The petition itself should not be read to the jury, however. See Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 1966 OK 268, ¶ 60, 418 P.2d 900, 915 ("it is not good practice to formulate the issues by reading at large from the pleadings"). As a result of the addition of paragraph (D) to 10 O.S. Supp. 2004, § 7006-1.

In accordance with Oklahoma law, the trial court charged the jury that the essential elements of an action based on manufacturer's or seller's breach of implied warranty of fitness required proof (preponderance of evidence) by the plaintiff that the claimed defect or defects constituting a breach of implied warranty of fitness existed at the time that the vehicle left the hands of the manufacturer or seller and must also prove that the claimed defect was the proximate cause of the accident and resulting injury or loss. Marathon Battery Company v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900, 902 (Okl. 1966), and Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967). The essential elements described by the court in its charge were:

The petition/motion itself should not be read to the jury. See Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 1966 OK 268, ¶ 60, 418 P.2d 900, 915 ("it is not good practice to formulate the issues by reading at large from the pleadings"). Juvenile Instruction No. 2.

Although the jury should be informed of the material allegations of the petition regarding the termination of parental rights, the petition itself should not be read to the jury. SeeMarathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 1966 OK 268 [1965 OK 212], ¶ 60, 418 P.2d 900, 915 (" it is not good practice to formulate the issues by reading at large from the pleadings" ).

Shamrock Fuel Oil Sales Company, Inc. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967), noted in 45 Texas L.Rev. 790 (1967). The basis for the Oklahoma decision, Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1966), is not clear, but the decisions relied on justify the conclusion that Oklahoma will also adopt the theory of strict liability in tort. The mere adoption of strict liability for all products, however, does little to facilitate a solution to the issues posed by this appeal.

Mustang's bald allegation that such reliance was present is insufficient to satisfy any evidentiary test. In Marathon Battery Company v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okl. 1965), the Court recognized the rule that an implied warranty of fitness may be destroyed by the absence of the purchaser's reliance. It stated: We decline to hold such transaction constituted sale of a specified article, under its patent or trade name, which destroyed the implied warranty of fitness because the transaction showed a choice determined by the purchaser which superseded the seller's judgment.

The plaintiff insists that in the situation presented the principle of strict liability applies and that even a bystander might recover. The manufacturer argues that, except in food and drink cases, Oklahoma has never applied the theory of strict liability in implied warranty cases. It points out that in Marathon Battery Company v. Kilpatrick, Okla., 418 P.2d 900, the Oklahoma Supreme Court extended to a purchaser from a retailer the right to recover against the manufacturer for breach of implied warranty but did not extend that right to a person who was neither a purchaser nor user. No Oklahoma decision has considered the specific issue with which we are confronted. The extension of a manufacturer's liability to anyone injured by a product not suitable for the use intended has been the subject of much discussion.

The act by which the nonresident defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Oklahoma, "may be shown by circumstances from which such fact may be reasonably inferred." Crescent Corp. v. Martin, 1968 OK 95, ¶ 30, 443 P.2d 111, 118; see alsoMarathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 1965 OK 212, ¶¶ 3, 37, 418 P.2d 900, 903, 910.

¶7 The trial court ignored the Committee Comments in OUJI Juv. 2.2 which counsel that "[a]lthough the jury should be informed of the material allegations of the petition regarding the termination of parental rights, the petition itself should not be read to the jury. See Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 1966 OK 268, ¶ 60, 418 P.2d 900, 915 ('it is not good practice to formulate the issues by reading at large from the pleadings')."

¶7 The trial court ignored the Committee Comments in OUJI Juv. 2.2 which counsel that "[a]lthough the jury should be informed of the material allegations of the petition regarding the termination of parental rights, the petition itself should not be read to the jury. See Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 1966 OK 268, ¶ 60, 418 P.2d 900, 915 ('it is not good practice to formulate the issues by reading at large from the pleadings')."