Opinion
A147183
08-11-2017
MARINA BAY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHAUNÉ WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC12-02677)
Defendant and appellant Chauné Williams (Williams), appearing in pro per, appeals from the trial court's orders denying her motion to set aside a default judgment and denying her motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Respondent Marina Bay Community Association (Marina Bay) is a California nonprofit mutual benefit corporation; its membership is comprised of the owners of condominiums within the Marina Bay community in Richmond. Appellant Williams was the owner of a Marina Bay condominium from June 1, 2007 through April 15, 2010, when the condominium was sold at public auction.
On July 1, 2009, Williams filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Marina Bay is listed as a creditor in the petition. On December 8, the bankruptcy court entered an order discharging Williams' debt pursuant to section 727 of title 11 of the United States Code.
Williams' August 26, 2016 request for judicial notice of the petition and the bankruptcy court's December 8, 2009 order is granted.
In November 2012, Marina Bay filed an action against Williams alleging breach of contract and seeking to recover unpaid assessments from August 1, 2009 through April 1, 2010, along with interest, late fees, collection costs, attorney's fees, and court costs. Williams failed to answer the complaint and her default was entered on January 10, 2013.
On May 20, 2013, the default was set aside pursuant to a "Stipulation and Order to Set Aside Default." Williams' appearance fee was paid and her status on the trial court's website was changed from "Defaulted" to "Served." On June 10, counsel for Marina Bay told Williams in an e-mail that the court's website indicated the order setting aside the default was signed May 20. On June 25, counsel for Marina Bay informed Williams by e-mail that her status on the website had been changed to "served."
On August 12, 2013, Williams' default was entered for a second time. In February 2014, Williams moved to set aside the default pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion in June 2014, reasoning "[Williams] fails to show any valid justification for failing to file an answer after the original default was set aside last year." Later in June, Williams moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion in October. Among other things, the court pointed out Williams had been informed her status had been changed to "served" and "[t]he only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this change in status was that the stipulation defendant Williams had submitted had been approved, and [Williams'] default had been set aside. [Williams] fails to explain why she did not file an answer promptly thereafter. [Marina Bay] waited almost seven weeks (48 days) after the June 25 email before taking [Williams'] second default."
On November 5, 2015, a default judgment was entered against Williams. Marina Bay was awarded $10,455.88, including amounts for the unpaid assessments, interest, late fees, collection costs, the filing fee, the process server fee, and attorney's fees.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Williams presents several claims of error. Each fails.
First, Williams contends the default judgment is void because the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims in the complaint. (See, e.g., Satten v. Webb (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 365, 376-377 [discussing exclusivity of bankruptcy jurisdiction].) However, Marina Bay points out in its brief on appeal that the complaint seeks to recover only for assessments and related charges that accrued after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. (See In re Gull Air, Inc. (1st Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 1255, 1263 ["proceedings or claims arising post-petition are not subject to the automatic [bankruptcy] stay"]; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).) Williams failed to file a reply brief addressing Marina Bay's arguments. While this is not an admission the appeal lacks merit (Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1218, fn. 4), we will not endeavor to respond to Marina Bay's arguments on Williams' behalf. Williams has not demonstrated the default judgment is void due to the prior bankruptcy proceeding. (See Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448 (Interinsurance Exchange) ["Appellant must affirmatively show error by an adequate record; error is never presumed."].)
Second, Williams contends the default judgment is void because the relief granted exceeds the amount demanded in the complaint. (See, e.g., Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826; Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 830-831.) Marina Bay asserts in its brief on appeal that "[e]ach element of" the award "was identified in the complaint. [Willaims] knew the principal demand of the complaint, and was aware that [Marina Bay] was seeking interest at 12% from October 1, 2012 to judgment, court costs, filing and process server fees, and attorney['s] fees. Obviously, at the time [Marina Bay] filed the complaint, interest, filing fees, process server fees and attorney's fees were not able to be calculated; nevertheless, they were identified as elements of damages claimed by [Marina Bay]." Notably, the sums specifically demanded in the complaint comprise over $7,500 of the $10,455.88 award; additional interest comprises another $2,291.90; and the remaining fees amount only to $587.56. As noted previously, Williams failed to file a reply brief addressing Marina Bay's arguments. Williams has not demonstrated the default judgment is void because the relief granted exceeds the amount demanded in the complaint. (See Interinsurance Exchange, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448.)
Rule 3.1700(a)(2) of the California Rules of Court provides, "A party seeking a default judgment who claims costs must request costs on the Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100) at the time of applying for the judgment." Williams contends no such form was filed in the present case, but in fact Marina Bay did file the form and request costs therein.
Finally, Williams claims she "was under the honest and mistaken belief that the court never signed the stipulation" to set aside the default and she "mistakenly believed the trial court was taking an extended time processing the order." The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams' motion to set aside the default and motion for reconsideration. (Parage v. Couedel (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1041.) Assuming the truth of Williams' assertions, she still fails to show "reasonable diligence" or "excusable neglect," given that she could have easily confirmed whether the order had been signed. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's orders are affirmed.
/s/_________
SIMONS, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.