Opinion
C.A. No. N18C-01-162 MMJ
08-03-2020
Karl Manuel, Plaintiff Pro Se Jennifer A. Sutton, Esq., Swartz Campbell LLC, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant
On Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
GRANTED MEMORANDUM OPINION Karl Manuel, Plaintiff Pro Se Jennifer A. Sutton, Esq., Swartz Campbell LLC, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant JOHNSTON, J.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
On January 16, 2018, Plaintiff Karl Manuel filed this negligence action against Defendant Chermika Dominique Wescott. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries arising from an automobile accident that occurred on January 16, 2016.
Compl. ¶ 1.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 16, 2019. Defendant filed an Answer on April 30, 2019. Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production directed to Plaintiff were served on April 30, 2019. Following a Motion to Compel discovery responses and/or to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, this Court ordered that Plaintiff had 30 days to respond to the outstanding discovery or the case would be dismissed. Plaintiff subsequently responded to the Interrogatories.
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's Requests for Production. The only medical records produced prior to the Request for Production consist of one page of records each for five visits between March 31, 2016 and April 12, 2016.
Pl.'s Op. Br., Ex. C.
The deadline for Plaintiff to produce an expert report was August 21, 2019. The deadline for discovery was January 15, 2020. Plaintiff has not produced an expert report opining that any injuries he allegedly suffered were caused by the accident on January 16, 2016.
See Case Scheduling Order, D.I. 63319894
Id.
Defendant filed this Motion for Summary Judgment on February 18, 2020. Plaintiff had the opportunity respond by July 27, 2020, but did not file a response.
See Letter to both parties regarding the reply and response deadlines to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, D.I. 65721398.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and judgment may be granted as a matter of law. All facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment may not be granted if the record indicates that a material fact is in dispute, or if there is a need to clarify the application of law to the specific circumstances. When the facts permit a reasonable person to draw only one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter of law. If the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, yet "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case," then summary judgment may be granted against that party.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 58-59 (Del. 1991).
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
ANALYSIS
Rule 56(c) mandates the granting of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and one which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Manucci v. The Stop'n'Shop Companies, Inc., 1989 WL 48587, *4 (Del. Super.).
In such cases, there can be no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment should be entered. "[W]here the non-moving party bears the ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, the moving party may instead demonstrate that a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element renders all other facts immaterial."
Id.
Kanoy v. Crothall American Inc., 1988 WL 15367, *1 (Del. Super.) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322).
In order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must adequately establish all of the elements essential to his case that he would have the burden to prove at trial. In a negligence claim that involves alleged bodily injuries, "the casual connection between the defendant's alleged negligent conduct and the plaintiff's alleged injury must be proven by the direct testimony of a competent medical expert.
Roache v. Charney, 38 A.3d 281, 284 (Del. 2012).
Rayfield v. Power, 840 A.2d 642 (Del. 2003) (TABLE) (citing Money v. Manville Corp., 596 A.2d 1372 (Del. 1991)). --------
The Court finds that Plaintiff has neither identified an expert witness nor produced an expert report as required to establish a causal connection between the January 16, 2016 accident and his alleged injuries. Thus, Plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of his negligence claim.
THEREFORE, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
The Hon. Mary M. Johnston