Opinion
Salinas District Office
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REMOVAL
JOSé H. RAZO, COMMISSIONER
We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Reconsideration/Removal and the contents of the report of the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) with respect thereto. Based on our review of the record, and based upon the WCJ’s analysis of the merits of the petitioner’s arguments in the WCJ’s report, we will dismiss the petition to the extent it seeks reconsideration and deny it to the extent it seeks removal.
A petition for reconsideration may properly be taken only from a “final” order, decision, or award. (Lab. Code, §§ 5900(a), 5902, 5903.) A “final” order has been defined as one that either “determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case” (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer) (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410]; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer) (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661]) or determines a “threshold” issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. (Maranian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650].) Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers’ compensation proceedings, are not considered “final” orders. (Id. at p. 1075 [“interim orders, which do not decide a threshold issue, such as intermediate procedural or evidentiary decisions, are not ‘final’ ”]; Rymer, supra, at p. 1180 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders or discovery orders”]; Kramer, supra, at p. 45 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders”].) Such interlocutory decisions include, but are not limited to, pre-trial orders regarding evidence, discovery, trial setting, venue, or similar issues.
Here, the WCJ’s September 17, 2021 Order Vacating Submission and Order to Develop the Record is solely an intermediate procedural order. It does not determine any substantive right or liability and does not determine a threshold issue. Accordingly, it is not a “final” decision and the petition will be dismissed to the extent it seeks reconsideration.
We will also deny the petition to the extent it seeks removal. Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board. (Cortez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 155]; Kleemann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, fn. 2 [70 Cal.Comp.Cases 133].) The Appeals Board will grant removal only if the petitioner shows that substantial prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is not granted. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, former § 10843(a), now § 10955(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2020); see also Cortez, supra; Kleemann, supra.) Also, the petitioner must demonstrate that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy if a final decision adverse to the petitioner ultimately issues. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, former § 10843(a), now § 10955(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2020).) Here, based upon the WCJ’s analysis of the merits of the petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that significant prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is denied and/or that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Reconsideration is DISMISSED and the Petition for Removal is DENIED.
I CONCUR, DEIDRA E. LOWE, COMMISSIONER KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR