Opinion
A168832 A169980
12-17-2024
In re T.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. L.G., Defendant and Appellant. MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Marin County Super. Ct. Nos. JV27156A, JV27156)
CHOU, J.
In this juvenile dependency proceeding, defendant L.G. (Father) appeals from orders issued in July 2023 and January 2024 regarding his son, T.G. (the minor), after hearings held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3. Father contends: (1) the juvenile court improperly delegated judicial discretion to plaintiff and respondent Marin County Health and Human Services (Department) concerning his visitation with the minor; (2) the court abused its discretion by failing to enforce its visitation orders; and (3) no substantial evidence supported the court's findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to maintain the minor's important relationships. We will affirm the orders.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Earlier Proceedings
For context, we summarize the earlier proceedings as described in our opinion in one of Father's prior appeals (Case No. A167431) - which the parties do not dispute. (In re T.G. (Aug. 16, 2024, A167431) [nonpub. opn.].)
Father has requested judicial notice of this court's opinions in Case Nos. A164680, A166192, and A166524 and of the records and briefs filed in Case Nos. A164680, A166192, A166524, A167431, and A168832, all of which were proceedings that Father previously initiated in this court. We deferred our ruling on the request pending consideration of the merits. We now grant the unopposed request.
The minor was born in November 2010. (In re T.G., supra, A167431.) The Department filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300, and Father (and the minor's mother) submitted to jurisdiction in January 2022 based on an amended petition alleging that Father negligently failed to adequately protect the minor from the mother. The juvenile court placed the minor in a Short-Term Residential Therapeutic Placement (STRTP) at Greenacre. (Ibid.)
Father appealed from the disposition order, claiming that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's conclusion that it would be detrimental to the minor if placed in his care (Case No. A164680). We affirmed the order. (In re T.G., supra, A167431.)
At the six-month status review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), the juvenile court again ruled that it would be detrimental to place the minor in Father's care. Father appealed (Case No. A166192). While the appeal was pending, the court re-authorized the minor's placement in a STRTP. Father appealed that order as well (Case No. A166524). (In re T.G., supra, A167431.)
We consolidated those two appeals and affirmed. We found that substantial evidence supported the ruling that placing the minor in Father's care would still be detrimental to the minor because" 'Father did not comply with aspects of his case plan,'" " 'did not make progress in eliminating the issues that led to the detriment finding at disposition,'" and" 'had not shown an ability to handle [the minor's] needs or addressed concerns about his [own] substance use.'" We also affirmed the placement of the minor in the STRTP. (In re T.G., supra, A167431.)
For the 12-month status review, the Department's November 2022 report recommended termination of reunification services. The Department asserted that Father had made only minimal progress on his case plan objectives, was extremely resistant to services and supports, pushed back on individual therapy, denied any need for concern about his substance abuse history, refused to undergo a substance abuse assessment, continued to test positive for marijuana, had nearly no support network and resented the minor having one, disputed the need for services that had helped the minor stabilize and progress, denied any responsibility for the past neglect of the minor, and displayed a very volatile temper with Department workers and other providers. (In re T.G., supra, A167431.) The Department's January 2023 addendum report advised that, while Father represented that he lived on a boat, the harbormaster informed the social worker that no one was allowed to stay on a boat overnight and that Father was not allowed on the boat more than three days a week. (Ibid.) The Department also discovered that Father told Marin County Behavioral Health and Recovery Services that he had no mental health concerns, which led to the unavailability of county services and required the Department to look elsewhere to assist Father. (Ibid.)
In February 2023, the juvenile court ruled that the minor could not be returned to Father and that services were reasonable and could not be extended to the 18-month date based on a substantial probability of return. (In re T.G., supra, A167431.) The court terminated reunification services for Father and reduced Father's supervised visits with the minor from twice a week to once a week. (Ibid.)
Father appealed from the 12-month review order, contending the juvenile court erred because he did not receive reasonable services and because there was a substantial probability the minor would be returned to his care if services were provided. (In re T.G., supra, A167431.) We affirmed the order.
With Father's reunification services terminated, the matter proceeded to hearings pursuant to section 366.3, which are the subject of these consolidated appeals.
B. July 2023 Section 366.3 Hearing
The Department reported that the minor continued to make progress with his academics and emotional and behavioral health in his STRTP placement. He met regularly with a school counselor, therapist, and psychiatrist, and he started on psychotropic medication. He maintained contact with his mother, adult half-sibling, paternal aunt, CASA, and former resource parent.
The Department recounted that Father's supervised visits with the minor had been reduced from twice a week to once a week at the 12-month hearing. Father thereafter visited with the minor once a week until visits were paused in June 2023 due to Father's persistent refusal to meet behavioral expectations for the visits.
The Department described several incidents contributing to the pause in visitation. For example, on March 8, 2023, Greenacre staff reported that the first thing Father did at his visit was to ask the minor in an angry voice why he had not been calling. Staff observed that Father appeared upset and the minor looked worried during the interaction. When Father asked staff about going to the minor's first baseball game and staff explained that changes to his visitation days would need to be arranged with the Department, Father became visibly upset in front of the minor, raising his voice and maintaining an angry tone for three minutes. When later queried by the social worker, Father denied that there was any argument, blamed staff for upsetting the minor, and yelled at the social worker that everything was always blamed on him. When the social worker attempted to explore the impact of Father's behavior on the minor, Father responded, "don't blame anything on me, I wasn't even involved." Father denied becoming upset about the minor not calling enough and denied he broke the rules for visits.
There were other examples of Father's problematic behavior. During a supervised phone call on May 30, 2023, Father complained to the minor that the social worker did not allow him to attend a school event and "went on a rant," claiming that everyone was trying to humiliate him. During an in-person visit on June 7, 2023, Father complained to the minor that Greenacre staff would not change his visit days to accommodate his schedule. When staff attempted to redirect the discussion, Father raised his voice, said the conversation was between father and son, and continued arguing with staff in a raised voice. After a two-minute break, Father calmed down and resumed the visit without further issues.
Greenacre staff advised the Department that it was difficult to redirect Father when he was upset. He repeatedly became argumentative, raised his voice, and made inappropriate comments when staff attempted to discuss scheduling visits and following visit expectations. Staff noted that nearly every phone call with Father was "incredibly hostile and rude."
Due to Father's ongoing failure to follow visit expectations, the Department paused his contact with the minor on June 12, 2023, until Father met with the social worker to review visit expectations and express a commitment to them. The social worker spoke with Father by phone, but Father refused to meet in person because he did not believe there were any issues to discuss and because he felt unfairly blamed. Father's visits therefore remained paused.
As a further consequence of Father violating visit expectations, resisting redirection, being argumentative, and putting the minor in the middle of those arguments, the Department asked the juvenile court to reduce the frequency of visits once they resumed. The case plan attached to the Department's report provided that Father would be offered visits twice a month for a total of two hours per month. Father could also have one supervised phone call per week. The Department would have discretion to increase or decrease the frequency, length, and nature of supervision based on Father's attendance, the quality of visitation, and the minor's medical and emotional needs.
The Department observed that the minor had made considerable progress since it became involved. The treatment team opined that continued STRTP placement was appropriate, but transitioning to a family-based setting was in the minor's best interest and should be pursued as soon as possible.
At the permanency hearing on July 25, 2023, Father did not appear. The juvenile court announced it had read and considered the Department's report. County counsel advised that the Department continued to reach out to Father to work with him so visits could resume, but he had not responded. According to Father's attorney, Father objected to the minor's continued placement at the STRTP, was uncomfortable meeting at the Department, and preferred another location or a phone call.
The juvenile court granted the Department's request to reduce visits to two times per month, for a total of two hours per month. In doing so, the court expressed its "concern[] about the negative messaging constantly coming from [F]ather." The court also ordered supervised phone calls once a week for a total of 15 minutes. The orders after hearing, which tracked the case plan in the Department's reports, further stated that "[t]he Department has the discretion to increase or decrease the frequency and length of visitation, as well as the nature of supervision (supervised, unsupervised, therapeutic, etc.), based on the parents' attendance, quality of visitation, and the child's medical and emotional needs, with 72-hour notice to minor's counsel."
In other matters, the juvenile court found that the Department had "made efforts to maintain the child's relationships with the individuals who are important to the child, consistent with the child's best interest." It also found that out-of-home placement continued to be necessary and in the minor's best interests and ordered the minor to remain in foster care with a permanent plan of "legal guardianship."
Father timely appealed from the July 25, 2023 order (Case No. A168832).
C. January 2024 Section 366.3 Hearing
In December 2023, the Department filed its status review report for the second section 366.3 hearing. The Department advised that the minor was scheduled to be "stepped down" from his STRTP placement at Greenacre on December 23, 2023, and placed with an approved relative (his adult half-sibling), who had moved to the North Bay in August 2023 and consistently visited and engaged in family therapy with the minor. The minor also continued to spend time with his CASA, former resource parent, mother, paternal aunt, and paternal cousin. Visits between Father and the minor remained paused, however, as Father continued to refuse to meet with the social worker at the Department to discuss the Department's concerns that led to the pause.
The proposed case plan attached to the Department's report provided that the Department would continue to offer Father supervised visits twice a month, for a total of two hours per month, as well as one supervised phone call per week. The case plan recounted the pause in visitation and Father's refusal to meet with the social worker for the visits to resume. The case plan again included the Department's discretion to adjust the frequency, length, and nature of visitation.
The CASA's report, filed on January 11, 2024, indicated that the most significant development since the prior hearing was the minor's transition from Greenacre, where he resided since mid-2022, to placement with his half-sibling. The CASA believed this was a very positive development, noting that the minor's attitude had improved since he began spending time with the half-sibling and his visits with Father were suspended.
On January 16, 2024, the juvenile court advised that it had reviewed the Department's report and case plan and the CASA's report, and that it intended to adopt the proposed findings and orders. Father's counsel obtained a continuance of the hearing.
At the continued hearing on January 23, 2024, Father and his attorney reiterated that Father did not want to meet at the Department's office with the social worker but was open to meeting in public or by phone. County counsel stated that the Department's practice was to meet with parents at the office for safety and security concerns, and in this case Father had become extremely angry with the social worker. The juvenile court encouraged Father to meet with the social worker and did not require that the meeting be outside the Department's office. Father's counsel did not raise the issue of the Department's discretion to increase or decrease visits.
The juvenile court announced that it would adopt the findings and orders proposed in the visitation attachment JV-400 to the Department's report. The JV-400 used the same language as the case plan and July 2023 order, allowing two visits per month and one supervised phone call per week. The order recognized that visits were paused due to ongoing issues with Father not meeting visit expectations and granted the Department discretion to increase or decrease the frequency and length of visits and adjust the nature of supervision, based on the parent's attendance, the quality of the visits, and the minor's medical and emotional needs. In addition, the court found that the minor's placement with the half-sibling was appropriate and in the minor's best interest. Finally, the court found that the Department had made efforts to maintain the minor's relationships with the persons who were important to the minor, consistent with the minor's best interest.
Father timely filed a timely notice of appeal from the January 23, 2024 order (Case No. A169980). We consolidated Case Nos. A168832 and A169980.
II. DISCUSSION
Father contends the visitation orders must be reversed because the juvenile court improperly delegated judicial discretion to the Department and failed to enforce its visitation orders. He further contends no substantial evidence supported the court's finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to maintain the minor's important relationships. As discussed below, Father's arguments are unpersuasive.
A. Visitation Orders
1. Delegation of Judicial Discretion
As to both the July 2023 and January 2024 orders, Father contends the juvenile court improperly delegated discretion to the Department to determine whether Father would have visitation or contact with the minor. His contention is unavailing.
Preliminarily, Father forfeited any right to challenge the delegation language in the July 2023 and January 2024 orders because he never complained about it in the juvenile court. Father does not identify anywhere in the record where Father challenged that language. Nonetheless, we will exercise our discretion to entertain his arguments. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293-1294, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.)
On the merits, Father fails to show that the juvenile court improperly granted discretion to the Department. It is well established that the court may delegate the management of visitation details to the social worker. (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374 (Moriah T.) "Such matters as time, place and manner of visitation do not affect the defined right of a parent to see his or her child and thus do not infringe upon the judicial function." (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) The" 'time, place and manner of visitation'" includes "the frequency and length of visits." (Moriah T., at p. 1376, italics added.) Indeed, "[o]nly when a visitation order delegates to the probation office or county welfare department the absolute discretion to determine whether any visitation occurs does the order violate the statutory scheme and separation of powers doctrine." (Id. at p. 1374, italics added; cf. In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212-215 [juvenile court did not improperly delegate judicial functions by authorizing probation department to offer community service to resolve alleged probation violation].)
Here, the July 2023 and January 2024 orders required that the Department offer Father supervised visits twice a month, for a total of two hours per month, as well as one supervised phone call a week for a total of 15 minutes. The juvenile court thus ordered that visitation take place and set forth the general parameters. Although the orders gave the Department discretion to adjust the frequency, length, and nature of the visitation, those adjustments would have to be based on the parent's attendance, the quality of visitation, and the child's medical and emotional needs. In short, the court gave Father the right to visitation with a specified frequency and duration, while granting the Department discretion and flexibility to respond to changing needs and family circumstances based on specified criteria. Rather than delegating all of its authority over visitation to the Department, the court remained able to review the Department's exercise of discretion in adjusting the visitation details. The orders therefore did not grant the Department absolute discretion over visitation and were not erroneous.
The cases on which Father relies do not compel a different result. For example, in In re James R. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 413 (James R.), the juvenile court's visitation orders were reversed in a delinquency case because the orders delegated all decisions regarding family visits to a private entity. (Id. at pp. 441-443.) Here, by contrast, discretion was granted to the Department, rather than to a private entity that was not a party to the proceeding. Moreover, in James R., the court deferred to the private entity's determination of appropriate visitation, even though the court believed that more frequent visitation was warranted, leading the court of appeal to conclude that it had effectively delegated absolute authority over visitation to the entity. (Id. at p. 442.) Not so here.
Father suggests that it makes no difference whether the discretion is granted to the Department or to a third party. He is incorrect. (James R., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 443; In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 213; In re Donnovan J. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1476; see Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374 [" 'The Department . . . acts as an arm of the court in the best interests of the minor[,]'" and it is" 'within the Department's role as a representative of the state and as an arm of the court, as empowered by the Legislature, to exercise limited discretion in the administration of the juvenile court's visitation order' "].)
In In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119 (T.H.), the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction with custody to the mother and issued an exit order that allowed supervised visitation by the father" 'to be determined by the parents.'" (Id. at p. 1121.) The court of appeal concluded that the language effectively delegated to the mother the power to determine whether visits occurred at all, because she could agree to just one visit a year or less without violating the order. (Id. at p. 1123.) Here, by contrast, the juvenile court did not grant one parent veto power over another parent's visits or give absolute discretion over visitation to a third party. Moreover, unlike T.H., in which the court was terminating its jurisdiction over the matter, the court here retained jurisdiction to review any exercise of the Department's discretion.
In In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, the juvenile court's order provided that," 'if the children refuse a visit, then they shall not be forced to have a visit.'" (Id. at p. 318.) The court of appeal held that this language granted only an illusory right to visitation, because the order "transform[ed] the children's ability to refuse 'a visit' into the practical ability to forestall any visits at all." (Id. at p. 319.) That did not occur here. The minor was not granted authority to veto visitation altogether.
In In re Kyle E. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1130, the juvenile court ordered "visitation 'as frequent as is consistent with the well-being of [the minor],' with all other conditions, including determinations regarding time, place and manner, and frequency and length of visits, left to the discretion of the Department." (Id. at p. 1135.) The court of appeal concluded this was an "improper delegation of authority to the Department regarding whether visitation would occur at all" and remanded the matter for clarification of the visitation terms, including the minimum number of visits or a statement that visitation occur regularly. (Id. at pp. 1136-1137.) Here, by contrast, the orders set forth a definite visitation schedule of twice per month with a weekly phone call. In sum, Father fails to show an improper delegation of discretion to the Department.
At any rate, even if the juvenile court had granted too much discretion to the Department, such an error would be harmless because Father has not shown that the Department's discretion resulted in a decrease in his visitation. As of the July 2023 order, visitation was set at twice per month with one phone call a week, but those contacts were paused. Father does not contend that the Department used the discretion granted in that order to reduce visitation further. While the Department continued the pause of visitation, it only did so because Father continued to refuse to meet with the social worker at the Department's office to confirm visit expectations. The juvenile court implicitly approved this visitation pause at the January 2024 hearing, urging Father to meet with the Department and declining to order that such a meeting occur outside the Department's office.
Father nonetheless argues that "[t]he delegation and denial of contact under the delegation continues to prejudice [F]ather and the minor" because Father "is deprived of the opportunity to show the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) or show that a guardianship order would not serve the best interests of the minor." (In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505 (Hunter S.) [any hope of satisfying the statutory exception to termination of parental rights would require maintaining contact with the child].) He further argues that the lack of visitation deprives them of any real chance of reunification, compromises Father's due process rights, and precludes Father from obtaining the minor's return to his care or reinstatement of reunification services based on a change of circumstances under section 388. (See id. at pp. 15041506.)
The argument is unconvincing. First, Hunter S. is readily distinguishable. In Hunter S., the juvenile court granted the mother visitation only" 'as can be arranged,'" giving the child virtually complete discretion to veto the visits, which he exercised without any meaningful oversight by the court. (Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 15041506.) None of that occurred here.
Second, the absence of contact between Father and the minor since the July 2023 order was not the direct result of the delegation of authority to the Department. The pause in visitation, which pre-existed the July 2023 order, arose because of Father's failure to act with the modicum of civility that would make continued supervised visits at the STRTP reasonably possible. The continuation of the pause after the July 2023 order was due to Father's own actions. Father held the power to resume his visits by meeting with the social worker at the Department, but he refused to do so despite the juvenile court's urging.
Third, even if the pause in visitation could be attributed to the Department's discretion, there is no indication that the pause would make or break Father's ability to prove the beneficial relationship exception or demonstrate a change in circumstances to obtain additional services. Father's difficulties in proving those matters flow not from a lack of visitation, but from the same issues that precluded him from obtaining custody and that led to the cessation of reunification services: his antics at visits; making only minimal progress on his case plan objectives; resisting therapy and support; rejecting the Department's concern about his substance abuse history; refusing a substance abuse assessment; lacking a support network; disputing the need for the services that had helped the minor stabilize and progress; misrepresenting that he was authorized to live on a boat; and displaying a very volatile temper with Department personnel and Greenacre staff. There is no indication that more visits would have resolved these issues.
2. Enforcement of the Visitation Orders
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion "in failing to enforce its visitation orders and to ensure that visitation and contact between the minor and [L.G.] was facilitated." Specifically, he argues that the evidence did not support the "suspension" of contact and that "[n]o substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the suspension of contact and visitation served the child's best interests."
The parties debate whether Father forfeited this argument by not raising it sufficiently in the juvenile court. Even if not forfeited, the argument lacks merit.
Substantial evidence supported the pause in Father's visitation until he met with the social worker and confirmed his willingness to abide by the expectations for appropriate conduct during visits. Despite repeated efforts from the Department, Father had persisted in abusing and alienating the staff at Greenacre, where supervised visits were held. His angry arguments with staff and the social worker were at times in front of the minor and noticeably affected him. The CASA observed how much the minor's attitude had improved since he spent time with his half-sibling and not with Father. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that the pause in visitation served the minor's best interests.
Father tells us that "[w]e are looking for passing grades here, not straight A's," quoting from David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 790. The reference is inapt given the context of that case. (Ibid. ["When we are considering whether to deprive a parent of custody, we are concerned only about his or her grasp of the important parenting concepts," not insignificant details such as indulging a child's "preference for carrots over peas"].) In any event, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that Father's behavior did not merit a passing grade. Father fails to establish error in the visitation orders.
B. Efforts to Maintain the Minor's Relationships
Father next contends the juvenile court's finding under section 366.3, subdivision (e) - that the Department had made reasonable efforts to maintain the minor's relationship with individuals who are important to him - must be reversed because Father is an important person to the minor and because the Department did not make reasonable efforts to maintain the minor's relationship with him. The argument is untenable.
Where the juvenile court has selected long-term foster care as a minor's permanency plan, the court or an appropriate local agency must review the minor's status at least every six months. (§ 366.3, subds. (d), (e); see D.T. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1040.) As part of that review, the court must identify persons important to the child and evaluate efforts to maintain the child's relationship with them.
Section 366.3, subdivision (e) states in relevant part: "Except as provided in subdivision (g), at the review held every six months pursuant to subdivision (d), the reviewing body shall inquire about the progress being made to provide a permanent home for the child, shall consider the safety of the child, and shall determine all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Identification of individuals other than the child's siblings who are important to a child who is 10 years of age or older and has been in out-ofhome placement for six months or longer, and actions necessary to maintain the child's relationship with those individuals, provided that those relationships are in the best interest of the child. The social worker shall ask every child who is 10 years of age or older and who has been in out-of-home placement for six months or longer to identify individuals other than the child's siblings who are important to the child, and may ask any other child to provide that information, as appropriate. The social worker shall make efforts to identify other individuals who are important to the child, consistent with the child's best interests. [¶] (3) The continuing appropriateness and extent of compliance with the permanent plan for the child, including efforts to maintain relationships between a child who is 10 years of age or older and who has been in out-ofhome placement for six months or longer and individuals who are important to the child and efforts to identify a prospective adoptive parent or legal guardian, including, but not limited to, child-specific recruitment efforts and listing on an adoption exchange." (Italics added.)
Here, the Department's efforts in identifying people important to the minor and keeping those relationships resulted in the minor maintaining regular contact with his adult half-sibling, paternal aunt, CASA, and former resource parent. In addition, the Department took steps for the minor to maintain his relationship with Father. The Department recommended in its reports that Father be granted visitation with the minor twice per month and be allowed weekly phone contact. Neither the Department nor the juvenile court imposed any impediment to that contact other than requiring Father to meet with the social worker at the Department to confirm expectations for those visits. This condition was reasonable due to Father's inappropriate behavior at visits and its perceived impact on the minor. After pausing visits, the social worker reached out to Father and his attorney, but Father refused to meet the social worker because he felt unfairly blamed, because he believed there was nothing to discuss, and because he did not want to meet at the Department's office. As the court implicitly confirmed, holding the meeting at the office was appropriate for safety reasons given Father's fits of anger. Thus, even if Father qualifies as an important person under section 366.3, substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the Department made efforts to maintain the minor's relationships with individuals important to him, consistent with his best interest, as required by section 366.3, subdivision (e).
To the extent Father raises the issue, substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that services to the minor were adequate for purposes of section 366.3, subdivision (e)(6).
Father notes that the juvenile court did not make a formal finding that visits would be detrimental, and he urges that his conflicts with the social worker were not enough to justify the discontinuation of the minor's relationship with him. But there is no requirement under section 366.3 that the court make a formal finding of detriment, and the evidence amply suggested that Father's behavior during visits affected the minor adversely. Furthermore, Father's conflicts were not just with the social worker, but with the staff at Greenacre, where visits were to be held and supervised. Finally, neither the Department nor the court prohibited a continuing relationship between the minor and Father. That was Father's choice. Indeed, the fact that Father refused for months to meet with the social worker at the Department's office suggests that he believed it was more important to dictate the location of that meeting than to see his son.
III. DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SIMONS, ACTING P.J. BURNS, J.