The time limit is a type of affirmative defense to the Rule 60(b) motion on which the other party is entitled to rely if timely raised, but the defense may be forfeited.But see Marcelli v. Walker, 313 Fed.Appx. 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that Rule 60(b)(1) time limit is "jurisdictional" without considering applicable Supreme Court precedent); Mitchell v. Rees, 261 Fed.Appx. 825, 830 (6th Cir. 2008) (same). Neither case appears to have involved forfeiture or waiver such that it made any difference whether the time limit was "jurisdictional" as opposed to just strictly enforced.

For example, in Marcelli v. Walker, the Sixth Circuit considered whether to reopen a district court case but ultimately decided that the plaintiff had not "presented good cause for the stipulated dismissal to be overturned." 313 F. App'x 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009).

Rule 60(d) offers a "'savings clause . . . that allows judgments to be attacked without regard to the passage of time[.]'" Marcelli v. Walker, 313 F.App'x 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009)(quoting Computer Leasco, Inc. v. NTP, Inc., 194 Fed. Appx 328, 334 (6th Cir. 2006)). See also Mitchell v. Rees, 651 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2011).

(1) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good conscience, []be enforced; (2) a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which prevented the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit of this defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of the defendant; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law.Mitchell v. Rees, 651 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Barrett v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 840 F.2d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir. 1987); Marcelli v. Walker, 313 F. App'x 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009); Buell v. Anderson, 48 F. App'x 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2002). "Moreover," the Sixth Circuit in Mitchell noted, "an independent action is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice."

The counterclaim for reimbursement, as we will address further below, involves the district court's denial of an equitable remedy. "We review [a] district court's equitable determination for abuse of discretion." Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston v. Gilbert, 507 F.3d 952, 959 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Marcelli v. Walker, 313 Fed.Appx. 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[In] an equitable action, our standard of review is abuse of discretion."). Abuse of discretion occurs only when the district court "committed a clear error of judgment, such as applying the incorrect legal standard, misapplying the correct legal standard, or relying upon clearly erroneous findings of fact."

To reopen a case dismissed with prejudice, a party must file a motion for post-judgment relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) . See Marcelli v. Walker, 313 Fed.Appx. 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)). Even if a party were to file a Rule 60(b) motion, it would be time-barred

” Marcelli v. Walker, 313 Fed.Appx. 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998)).

” Marcelli v. Walker, 313 Fed.Appx. 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2009). “The purpose of a Rule 60(b) motion . . . is to permit a district court to reconsider its judgment when that judgment rests on a defective foundation.

This subsection must be read in conjunction with the entirety of Rule 60, which provides for “Relief from a Judgment or Order” by motion (part (b)) or by independent action (part (d)). Rule 60(b) is “generally a party's exclusive avenue when seeking relief from a final judgment or order.” Marcelli v. Walker, 313 Fed.Appx. 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998)). A party seeking relief from judgment on the basis of fraud under Rule 60(b)(3), however, is subject to a one-year statute of limitations contained in Rule 60(c)(1).

Petitioner filed a motion under Rule 60(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking an independent action based on fraud on the court. While Rule 60(b) is generally a party's exclusive avenue when seeking relief from a final judgment or order, see United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998), Rule 60(d) provides a “savings clause, preserving the law before its enactment in 1946, that allows judgments to be attacked without regard to the passage of time[.]” Computer Leasco, Inc. v. NTP, Inc., 194 Fed.Appx. 328, 334 (6th Cir.2006); Marcelli v. Walker, 313 Fed.Appx. 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009). Rule 60(d) provides: