill.2d 620, 627; Calcutt v. Gaylor, 415 Ill. 390), and all presumptions are indulged in favor of findings of fact by a Chancellor (Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo v. Reynolds, 308 Ill. App. 595; Union Drain. Dist. No. 5 v. Hamilton, 390 Ill. 487, 493). [5] It has frequently been determined that where the cause is heard by a Chancellor without a jury, his findings of fact are entitled to the same weight as a jury's verdict, and that the Court should be guided by the same principles as would be applied had there been a jury verdict.
Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.
325 Ill. App. 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945) Cited 70 timesIn Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 421, a garnishment proceeding involving the construction of a similar exclusion provision, this court held that the insurance company as garnishee was not liable.
The findings of a trial court will be sustained unless wholly unsupported by the evidence. ( Winnetka Park Dist. v. Hopkins, 371 Ill. 46; Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo v. Reynolds, 308 Ill. App. 595.) For the reasons hereinabove given, we feel that the trial court, from the evidence in this case, was justified in discharging the garnishee.
Marine Trust Co. v. Reynolds
308 Ill. App. 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941)Opinion filed February 26, 1941 Rehearing denied March 10, 1941 The facts and the law in this case are controlled by the facts and the law in the case of Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo v. Reynolds, 308 Ill. App. 595. Appeal from Superior Court of Cook county; Hon. FRANCIS B. ALLEGRETTI, presiding.