InfoSpace argues that the priority of action rule is inapplicable here because the actions were filed in different states; according to InfoSpace, in that situation dismissal of claims is beyond the authority of the trial court. InfoSpace contends that the correct legal standard that the trial court should have applied, instead of American Mobile Homes, is found in Marcus v. Marcus, 3 Wn. App. 370, 475 P.2d 571 (1970). There, the trial court denied a wife's motion to dismiss her husband's action for divorce.

Id. at 172.See, e.g., Estes v. Masner, 244 Ark. 797, 427 S.W.2d 161 (1968); Tinney v. Tinney, 211 Cal.App.2d 548, 27 Cal.Rptr. 239 (1963); Farah v. Farah, 25 Ill. App.3d 481, 323 N.E.2d 361 (1975); Greenberg v. Greenberg, 11 N.J. Super. 582, 78 A.2d 723 (1951); Marcus v. Marcus, 3 Wn. App. 370, 475 P.2d 571 (1970). Thus, whether proceedings should be stayed in a particular instance in order to permit adjudication of the same action pending in another jurisdiction does not affect the court's subject-matter jurisdiction but, rather, calls upon the court to exercise a sound discretion in all the circumstances.

In view of evidence that the wife had not diligently prosecuted her action in Maryland, we find no abuse of discretion. Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1964); Estes v. Masner, 244 Ark. 797, 427 S.W.2d 161 (1968); Mulvey v. Mulvey, 123 Colo. 320, 228 P.2d 452 (1951); Cox v. Cox, 234 Miss. 885, 108 So.2d 422 (1959); Wilburn v. Wilburn, 260 N.C. 208, 132 S.E.2d 332 (1963); Marcus v. Marcus, 3 Wn. App. 370, 475 P.2d 571 (1970). Appellant also argues that the evidence did not support a finding of a year's voluntary separation.

"[T]he more extrinsic and corroborative evidence [a party] can introduce which is consistent with [their] stated intention, the more likelihood there is that the trier of the fact will believe [them]." Marcus v. Marcus, 3 Wn.App. 370, 371, 475 P.2d 571 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 58 Wn.2d 377, 381, 363 P.2d 107, 110 (1961))

"[T]he more extrinsic and corroborative evidence [a party] can introduce which is consistent with [their] stated intention, the more likelihood there is that the trier of the fact will believe [them]." Marcus v. Marcus, 3 Wn.App. 370, 371, 475 P.2d 571 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 58 Wn.2d 377, 381, 363 P.2d 107, 110 (1961))

A domicile, once established, is not destroyed by a temporary absence no matter how long continued. Sasse v. Sasse, supra; Marcus v. Marcus, 3 Wn. App. 370, 475 P.2d 571 (1970); White v. Tennant, supra. Once acquired, domicile is presumed to continue until changed and the change must be shown by substantial evidence. See Fiske v. Fiske, supra. It is the generally accepted rule that a woman at marriage loses her own domicile, and acquires that of her husband, although she may acquire a separate domicile when living apart from her husband.