Opinion
Civil Action No. 06-cv-01759-WYD-PAC.
June 12, 2007
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the following motions: Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand to State Court and Memorandum in Support Thereof [# 6], filed September 19 2006; Defendants United Government Security Officers of America, International Union, and its Local 50's ("Union") Motion to Dismiss [# 24], filed November 3, 2006; and Defendant, Am-Gard's Second Motion to Dismiss [# 25], filed November 3, 2006. A response and reply were filed with respect to the motion to remand. Responses were also filed with respect to the motions to dismiss, however, no replies were submitted.
By way of background, Plaintiff Jean Manson brought this action against the Defendants in Colorado State District Court on August 11, 2006, alleging two causes of action arising out of his employment with Am-Gard. Plaintiff alleged: (1) breach of express and implied contract under the collective bargaining agreement and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and (2) tortious neglect in failing to both reinstate Plaintiff and prosecute a grievance on behalf of Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-27.) For his claims, Plaintiff requested economic and non-economic damages in excess of $100,000.00. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32.) Defendant Union removed the Complaint to this Court on September 6, 2006. On September 19, 2006, Plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion to remand is denied and Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2001, Plaintiff began employment with Am-Gard as a security officer in the Social Security Administration Office of the United States Government located in Durango, Colorado. In connection with his employment, Plaintiff joined both the International and Local # 50 Union ("Union"). The Union has a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Am-Gard. On or about September 24, 2004, Plaintiff was notified by Am-Gard that he was being suspended without pay.
Plaintiff believes that his suspension by Am-Gard was as a result of a demand by representatives of the U.S. Government that he be removed from his post at the Social Security Administration office in Durango, Colorado but that the demand . . . was not that he be suspended without pay or fired but rather they expected he would be relocated to some other U.S. government office.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) On or about September 28, 2004, Plaintiff notified the Union that he wished to file a grievance. On September 30, 2004, Plaintiff filed for unemployment compensation and began employment interviews. On or about January 21, 2005, Plaintiff began alternate employment with Dawn Trucking Company in New Mexico. On February 2, 2005, Plaintiff was injured while working for Dawn and states that he has been permanently disabled.
Plaintiff alleges that his suspension without pay "was without cause, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement . . . and in violation of its expressed covenant of good faith and fair dealing with its employee." (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff further alleges that between September 24, 2004, and February 2, 2005, the Union "ceased adequate and appropriate representation of Plaintiff . . . in the grievance process and apparently joined with Am-Gard in an effort to alter the attitude of the U.S. Government. . . ." (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant Union's Motion to Remand
As noted, Plaintiff filed suit in Colorado state court in August of 2006. On September 6, 2006, Defendant Union filed a notice of removal in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on the ground that Plaintiff's suit could have been commenced as an original action in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because, according to the Union, Plaintiff's claims are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Section 301 of the LMRA states in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Accordingly, Defendant Union argues that removal to federal court was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
1. Standard of Review
A defendant may remove to federal court "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, an action arises under federal law "only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Thus, as "master of the claim," a plaintiff "may prevent removal by choosing not to plead a federal claim even if one is available." Schmeling v. NRODAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1996).
"There does exist, however, an `independent corollary' to the well-pleaded complaint rule, known as the `complete pre-emption' doctrine." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. This doctrine provides that "if a federal cause of action completely pre-empts a state cause of action, any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily `arises under' federal law." Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). Section 301 of the LMRA is such a federal cause of action. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393-94. Section 301 of the LMRA creates federal jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has further stated that "[s]ection 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. 394. Therefore, section 301 preempts "questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, . . . whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort." Saunders v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 927 F.2d 1154, 1155 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. Analysis
In determining whether Plaintiff's claims in the instant action are "founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements," or are "substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement," I must first look to Plaintiff's complaint. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. However, in light of the fact that "[p]laintiffs often attempt to avoid federal jurisdiction under § 301 by framing their complaints in terms of state law theories," I may "look beyond the allegations of the complaint . . . to determine whether the wrong complained of arose from a breach of obligations under the collective bargaining agreement." Albertson's Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains the following allegations:
Legal Claims . . . Against All Defendants in Contract
21. Defendant Am-Gard, by placing Plaintiff Jean Manson on unpaid suspension based upon an unfounded and uninvestigated demand by the United States government, without probable cause, while at all times knowing of Plaintiff Jean Manson's exemplary service and performance of duties for Am-Gard, and doing so without affording Plaintiff Jean Manson due process, breached its expressed contract of employment with Plaintiff Jean Manson, its obligations under the Collective Bargaining Agreement with International and Local #50, and its implied contract with Plaintiff Jean Manson of good faith and fair dealing. In so doing, Defendant Am-Gard caused Plaintiff Jean Manson to suffer loss of wage from September 25, 2004 to this date and for an unknown time into the future, said wage loss being in excess of $15,000.00.
22. Defendants International and Local #50, by failing, without just cause, to diligently, timely, and appropriately prosecute Plaintiff Jean Manson's grievance against Am-Gard, and by entering into a joint agreement with Am-Gard to pursue, for their own personal interests, another course of action, breached their expressed and implied duties under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, their expressed and implied duties under the Union membership of Plaintiff Jean Manson, and their duty of fair representation of Plaintiff Jean Manson. In so doing, the Defendants International and Local #50 have caused Plaintiff Jean Manson loss of wage from that time when the grievance would be reasonably expected to have been completed through arbitration to this date and for an unknown time into the future, said wage loss being in excess of $15,000.00.
Legal Claims . . . Against All Defendants in Tort
23. Am-Gard, International and Local #50 knew, or in the exercise of reasonable knowledge should have known, that Plaintiff Jean Manson would be forced to go to work for someone unless he were reinstated with back pay by Am-Gard and that such work as he might be able to find might significantly increase the likelihood of his sustaining a disabling injury.
24. Nevertheless, Am-Gard, International, and Local #50 and each of them, intentionally, negligently, carelessly, recklessly, fraudulently, conspiratorially, and/or outrageously failed, refused and neglected to reinstate Plaintiff Jean Manson and failed to properly, timely, and diligently process Plaintiff Jean Manson's grievance for being improperly suspended without pay.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-24.) In examining Plaintiff's Complaint, I find, on its face, Plaintiff's claims are based on state law contract and tort theories. However, when the Complaint is viewed more closely in its entirety, I find that Plaintiff's claims are ultimately based on an alleged breach of the labor agreement between the Union and Am-Gard. Plaintiff's claims refer to the collective bargaining agreement and Defendants failure to comply with its terms and duties. Therefore, an interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement is essential to the evaluation of Plaintiff's claims, and this Court has jurisdiction under section 301. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for remand should be denied.
B. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
1. Standard of Review
The Defendants assert in their respective motions that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, I "must accept all the wellpleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." David v. City and County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 S.Ct. 858 (1997) (quoting Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1474 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1994)). Further, "[a] complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) only `if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support a claim for relief.'" Id. (quoting Jojola v. Chavez, 54 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir. 1995)).
2. Analysis
Defendants Union and Am-Gard both move to dismiss this action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Defendants argue that Plaintiff's contract claim is a hybrid clam under section 301 of the LMRA and is thus, time-barred. The Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's tort claims are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA and are thus, time-barred as well. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that his claims are grounded in state law, and therefore, the LMRA does not apply.
"Section 301 of the LMRA makes collective bargaining agreements enforceable in federal court but provides no statute of limitations for claims brought under it." Edwards v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America, 46 F.3d 1047, 1050 (10th Cir. 1995); See 29 U.S.C. § 185. However, in Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1983), the Supreme Court held that federal labor policies and the practicalities of section 301 litigation supported the application of the six-month statute of limitations prescribed by section 10 of the LMRA to hybrid claims. Id. The Supreme Court determined that hybrid claims under section 301 of the LMRA include an employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement as well as a union's breach of its duty of fair representation. Id.
Further, the Tenth Circuit applied this law in a similar case. In Williams, 46 F.3d at 1047, the plaintiff brought an action against the union alleging that it had breached its duty of fair representation by mishandling plaintiff's wrongful discharge grievance against a former employer. Id. The District Court dismissed the action as barred by the six-month statute of limitations applicable to hybrid claims under the LMRA. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court and held that the six-month statute of limitations under the LMRA was applicable to the plaintiff's hybrid claims, not the two-year statute of limitations under state law. Id.
The Court's role on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the Plaintiff's Complaint is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted. I must accept all of the Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). Based on my earlier analysis that Plaintiff's claims are governed by section 301 of the LMRA, my analysis turns to whether Plaintiff's claims are hybrid claims, and therefore subject to the applicable six-month statute of limitations prescribed by section 10 of the LMRA.
In the case at hand, paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint clearly alleges that Defendant Am-Gard breached its employment contract with Plaintiff under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Moreover, paragraph 22 of the Amended Complaint clearly alleges that Defendant Union breached its duties under both the collective bargaining agreement and the union membership of the Plaintiff. Paragraph 22 further alleges that Defendant Union breached its "duty of fair representation of Plaintiff Jean Manson." (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) Under the law set forth above and after reviewing the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, I find that Plaintiff's alleged contract claim is a hybrid claim and therefore, subject to the applicable six-month statute of limitations prescribed by section 10 of the LMRA.
Having established that Plaintiff's contract claim is a hybrid claim, my analysis now turns to whether Plaintiff's claim is time-barred. After a further review of the Amended Complaint, I find that Plaintiff's claim is not timely. In paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that "after the 24th day of September, 2004 and prior to the 2nd day of February, 2005 Defendant Union ceased adequate and appropriate representation of Plaintiff . . ." (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Thus, the latest date that Defendant Union allegedly breached its duty of fair representation was February 2, 2005. Therefore, in order to comply with the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiff was required to bring his claims by August 2, 2005. However, Plaintiff did not bring this action until August 11, 2006. ( See State Court Summons and Compl.) Plaintiff's "hybrid" contract claim is untimely and barred by the applicable six month statute of limitations under section 10 of the LMRA and should be dismissed with prejudice.
Turning to my analysis of Plaintiff's tort claim, I find that the language of the second claim asserted in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Amended Complaint expressly alleges a breach of duty owed under the collective bargaining agreement to fairly represent Plaintiff and process Plaintiff's grievance. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24.) Therefore, Plaintiff's claim in the second cause of action involves rights and duties arising under a collective bargaining agreement and is therefore, completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (holding that when resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon the analysis of the collective bargaining agreement, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal law). Accordingly, based on my above analysis of Plaintiff's contract claim and after reviewing the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, I find that Plaintiff's alleged tort claim is also a hybrid claim and therefore, subject to the applicable six-month statute of limitations prescribed by section 10 of the LMRA. and should be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss should be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [# 6], is DENIED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Union's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [# 24], is GRANTED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Am-Gard's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [# 25], is GRANTED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.