While employers are not required to pay medical expenses for aggravation of a pre-existing hernia under OCGA § 34-9-266, they are required to pay income benefits when a claimant is disabled because of aggravation of a pre-existing hernia. See Boswell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Ga. App. 556, 560(2) ( 49 S.E.2d 117) (1948); Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26(1) ( 101 S.E.2d 898) (1958). Edwards appealed to the superior court, which remanded the case to the Appellate Division with direction to determine whether Edwards's incisional hernias — as opposed to inguinal or femoral hernias — were governed by OCGA § 34-9-266.
This court has long held that there may be recovery of compensation due to an aggravation of a pre-existing condition. See Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26 ( 101 S.E.2d 898) (1958). However, the phrase "compensable accident" employed by the Board and the words "accidental injury" have been used repeatedly to encompass the concept of aggravation of a pre-existing condition.
1. It is well settled that aggravation of a preexisting infirmity, whether congenital or otherwise, is compensable. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26 ( 101 S.E.2d 898); Aetna Cas. c. Co. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 440 ( 126 S.E.2d 907). Moreover, though the occlusion occurred in the area of the previously diagnosed narrowing of the middle cerebral artery, aggravation by continued work of a previous injury is a "new accident" and is compensable. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 122 Ga. App. 332, 333 ( 177 S.E.2d 125); Williams v. Morrison Assur. Co., 138 Ga. App. 191, 194 ( 225 S.E.2d 778); Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649 (1) ( 21 S.E.2d 478). There was some evidence that the injury in this case could have been the result of work-related aggravation.
"It is well settled that aggravation of a pre-existing infirmity, whether congenital or otherwise is compensable. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26 ( 101 S.E.2d 898); Aetna Cas. c. Co. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 440 ( 126 S.E.2d 907). It is also well settled that where a disability results which is objectively physiologically ascertainable, it is compensable although the onset of disability is imperceptible from day to day, and there is no one `accident' at a specifiable time and place to which the result may be attributable. Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 487 ( 125 S.E.2d 72)." Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 123 Ga. App. 512, 514 ( 181 S.E.2d 874). "[A]ggravation by continued work of a previous injury is a `new accident.
In a well-reasoned and comprehensive decision of this court, written by Judge Deen, concurred in by Chief Judge Bell and Judge Pannell, it was held that: "[a]ggravation of a pre-existing infirmity, whether congenital or otherwise, is compensable." Thomas v. FordMotor Co., 123 Ga. App. 512, 514, supra; Manufacturers Cas. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26 ( 101 S.E.2d 898); Aetna Cas. c. Co. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 440 ( 126 S.E.2d 907). In addition, the Thomas case holds that: "[j]ob-connected duties of lifting, stooping and bending combined with a pre-existing congenital infirmity to result in temporary total disability of the employee-claimant for a period of time, including hospitalization, his loss of time and medical expenses are compensable ..."
It is well settled that the aggravation of a pre-existing infirmity, whether congenital or otherwise, is compensable. Manufacturer Cas. Ins. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26 ( 101 S.E.2d 898); Aetna Cas. c. Co. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 440 ( 126 S.E.2d 907). It is also well settled that where a disability results which is objectively physiologically ascertainable, it is compensable although the onset of disability is imperceptible from day to day, and there is no one "accident" at a specifiable time and place to which the result may be attributable. Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 487 ( 125 S.E.2d 72).
It is well settled that the aggravation or acceleration of a pre-existing latent infirmity is compensable. Pruitt v. Ocean Acc. c. Corp., 48 Ga. App. 730 ( 173 S.E. 238); Employers Liability c. Corp. v. Johnson, 62 Ga. App. 416 (2) ( 8 S.E.2d 542); American Mut. c. Ins. Co. v. Gunter, 74 Ga. App. 500 (2) ( 40 S.E.2d 394); Davis v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. App. 515, 518 ( 43 S.E.2d 780); U.S. Cas. Co. v. Kelly, 78 Ga. App. 112 ( 50 S.E.2d 238); Massachusetts Bonding c. Co. v. Turk, 84 Ga. App. 547, 550 ( 66 S.E.2d 364); Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26 (1) ( 101 S.E.2d 898). We can see no difference between aggravation of a preexisting infirmity whether incurred while working for another employer (see Johnson, supra), or whether congenital in nature (e.g., Peacock, supra), and this situation.
This is the second appearance of this case before this court. (See Manufacturer's Casualty Ins. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26, 101 S.E.2d 898). After the case was remanded to the State Board of Workmen's Compensation additional evidence was heard before a deputy director and an award rendered finding that the claimant was entitled to compensation as the result of the aggravation of a pre-existing hernia. Compensation was awarded for the period when the claimant was found to be totally disabled.
Thus, in American Rolling Mill Co. v. Leslie, 302 Ky. 601, 194 S.W.2d 643, and In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 133 P.2d 427, the courts were careful to point out that they did not consider the lawmakers as intending to deny compensation (because of "pre-existence") in cases where a congenital hernia or bodily predisposition to hernia was claimed to be a disqualifying pre-existing hernia; note Mr. Justice Foster's introductory remarks in Gulf States Creosoting Co. v. Walker, 224 Ala. 104, 139 So. 261. We construe the opinions in Wood v. Wagner Electric Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 197 S.W.2d 647, Boswell v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 77 Ga. App. 556, 49 S.E.2d 117, Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Peacock, 97 Ga. App. 26, 101 S.E.2d 898, and Padrick Chevrolet Co. v. Crosby, (Fla.) 75 So.2d 762, as authorizing compensation under sections corresponding to § 288. Thus, Florida Statutes Ann. § 440.02 (19), reads in part: