"[I]f no juror indicates, upon inquiry made to the jury collectively, that he has read or heard any of the publicity in question, the judge is not required to proceed further." Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 84 (1969); see also United States v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 671 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 262, 284, 121 L.Ed.2d 192, 210 (1992); United States v. Concemi, 957 F.2d 942, 946 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 194 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2629, 49 L.Ed.2d 375, 376 (1976). While we have recommended an individualized inquiry, see United States v.Hood, 593 F.2d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1979), a collective inquiry is not a per se abuse of discretion.

Jury control measures, however, lie within the discretion of the district court judge; this is not an area in which a decision not to sequester, or a decision to permit jurors to walk around unsupervised, triggers such a strong presumption of error that we would have to reverse on that basis even in the absence of both (1) any objection at trial and (2) any complaint on appeal. See Recuenco, supra. District courts have no duty to "sequester the jury . . ., sua sponte, in every case involving prejudicial publicity." Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 732 (7th Cir.1969). There is no presumption or rule that sequestration is ever necessary, although we do not dispute that it is a good idea in some high-profile cases, and may well have been the better course here.

Absent the request, a change of venue may not be ordered." United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 505 F.2d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990, 95 S.Ct. 1424, 43 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975); see United States v. Means, 409 F. Supp. 115 (D.S.D. 1976); United States v. Holder, 399 F. Supp. 220 (D.S.D. 1975); see also Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 84 (1969). A defendant therefore cannot be forced to accept a change of venue against his will.

Furthermore, the fear of some media publicity is seldom a sufficient reason alone for subjecting the jurors to the inconvenience of sequestration. Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 732-35 (C.A.7), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 84 (1969). The trial is estimated to last five to six weeks and it must be recognized that sequestration subjects jurors and their families to burdensome hardships and makes it extremely difficult to obtain a fair cross-section of the community to serve on the jury.

" United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1063 (7th Cir. 1972). As we stated in Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1969): Thus, the procedure required by this Circuit where prejudicial publicity is brought to the court's attention during a trial is that the court must ascertain if any jurors who had been exposed to such publicity had read or heard the same.

United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1334 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d at 613); United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 944 (7th Cir. 1990). However, when presented with reports of prejudicial publicity, a district court is required under Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 84 (1969), and Trapnell to inquire of the jurors about their knowledge, if any, of the reports. United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1063-64 (7th Cir. 1972).

United States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71, at 77. (Quoting from Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 84 (1969)). If, on the other hand, some members have been exposed to the prejudicial material, the district court must then determine the extent and effect of the infection and act to ensure a fair trial.

My colleagues find no problem with that and so do not need to reach the issue of harmless error; I am not so sure. When a defendant's notoriety “guarantee[s] extensive press coverage,” ante at 530, it is imperative that the court be ready to make use of the limited two-step voir dire process we established in Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir.1969), to ensure that the trial is fair. Voir dire helps to guarantee that a trial's outcome is determined by events inside the courtroom, not what is going on outside in the court of public opinion.

My colleagues find no problem with that and so do not need to reach the issue of harmless error; I am not so sure. When a defendant's notoriety "guarantee[s] extensive press coverage," ante at 14, it is imperative that the court be ready to make use of the limited two-step voir dire process we established in Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1969), to ensure that the trial is fair. Voir dire helps to guarantee that a trial's outcome is determined by events inside the courtroom, not what is going on outside in the court of public opinion.