"The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."Marcus v. State, 411 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1966). The effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on state regulatory powers was explained by the United States Supreme Court in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972).
The State necessarily possesses broad police power to regulate and supervise all phases of the liquor industry to protect the public health, safety, welfare and morals. State v. Parham, Okla., 412 P.2d 142 (1966); Marcus v. State, Okla., 411 P.2d 539 (1966); Okla. Alcoholic, etc. v. Heublein Wines, Intern., Okla., 566 P.2d 1158 (1977); and, Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 60 S.Ct. 163, 84 L.Ed. 128 (1939). This traditional broad police power of the State with regard to the liquor traffic is augmented by the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Okla. Alcoholic, etc. v. Heublein Wines, Intern., supra; California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Berry v. Arapahoe Shoshone Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934 (D.Wyo. 1976); and Wright v. Town of Huxley, Iowa, 249 N.W.2d 672 (1977).
It is well settled law that the Legislature may determine what classes of individuals may be licensed to deal in alcoholic beverages. In Marcus v. State, Okl., 411 P.2d 539 (1966) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated: "No one has an absolute or inherent right to a license to sell intoxicating liquor, and its issuance is a matter, not of right, but purely of legislative grace, and may be extended, limited, or denied without violating any constitutional right." Another authority provides: "The legislature of a state may lawfully, and without violating the constitutional guaranties securing the just rights of the individual, provide a system for the granting of licenses to sell such liquors, imposing proper conditions and restrictions on the granting of such licenses, prescribing the qualifications necessary to secure them. . . . The fact that the director or administrative agency misuses the licensing power or violates the controlling statutes does not affect the validity of the statute providing for licenses.
It is well settled law that the Legislature may determine what classes of individuals may be licensed to deal in alcoholic beverages. In Marcus v. State, Okl., 411 P.2d 539 (1966), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated: "No one has an absolute or inherent right to a license to sell intoxicating liquor, and its issuance is a matter, not of right, but purely of legislative grace, and may be extended, limited, or denied without violating any constitutional right." Another authority provides: "The legislature of a state may lawfully, and without violating the constitutional guaranties securing the just rights of the individual, provide a system for the granting of licenses to sell such liquors, imposing proper conditions and restrictions on the granting of such licenses, prescribing the qualifications necessary to secure them . . .
Provided, that nothing herein shall prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverage legally confiscated as provided by law." The foregoing provisions of law were construed by our Supreme Court in Marcus v. State, Okl., 411 P.2d 539, wherein it was held that employees or agents of a political subdivision of the State are prohibited from engaging in any phase of the alcoholic beverage business while serving in such position under the provisions of the State Constitution and statutes. The decision in Marcus, supra, is in accord with Attorney General's Opinion Number 63-257, a copy of which is enclosed for your information. Sale of "beer," an intoxicating beverage, by employees or agents of any political subdivision of the State is expressly prohibited; however, the same is not true of the sale of "light beer."
62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, 1932. As an officer of a municipal corporation, the city treasurer is an agent thereof. In Marcus v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 411 P.2d 539 (1966), the Supreme Court held: "It has been stated that the officers of a municipal corporation, like those of a private corporation, are agents of the corporate body. 37 Am.Jur. Municipal Corporations, Sec. 22, p. 854. "A public officer is an agent elected or appointed to perform certain political duties in the administration of government.