Opinion
A148365
01-31-2017
In re K.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KARLA F., Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Marin County Super. Ct. No. JV26029)
Karla F. (Mother), mother of 16-year old K.F., seeks to reverse the juvenile court order limiting her right to make educational decisions for her daughter. We conclude the order is supported by the evidence and the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Mother's rights. So, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In November 2014, the Marin County Health and Human Services Department, (the Department) filed a dependency petition alleging 13-year old K.F. came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The petition alleged that K.F. was at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm because Mother's mental illness interfered with her ability to provide regular care for K.F. as well as Mother's failure to provide for K.F.'s support.
All further statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In December 2014, the juvenile court found the petition true and sustained the allegations. K.F. was removed from her Mother's custody and placed in a foster home. Mother was granted one or two supervised weekly visits with K.F. for a total of no more than 2 hours.
At the time, K.F. was an eighth grader at a San Francisco middle school. Although she lived in Marin County, K.F. had been moved by Mother from a Sausalito school to one in San Francisco in fourth or fifth grade. According to Mother, K.F. was transferred because she had a long history of educational needs which were not being met at her Marin County school. Mother advocated for an individualized educational program (IEP) for K.F., which K.F. began around middle school to address her educational needs. Mother testified that she had attended every IEP meeting up to K.F.'s removal, and advocated for K.F.'s best interests. Shortly after the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction, K.F. transferred to a San Rafael middle school midway through the academic year.
"An IEP is a comprehensive statement of a disabled child's educational needs and the specifically designed instruction and related services that will meet those needs. [Citation.] It is developed by a school official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, and the parents. [Citation.] It guides the school system as to how the child will be educated." (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1067.) "[An] IEP is reviewed at least annually and revised as necessary." (Ibid.)
Until the order at issue in this appeal, Mother had the right to make educational decisions for K.F. without limit. The Department's disposition report made no suggestion to the court to limit Mother's rights to make educational decisions for K.F., nor did it identify any critical issues related to K.F.'s educational needs. Indeed, in its January 2015 disposition order, the court found there was no need to limit Mother's education rights and also found that K.F.'s educational, physical, mental health, and development needs were being met.
The Department's July 2015 report for the six-month status review updated the court on K.F.'s educational progress. K.F. passed all her courses and graduated middle school with a 3.0 grade point average. During K.F.'s latest IEP meeting discussed in the report, K.F.'s teachers and resource specialist stated that K.F. had been performing "phenomenally well;" "has had no behavioral issues at the school;" "presents as mature, polite, respectful, and able to handle any difficult emotions that may arise;" and is "a 'delight to have in class.' " Her IEP team further reported that K.F. "transitioned well with her peers and they have no concerns."
The six-month status report also explained K.F. did not want to "be treated differently than her peers in regards to special accommodations" but it acknowledged her IEP "continues to provide her with the options for test taking accommodations [and] specialized academic instruction." Further, based on the "drastic improvement in her behavior," the IEP team decided her previous "Behavior Intervention Plan and the qualifier of 'Emotional Disturbance' would be phased out" from her IEP.
The record does not contain copies of any of K.F.'s IEPs.
The report noted that Mother "consistently expressed concern about [K.F.'s] academic performance" and "felt 'disrespected and ignored' " by the IEP team, and she criticized the team as unprofessional.
Elsewhere, the report noted K.F. had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) but decided with Mother to not take any medication. Even without medication, K.F. continued to "function well in school" and her school, foster parent, CASA, and social worker "all observed [K.F.] to be well-behaved and able to manage her emotions in a generally healthy way."
For the six-month status review, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) also submitted a report which recounted that K.F. "has a history of disruptive and defiant behavior" but "currently presents as more mature and able to handle her emotions." Otherwise, the CASA report reiterated several of the facts in the Department's report.
Both the Department and the CASA disclosed K.F.'s recently-discovered sexual abuse by her 25-year-old uncle (Mother's younger brother), who had also been cared for by K.F.'s foster parent. According to the CASA report, K.F. and her uncle became "inappropriately close" and were discovered having sex by K.F.'s foster parent upon her return home from shopping. The foster parent immediately called the police, and the uncle was arrested. Both a criminal investigation and a Department investigation followed. The Department investigation "was inconclusive for general neglect by the current caregiver, which means that the caregiver took all the right measures to keep K.F. safe." The uncle was jailed and subject to a restraining order, and the foster parent was "committed to keeping [K.F.] safe from [him]."
In its order following the six-month status review, the court re-affirmed K.F.'s out-of-home placement in foster care as proper. The court also suspended Mother's visitation until the completion of therapy between Mother and K.F. But it found no need to limit Mother's educational rights and continued to find that K.F.'s educational, physical, mental health, and development needs were met.
The Department's December 2015 status report for the twelve-month permanency hearing reported on K.F.'s continuing progress at her San Rafael high school: "[K.F.] is excelling her freshman year of high school. . . . As of her second quarter progress report, she is receiving A's in all of her classes. At this time, [K.F.] and her foster Mother report that she is functioning well with minimal special education services. . . . [K.F.] is also planning to sign up for Advanced Placement courses to take in her sophomore year. [K.F.] states that she really enjoys attending [her high school] and wants to continue going to school there, despite what may happen if she reunifies with her Mother."
In its order following the twelve-month status review, the juvenile court continued to find K.F.'s placement in foster care proper. It again found no need to limit Mother's educational rights and that K.F.'s educational, physical, mental health, and developmental needs continued to be met. The court resumed Mother's supervised weekly visits lasting no more than a total of 2 hours per week.
Two months later, in February 2016, Mother asked the court for an ex parte hearing for an order requiring K.F.'s social worker "[t]o insure [K.F.'s] safety as she is disable [sic] and needs special care." Mother also claimed the Department's methods for caring for K.F. had "push[ed] [K.F.] in many distressful situations unsafe for her condition." She cited the Department's decision to "neglec[t]fully place a child to be sexually abuse [sic], despite the numerous concerns of the Mother."
At the hearing, Mother accused the Department of hiding information from her, taking away parental rights, and not doing an IEP. Mother said that at the IEP meeting she did attend, the IEP team was "not that professional" and spoke more about their personal matters than K.F. She did not think it was fair that she had "to take [her] time in order to go to an IEP and they talk about something else." The Department sought to address Mother's claims, relaying to the court K.F. felt safe in her foster home, had her needs met there, and wanted to remain. With respect to the sexual abuse issue by her uncle, the Department commented "as soon as the foster parent discovered the issue, it was immediately addressed appropriately" and "safety concerns have been met." Following the hearing, the court found "there are no issues regarding [K.F.'s] scholastic performance or foster care conditions that require the court's intervention at this time."
In March 2016, the Department requested the court change its December 2015 order preserving Mother's right to make decisions on K.F.'s education. Based on school reports, the Department claimed Mother was delaying K.F.'s IEP process and insisting K.F. return to a previous IEP which no longer served K.F.'s best interests.
In two emails accompanying the request, school personnel expressed concerns regarding Mother's continued involvement in educational decisions regarding K.F. following a difficult meeting with Mother. The first email from the high school's Assistant Director of Student Support Services asserted, "[K.F.] is doing very well in school, she currently has straight As . . . , perfect attendance, no discipline issues . . . . Because [K.F.] was struggling when she lived with [Mother] and has blossomed into a high achieving student with a flawless record, it appears that [Mother] feels angry and threatened rather than happy for and proud of her daughter. [Mother] made it very clear that she wishes to return to the IEP that was in place in [K.F.'s San Francisco schools] when [K.F.] was struggling in school and had a behavior intervention plan. None of this is applicable to the student we are serving today." The second email from the school's resource specialist recounted "at least seven occasions" that school officials attempted to contact [Mother] on K.F.'s "excellent progress" at school. The resource specialist also added, "I am concerned about [Mother's] ability to appropriately advocate for her daughter's educational needs. . . . She . . . seemed to disregard the fact that [K.F.] is performing very well in school. She seemed to want to create problems when we have only noticed that K.F. is a capable student in all respects."
At the contested April 11, 2016 hearing on the Department's request, the Department called Spenser Leverett, K.F.'s social worker, as its sole witness. Leverett testified the Department filed the request due to the delay to K.F.'s IEP process stemming from the IEP team's unproductive attempts to engage Mother in the process. Referring to an upcoming IEP team meeting, Leverett explained, "The concern of the Department, as well as the school, is that if the Mother does not agree with the opinions of the professionals who are accessing [K.F.], that she won't sign any documents or allow for the process to move forward. [¶] . . . [¶] [T]he concern is that the Mother will not be able to make consistent or clear decisions on [K.F.'s] behalf." He further stated Mother "demand[ed] that K.F. be returned to an IEP from years ago that really no longer serves her best interest. That she's emailing officials at the state level, and really what the school has also let me know, is that this takes away from their time that they are able to dedicate to [K.F.] because they are doing damage control, and, you know, emailing everyone and letting everyone know, no, she is doing okay." The social worker also testified that Mother has impeded K.F.'s educational process by delaying getting documents signed, but also acknowledged miscommunications by the school had led to a breakdown in trust between Mother and the school and that he did not know what language the documents sent to Mother, a non-English speaker, were written in.
On March 28, 2016, the court entered an order granting the Department's request to limit Mother's educational rights over K.F. and to grant them to the foster parent. The court issued the order with the understanding that there were no objections from Mother. Because Mother had not been properly notified of the request and had no opportunity to object or request a hearing, the court re-set the hearing.
The CASA commented how seriously she considered the Department's request because she had never seen a school advocate that educational rights be taken from a parent. She expressed concern with the school's report that Mother was unable to prioritize K.F.'s best interests. Based on reports the CASA received regarding how well K.F. was doing in school, the CASA added, "I'm a little confused about why she has an IEP at all. Her designation was emotional disturbance, and it seems clear that is not interfering with her ability to access her education. . . . [I]t seems like we are focusing on the past and what she needed rather than taking this child where she is at now and responding to what she needs. . . . And I feel like the people who know best about what her educational needs are are the staff and the personnel at the school and they are very concerned."
Mother testified she only once refused to sign an IEP because she needed more information and additional time to make an informed decision. But eventually she signed the document. She disputed the Department's contention that she wanted K.F. to return to her prior IEP. Regarding the upcoming IEP meeting, asked if she had any reason to believe she would not sign the IEP, she answered she "perhaps would ask for a day or two" to review it before signing because of the faulty communications from the school. She testified she only wanted to ensure K.F. would have help if she needed it. She "just want[ed] them to provide support when [K.F.] feels overwhelmed or frustrated. Only when necessary." Mother expressed concern about K.F.'s foster parent becoming her educational representative and doubted the foster parent's ability to do the job.
K.F.'s counsel informed the court that K.F. did not oppose Mother continuing to hold educational rights.
The court found it was in K.F.'s best interest for the foster parent to hold the educational rights and responsibilities for her at this time. The court stated: "[I]n reviewing all the information . . . the Court does note that [Mother] has some difficulty or has had difficulty in making decisions related to [K.F.] sometimes, educational decisions, sometimes her personal needs, and the Court does find it appropriate for [Mother] to be present when educational issues with [K.F.] arise and for [Mother] to receive the appropriate information about [the minor's] schoolwork and that she be apprised of and can be present . . . at most meetings regarding these decisions." The court further explained, "In the total context of the Court's review of all matters related to [K.F.] in this case the Court does find that more appropriate decisions related to [K.F.] and her education matters be placed with [the foster parent]."
Mother timely appealed the juvenile court's decision.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in limiting her rights to make educational decisions for K.F. and contends its decision must be reversed because "there was simply no evidence on the record that showed [Mother's] unwillingness, inability, or unavailability to make decisions on behalf of [K.F.], nor was there any evidence that the limitation was necessary to protect [K.F.]. Rather, Mother contends the evidence shows she was committed to ensuring her daughter's educational needs were met, and that the real reason for the limitation on her educational rights was simply because she was "difficult to deal with" or as a non-English speaker, "had difficulty making decisions because of the language barrier."
"The liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court." (Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 65.) This encompasses a parent's constitutionally protected right to direct the education of their children. (In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276 (R.W.).) "In dependency proceedings, however, those rights may be limited. . . . [Citation.] After a child is brought into the dependency system through the parents' neglect or abuse, a parent's constitutional rights to raise his or her children, including the right to make education choices may be curtailed. [Citations.]" (In re Samuel G. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 502, 510 (Samuel G.).)
The juvenile court may issue reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance and support for each child under its jurisdiction, including orders addressing the child's education. (§§ 202, subd. (b), 361, subd. (a), 362, subd. (a).) The state's responsibility "for educating all children within its borders" extends to each child who is the subject of a dependent proceeding " 'at every stage of the child's case.' " (Samuel G., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.) Where the child has been declared a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, however, the juvenile court may limit a parent's right to make educational decisions for the child. (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).) However, any limitations on a parent's right to make educational decisions "may not exceed those necessary to protect the child." (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).) If the court so limits a parent's rights, the court must at the same time "appoint a responsible adult to make educational . . . decisions for the child. . . ." (Ibid.; see § 366.3, subd. (e)(5); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.650(a).) "All educational decisions must be based on the best interests of the child. [Citation.]" (Samuel G., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 510.)
For dependent children under its jurisdiction, the juvenile court regularly considers limits to a parent's educational rights over a dependent child at the periodic status reviews that occur at least every six months. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.708(f).) For these status reviews, the county social worker must prepare a report that addresses whether the parent is "unwilling or unable to participate" in making educational decisions for her child, or whether the parent's ability to make educational decisions for her child is compromised. (§ 366.1, subd. (e).) At these review hearings, the court must decide whether there should be limits on a parent's right to make educational decisions for the child. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1)(C).) Any limitation imposed at a status review also "may not exceed those necessary to protect the child." (Ibid.)
We review the juvenile court order limiting Mother's educational rights for abuse of discretion [citation], bearing in mind "[t]he focus of dependency proceedings is on the child, not the parent. [Citation.]" (R.W., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.' " (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) Under this standard, a reviewing court will not disturb a ruling unless it finds the trial court "exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 318.) " 'When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' " (Id. at p. 319.)
Mother also contends we should review the juvenile court's decision for substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is any evidence which is of ponderable legal significance but it is not synonymous with any evidence; rather it must be "reasonable, credible and of solid value." (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) For the reasons identified in our analysis, even under the substantial evidence standard, our disposition of this appeal is the same.
Here, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion or acted without substantial evidence in limiting Mother's right to make educational decisions for K.F. There was ample support in the record for its decision to impose limits needed for K.F.'s protection. While K.F. may have previously exhibited "disruptive and defiant" behavior in middle school that favored an IEP with a behavior intervention plan and consideration for emotional disturbance, the record demonstrates that K.F. made drastic improvements over the approximately 16 months she was placed in foster care. High school faculty and staff described K.F. as a delight in class and commented she was performing "phenomenally well" and showed no behavioral issues. They observed she was "able to handle difficult emotions that may arise" and described her as "mature, polite, and respectful." She had a straight-A record as a freshman.
Moreover, K.F. was able to attain emotional stability and academic success absent significant or meaningful reliance on her IEP. Indeed, K.F. herself preferred to leave her IEP and its attendant disruptions. Based on her performance, school officials, who interacted with K.F. almost daily, saw no need for the IEP. This view clashed with that of Mother, who, according to school officials, continued to regard the IEP as necessary for K.F.'s stability, and appeared to push for a return to the IEP K.F. utilized in middle school. While Mother disputed this, her February 2016 ex parte application and April 2016 testimony reveal serious disagreements and distrust with school officials that could hinder K.F.'s significant progress to date. On the evidence presented, the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Mother's rights to make educational decisions for K.F.
Mother argues the court's order limiting her rights over K.F.'s education was not necessary to protect K.F. But her reliance on In re. D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 41 (D.C.), is not persuasive. There, the court found the juvenile court could reasonably have determined an order limiting the father's educational rights was necessary based on evidence that the parent had a pattern of harassing school officials. (Id. at p. 58.) The court found this especially troubling because the parent had stated he did not want a relationship with his child. (Ibid.) Even if Mother is correct that her behavior does not resemble what she views as the "extreme circumstances" in D.C., nothing in D.C. indicates that its rule sets the floor for the type of impermissible conduct that justifies limits to a parent's educational rights. The evidence before the juvenile court here amply supported its view that limiting Mother's educational rights was necessary.
Mother also contends there was no evidence that K.F. needed protection or that such protection was in her best interest, given K.F. had been thriving in school. Mother points to the dearth of any evidence demonstrating she had failed to address her daughter's needs and emphasizes her history of reliably signing IEPs, attending IEP meetings, and years of dedicated advocacy for K.F. However, the record also contains evidence that Mother had conflicts with school officials and sought to reinstate an outdated and unnecessary IEP for K.F. School officials also thought Mother failed to recognize K.F.'s current growth and improved disposition. From this evidence, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred K.F.'s progress would have been impeded and limits to Mother's educational rights were necessary for K.F.'s protection. Because the court's limitation order, sufficiently supported by the evidence, does not exceed the bounds of reason, we must uphold it; we cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the juvenile court.
Mother additionally asserts the juvenile court applied the wrong standard when it limited her educational rights. Mother contends the court based its decision on her "difficulty" making educational decisions for K.F., rather than what was "necessary to protect" K.F., as articulated in section 361, subdivision (e). Not so. The juvenile court made clear it "review[ed] all the information" and issued its order "[i]n the total context of the Court's review of all matters related to K.F. in this case." The basis for the court's decision went well beyond Mother's "difficulty" in making decisions.
The court's limitation order also did not exceed what was necessary to protect K.F. While the order limited Mother's right to make educational decisions for K.F. and left the ultimate decision to the foster parent, it did not deny Mother the right to continue to participate in K.F.'s education. Mother was not prevented from participating in IEP meetings, being present when educational issues regarding K.F. arose, or receiving appropriate information about K.F.'s school work. Further, nothing in the court's order prevented Mother from communicating with K.F.'s teachers or helping and encouraging K.F.
Finally, we need not reach Mother's contention that reversal is warranted because she has always been willing and able to participate in making educational decisions for K.F., since we do not find this issue to be disputed or dispositive. The juvenile court's order limiting Mother's educational rights was based on section 361, subdivision (a), which Mother agrees is the "applicable statute." Section 366.1, subdivision (e), on the other hand, details the types of factual discussions necessary for a social worker's periodic status reports to the court, and include parents' willingness and ability to participate in making decisions about their children's education as a necessary area to cover. Mother claims that under section 366.1, the Department can only seek to limit a parent's educational rights after such an assessment is made and suggests there was no evidence of her unwillingness or inability to participate in decisions about her daughter's education. We agree that Mother's unwavering commitment to participating in her daughter's education over the years is apparent in the record, but we find nothing in section 366.1 that so conditions the Department's request on finding an absence of such a commitment, and Mother provides no support for reading this prerequisite into the statute.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order limiting Mother's right to make educational decisions for K.F. is affirmed.
/s/_________
Siggins, J. We concur: /s/_________
McGuiness, P.J. /s/_________
Pollak, J.