No. 01-09-00792-CR
Opinion issued August 19, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 174th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1166211.
Panel consists of Justices HANKS, BLAND, and WILSON.
The Honorable Davie L. Wilson, retired Justice, First Court of Appeals, participating by assignment.
JANE BLAND, Justice.
A jury convicted Mark Anthony Mares of aggravated assault and assessed punishment at twelve years' confinement. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a) (2) (Vernon Supp. 2009). On appeal, Mares contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of (1) circumstances surrounding a previous dispute used to impeach a witness for bias and (2) six prior convictions for impeachment purposes, all of which occurred more than ten years before trial. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the facts used to show witness bias and the prior convictions for theft and attempted burglary. We hold that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Mares's prior drug convictions, but we conclude that this error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict in light of the other evidence and the trial record as a whole. We therefore affirm.
Background
In May 2008, Kenneth Allen Mares ("Kenneth"), his wife Diane, their son Kenneth Adrian Mares ("Adrian"), and his mother Stephanie ("Mrs. Mares"), visited one of Kenneth's brothers, Samuel, in prison. At the prison, Samuel and Kenneth discussed the disappearance of several of Samuel's vehicles during his incarceration. Samuel had heard from other people that one of their other brothers, Mark Anthony Mares ("Mares"), was involved and he requested that Kenneth ask Mares about the vehicles. Upon returning to Mrs. Mares's house, Kenneth entered first, followed by Diane and then Adrian, who was pushing Mrs. Mares in her wheelchair. Kenneth saw Mares standing in the living room with his back to the entryway, and he told Mares that Samuel "want[ed] to know about his vehicles." According to Kenneth, Mares "blew a fuse" and told Kenneth that the matter did not concern him and he should mind his own business. Kenneth then told Mares that he should write Samuel an explanatory letter. As they continued arguing, Mares began walking toward Kenneth with a baseball bat. Mares beat Kenneth on the ear, arm, and leg with the baseball bat, severing his ear and fracturing his arm. Diane then jumped in front of Kenneth, who then ran out the front door and passed out. Diane testified that she stood about two steps behind Kenneth and heard the brothers talking about Samuel's cars. When she turned around from helping Mrs. Mares inside the house, she saw Mares beating Kenneth with a baseball bat. She stepped in between the brothers, grabbed Mares's arms, and told him to stop. Adrian testified that he stood behind Diane and Mrs. Mares's wheelchair. When he saw Mares hit Kenneth, he pushed Mrs. Mares forward behind a wall so she would not get hurt. Adrian also described the incident as an attack by Mares instead of a fight. Kenneth testified that he did not have anything in his hands when he entered the house and he did not hit Mares with anything during the altercation. Diane and Adrian also testified that Kenneth had nothing in his hands when he walked into the house, and Diane did not see him hit or swing anything at Mares. But she agreed with defense counsel that, after walking into the house, she did not know what Kenneth had been doing before Mares hit him with the bat. Deputy Deleon, who responded to Diane's 911 call and arrested Mares four days later, testified that when he arrested Mares, he did not have any injuries or bruises and he did not mention being the victim of an assault. Mrs. Mares testified on behalf of Mares, and she stated that Mares is her caretaker and she "love[s Mares and Kenneth] both" and "[doesn't] like for them to fight." Mrs. Mares testified that, during the altercation between Kenneth and Mares, both she and Diane remained outside of the house and did not see the fight occur. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Mrs. Mares if this particular incident was the first time she has been involved in a legal matter between Mares and Kenneth. When she replied that this was the first time, the prosecutor then asked if "[t]here wasn't a time back in 2006 when [Mares] asked you to help him out with a legal matter regarding [Kenneth]?" Mrs. Mares responded that she did not know. The next morning, the prosecutor explained to the trial court that Mrs. Mares had been involved in another incident between the brothers. She had asked Kenneth not to pursue criminal charges against Mares. The prosecutor asked to recall Kenneth to testify regarding this earlier incident to show that Mrs. Mares had a bias in favor of Mares. Defense counsel responded that he did not open the door to this evidence. The trial court allowed Kenneth's testimony on the ground that it showed Mrs. Mares's bias. Kenneth then testified that Mares had stolen Kenneth's vehicle and then pressured Mrs. Mares to testify that the vehicle was actually hers. Mrs. Mares told Kenneth that she did not want to go to court and testify and she asked Kenneth to drop the charges, which he did, solely "for [Mrs. Mares]." Mares testified on his own behalf. He stated that Kenneth entered the house carrying a digital camera in his left hand and pointed the camera at him while questioning him about Samuel's cars. According to Mares, Kenneth hit Mares on the arm with four-foot-long bolt cutters, which he carried into the house by his right arm. Mares picked up a stick as a reflex and hit Kenneth once on the face and arm. The stick was about as thick as a shovel handle. Mares testified that Diane was outside helping Mrs. Mares during this incident. Mares's son, Mark, testified that he picked Mares up shortly after the incident with Kenneth and noticed that Mares' left arm was bruised and bleeding. Mark acknowledged that he did not know for sure how Mares injured his arm. Michael White, the father of one of Mark's friends, testified that he observed "a lot of blood" on Mares's arm when Mark brought Mares back to White's house later in the evening. White also stated that he did not know how Mares received his injuries other than what Mares said about the incident. Although he had only met Mares once before, he is a "good judge of character" and would not lie for Mares and Mark. Before cross-examining Mares, the prosecutor approached the bench and argued that Mares's criminal history, which consisted entirely of convictions that occurred more than ten years before the trial, was relevant to his credibility and outweighed any prejudicial effect. The trial court agreed to allow evidence of Mares's criminal history for the purpose of evaluating his credibility. Mares then testified that he had been convicted of multiple crimes, including: (1) felony possession of heroin; (2) attempted burglary of a vehicle; (3) felony theft; (4) misdemeanor theft; (5) misdemeanor possession of marijuana, twice; and (6) felony tampering with a government document. Mares agreed with the prosecutor that Mrs. Mares knew of his past troubles with the law and did not want to see him go to prison. On redirect, Mares clarified that he was convicted of heroin possession in 1981, and his theft and marijuana possession convictions occurred around twenty-five years ago. Mares acknowledged that he has a long criminal record, but also stated that he had never been convicted of a violent crime. The trial court included the following instruction in the written charge: "You are instructed that certain evidence was admitted before you in regard to the defendant's having been charged and convicted of an offense or offenses other than the one for which he is now on trial. Such evidence cannot be considered by you against the defendant as any evidence of guilt in this case. Said evidence was admitted before you for the purpose of aiding you, if it does aid you, in passing upon the weight you will give his testimony, and you will not consider the same for any other purpose." Discussion
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A trial court abuses its discretion only if the court's decision is "so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree." Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Roberts v. State, 29 S.W.3d 596, 600, (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if evidence supports its decision. See Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). If the trial court's decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will uphold the decision, even if the trial court gives the wrong reason for its decision. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Admissibility of the Circumstances Showing Witness Bias
Mares first contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Mares's prior dismissed theft charge and Mrs. Mares's involvement in obtaining that dismissal because the defense did not open the door to this extraneous offense, and thus using extrinsic evidence to attack Mrs. Mares's credibility violates Texas Rule of Evidence 608(b). TEX. R. EVID. 608(b). Rule 608(b) provides that a party may not generally impeach a witness' credibility using specific instances of the witness' conduct, either on cross-examination or by extrinsic evidence. See id.; Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 39-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Specific instances of conduct may, however, be used to establish a witness's bias or interest. See TEX. R. EVID. 613(b). The Court of Criminal Appeals has observed that "there is an important distinction between an attack on the general credibility of a witness and a more particular attack on credibility that reveals `possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.'" Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1973)); see also Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (op. on reh'g) ("Rule 608 addresses a witness's general character for truthfulness. Rule [613] addresses a witness's trustworthiness in the particular case because of some bias or interest."). Although a party may not use specific instances on cross-examination or by extrinsic evidence to attack a witness's general character for truthfulness or credibility, the rules of evidence "permit a witness to be cross-examined on specific instances of conduct when they are used to establish his specific bias, self-interest, or motive for testifying." Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 563; see also TEX. R. EVID. 613(b); Crenshaw v. State, 125 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd); Gonzales v. State, 929 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, pet. ref'd) (per curiam) ("The rules of evidence grant a party greater latitude to prove a witness's bias than to prove a witness's untruthful character. . . . Rule [613], by contrast [to Rule 608(b)], places no limits on the sort of evidence that may be adduced to show a witness's bias or interest."). Under Rule 613(b), before cross-examining the witness or offering extrinsic evidence regarding the specific instances demonstrating bias, the party must first tell the witness the circumstances supporting the claim of bias, allowing an opportunity to explain or deny the circumstances. See TEX. R. EVID. 613(b). If the witness denies the circumstances or the motive to testify in a particular manner, "the opponent may introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the motive or bias." Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 563. Among the facts and circumstances which may be used to establish bias is the witness's familial or personal relationship with a party. Johnson v. State, 263 S.W.3d 405, 424 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. ref'd) (citing Vaughn v. State, 888 S.W.2d 62, 74-75 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994), aff'd, 931 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Here, Mrs. Mares testified on direct that Mares acts as her caretaker and that she believes Kenneth is jealous of Mares. Her testimony regarding the events at her home is inconsistent with the testimony from Kenneth, Diane, and Adrian. According to Mrs. Mares, both she and Diane remained outside of the house and did not see the assault. Kenneth, Diane, and Adrian all testified to the contrary: Adrian pushed Mrs. Mares's wheelchair into the house, and when Mares first beat Kenneth, Adrian pushed her wheelchair behind a wall to keep her safe. On cross-examination, Mrs. Mares denied recollection of the earlier incident, when she asked Kenneth to drop the theft charges against Mares and he agreed to do so. Mrs. Mares also agreed with the prosecutor that she does not want to see Mares go to jail. Kenneth testified that, previously, Mares stole one of Kenneth's vehicles and then asked Mrs. Mares to testify that the car was hers when the case went to trial. According to Kenneth, Mares was pressuring Mrs. Mares to testify and she did not want to be "drag[ged] to court," so she asked Kenneth to drop the charges against Mares. Although Kenneth believed Mares stole the car, he asked the district attorney not to prosecute Mares, and he did so "for [Mrs. Mares]." We hold that Kenneth's testimony is relevant to a determination of witness bias. After giving Mrs. Mares an opportunity to explain or deny the circumstances supporting her bias, the prosecutor could then establish it through Kenneth's extrinsic testimony. TEX. R. EVID. 613(b). Mares further contends that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence because Mares did not open the door to allow evidence of this extraneous offense and Mrs. Mares' involvement, but instead the State opened the door by questioning Mrs. Mares on cross-examination regarding the previous incident between Mares and Kenneth. Mares cites Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) and Shipman v. State, 604 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), for the proposition that, although a witness may open the door to her otherwise irrelevant and inadmissible past by creating a false impression, this does not allow the State to rely on its cross-examination of the witness to contradict the witness and admit evidence of collateral matters. See Delk, 855 S.W.2d at 704; Shipman, 604 S.W.2d at 184-85. Here, in contrast to Delk and Shipman, the State did not offer testimony regarding the past theft charge as extraneous offense evidence to impeach Mares' testimony as a defendant, but rather to show Mrs. Mares's own bias in favor of Mares. The trial court has "great latitude" to admit evidence demonstrating the relevant bias of a witness. Carpenter v. State, 979 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Billodeau, 277 S.W.3d at 42 (stating that a witness's possible bias is "never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry"). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Kenneth to testify regarding Mrs. Mares's involvement in a previous legal dispute between Kenneth and Mares. Admissibility of Prior Convictions
Mares also contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of six prior convictions that occurred more than ten years before the date of trial. Rule 609 provides that the trial court shall admit evidence of a witness's prior convictions for impeachment purposes if the crime was a felony or a crime of moral turpitude and the court determines that the probative value of admitting the conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. TEX. R. EVID. 609(a); Morris v. State, 67 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). If ten years have passed since the date of conviction or release from confinement, however, the conviction is not admissible unless the trial court determines that the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. TEX. R. EVID. 609(b); Jackson v. State, 50 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) ("Whether to admit remote convictions lies within the trial court's discretion and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case."). Generally, remote convictions more than ten years old are inadmissible because we presume that a defendant is capable of rehabilitation and that his character has reformed over a period of law-abiding conduct. See Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 263. The State points out, however, that even though a particular conviction is more than ten years old, subsequent convictions for felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude "remove the taint of remoteness from the prior convictions." Id. (citing Hernandez v. State, 976 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd)). In that circumstance, we use Rule 609(a)'s "outweigh" standard, instead of Rule 609(b)'s "substantially outweigh" standard, because "tacking" the intervening convictions "renders convictions more than ten years old no longer remote." Id. Here, the State introduced evidence of seven prior convictions: (1) attempted burglary of a motor vehicle in 1976; (2) misdemeanor theft in 1977; (3) felony theft in 1980; (4) felony possession of heroin in 1981; (5) misdemeanor possession of marijuana in 1988; (6) misdemeanor possession of marijuana in 1997; and (7) felony tampering with a governmental record in 1998. All of Mares's prior convictions occurred more than ten years prior to trial. We therefore apply Rule 609(b)'s "substantially outweigh" standard to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of these remote convictions. See Hernandez, 976 S.W.2d at 756 ("The court may find that the prior conviction is remote but that under rule 609(b) its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, in which case the evidence is admissible."). In Theus v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated a non-exclusive list of factors to consider in weighing the probative value of a conviction against its prejudicial effect. 845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). These factors include: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the temporal proximity of the past crime relative to the charged offense and the witness's subsequent criminal history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the charged offense; (4) the importance of the witness's testimony; and (5) the importance of the witness's credibility. Id.; Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 264. Crimes involving deception have a higher impeachment value relative to crimes of violence, which have a higher potential for prejudice. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881. Three of Mares's convictions involve deception: attempted burglary, and misdemeanor and felony theft. See White v. State, 21 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. ref'd) (burglary); Davis v. State, 259 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd) (theft). Mares also has three prior drug possession convictions. Drug related crimes have lower impeachment value, because they generally do not involve deception, moral turpitude, or violence. See Denman v. State, 193 S.W.3d 129, 136 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd). We also note that a possession of marijuana conviction is neither a felony nor a crime involving moral turpitude, and thus cannot be used to impeach a witness under Rule 609. TEX. R. EVID. 609(a); see Hernandez, 976 S.W.2d at 755-56. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of admission for Mares's burglary and theft convictions, and weighs against admission for Mares's possession convictions. Mares's convictions include felony tampering with a governmental record in 1998 (eleven years before trial), possession of marijuana in 1997 (twelve years before trial), possession of marijuana in 1988 (twenty-one years before trial), possession of heroin in 1981 (twenty-eight years before trial), felony theft in 1980 (twenty-nine years before trial), misdemeanor theft in 1977 (thirty-two years before trial), and attempted burglary in 1976 (thirty-three years before trial). None of these convictions occurred recently; however, Mares has been convicted of seven crimes in the thirty-three years before his current trial. For both the felony theft and possession of heroin convictions, Mares's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to five years' confinement. Although Mares's convictions are old, he has "demonstrated a propensity for running afoul of the law," and therefore, following Theus, this factor favors admissibility. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881. Similarity between the past crimes and the charged offense weighs against admissibility of the prior convictions. Id. The Theus court reasoned that admitting a similar prior crime for impeachment purposes "presents a situation where the jury would convict on the perception of a past pattern of conduct, instead of on the facts of the charged offense." Id. Mares concedes that none of his prior crimes, all of which are either crimes involving deception or drug-related offenses, are similar to the charged crime of aggravated assault, a crime of violence. This factor, therefore, favors admissibility. The final two Theus factors, the importance of the defendant's testimony and credibility, "both depend on the nature of a defendant's defense and the means available to him of proving that defense." Id. "A defendant should generally have the right to testify without being impeached by remote prior convictions." Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 264. When the importance of the defendant's credibility increases, however, so does the State's need to impeach the defendant's credibility. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881; Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 264-65. Here, Mares testified on his own behalf. He called three additional witnesses: Mrs. Mares, Mark, and Michael White. Mark and White did not see Mares until later in the evening. Although Mrs. Mares was present at the house, she testified that she was outside during the incident, and therefore did not see the altercation between Mares and Kenneth. As a result, Mares was the only defense eyewitness to the incident, and he testified, in contrast to Kenneth, Diane, and Adrian, that Kenneth was actually the aggressor, and that he struck back only in self-defense. In this situation, Mares's testimony and credibility, as well as the State's need to impeach his credibility, was critical. See Davis, 259 S.W.3d at 784 ("[T]he complainant and appellant provided the only direct eyewitness testimony concerning the assault. Moreover, the credibility of the complainant and appellant were critical issues because the complainant and appellant each testified that the other was the aggressor in the incident."). Although, in this circumstance, the State has a greater justification to impeach the defendant's testimony, here, the State could have relied on Mares's three prior convictions for theft and attempted burglary, which have greater impeachment value than his drug convictions. See Jackson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 336, 340-41 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (holding that defendant's more recent theft convictions "drastically lessened" need for State to impeach with older aggravated rape and crime against nature convictions). We conclude that this factor favors admission of Mares's theft and attempted burglary convictions, but weighs against the admission of his drug convictions, which do not directly impeach his credibility as a witness. Applying all of the Theus factors, we hold that the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the probative value of the theft and attempted burglary convictions substantially outweighed their prejudicial effect; thus, the trial court's decision to admit evidence of these three convictions was not outside the "zone within which reasonable people might disagree." See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 579. Because, however, Mares's three previous drug convictions have low impeachment value, the most recent of these convictions occurred twelve years before trial, and Mares had four additional prior convictions involving deception and moral turpitude that the State could use to impeach his credibility, we hold that the probative value of these convictions does not substantially outweigh their prejudicial effect. Thus, the trial court erred in admitting these convictions for purposes of impeachment. Error in the admission of evidence is non-constitutional error subject to a harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Jabari v. State, 273 S.W.3d 745, 754 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). We disregard any non-constitutional error that does not affect a defendant's substantial rights by having a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Jabari, 273 S.W.3d at 754 (citing Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). We should not reverse a conviction for non-constitutional error if, after examining the record as a whole, we have "fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect." Jabari, 273 S.W.3d at 754 (citing Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)); Hankins v. State, 180 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. ref'd) ("[W]e consider the entire record, including testimony, physical evidence, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, the State's theory, the defensive theory, and closing arguments."). The State theorized that, after Kenneth began questioning Mares regarding Samuel's missing vehicles, Mares became angry, argued with Kenneth, and ultimately hit him on the ear, arm, and leg with a baseball bat, fracturing Kenneth's arm and severing his ear. Kenneth, Diane, and Adrian all testified to this version of events, and stated that Kenneth did not provoke Mares, did not carry anything inside the house, and did not hit Mares first. Deputy Deleon also testified that, when he arrived at the house, Kenneth had a "large laceration" and "a lot of blood" on the left side of his face. He further testified that Mares showed no physical injuries. The State introduced pictures of Kenneth's injuries and his medical records from the incident. Ample physical evidence proved that an assault had taken place. In contrast, Mares testified that Kenneth first hit Mares on the arm with bolt-cutters that he carried into the house, and, as a reflex, Mares hit Kenneth once on the face and arm with a stick about the width of a shovel handle. According to Mares, Diane, Adrian, and Mrs. Mares were all outside during the altercation. Mares's son Mark and Michael White both testified that, when they saw Mares later in the evening, his arm was covered in blood, and they both believed him when he stated that Kenneth hit him first and then he hit Kenneth back. While cross-examining Mares, the State asked Mares to confirm each of his prior convictions. The State asked Mares a total of five questions about his felony possession of heroin conviction, including questions about the length of his original probation term, the revocation of his probation, and his ultimate sentence. The State asked one question about each of Mares's possession of marijuana convictions. The State did not inquire into the details of these offenses. On re-direct, Mares conceded that he had a long criminal record, but he had never been convicted of a violent crime and he would not describe himself as a violent man. During closing argument, defense counsel acknowledged Mares's prior convictions, but reiterated that most of the convictions occurred in the 1970s and 1980s and he had never been convicted of a violent crime. The State referred to Mares's criminal history once during argument while discussing Mrs. Mares's testimony, stating that she "is trying to do her best to keep [Mares] from being sent to prison again." The State then argued that Mares' criminal record should not be used to suggest he is not violent. The trial court included an instruction in the written charge, instructing the jury that they were not to consider evidence of Mares's prior convictions as evidence of guilt in this case. The State did not emphasize Mares's criminal history during closing arguments, nor did it "attempt to develop its probative value, but [instead] simply asked whether appellant had been convicted of the drug [offenses] without inquiring about the details of the offense[s]." Hankins, 180 S.W.3d at 182. Mares's prior drug convictions lacked similarity to the charged offense of aggravated assault and occurred at least twelve years before trial. The trial court instructed the jury in the written charge that they are only to consider the prior convictions when determining the weight to give Mares's testimony, and not to decide guilt or for any other purpose. See Jackson, 50 S.W.3d at 593-94 ("[T]his trial court specifically instructed the jury that it could only consider the prior convictions to determine [Jackson's] `credibility as a witness and for no other purpose.'"). For these reasons, and considering the strong physical evidence supporting the verdict, and the testimony of Kenneth, Diane, and Adrian, we conclude that the trial court's admission of Mares's drug convictions "could not have caused more than a slight influence on the jury in light of the other, more prejudicial evidence" against Mares. Hankins, 180 S.W.3d at 183. We therefore hold that the trial court's erroneous admission of Mares's three drug convictions was harmless error. Conclusion
We hold that testimony relating to a past dismissed theft charge was admissible to show witness bias, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this extrinsic evidence. We further hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Mares's remote theft and attempted burglary convictions because the probative value of these convictions substantially outweighed their prejudicial effect. Although the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of Mares's three drug convictions, we hold that this evidence could not have caused more than a slight influence on the jury and thus their admission was harmless. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.