Clearly, the mere fact that an Authority employee was involved in an accident on a road owned and maintained by the Authority cannot serve as a sufficient basis to conclude the accident occurred in the course of petitioner's employment. We conclude, as did the compensation judge, that the facts at hand are much closer to those presented in our decisions in N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Elec. Gas, 234 N.J.Super. 116, 560 A.2d 117 (App.Div.), certif. denied 118 N.J. 178, 570 A.2d 948 (1989) and Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J.Super. 138, 550 A.2d 1278 (App.Div. 1988), than to those presented in Ramos. In N.J. Mfrs., we concluded that a petitioner injured in an auto accident while driving to work on a road owned by his employer, maintained by a third-party, patrolled by the local police, and used on occasion by the public, 234 N.J.Super. at 117, 560 A.2d 117, was not injured at a place "under the control of his employer."

The guiding principle in Livingstone, then, is that an employer provided parking lot to which an employee is assigned parking, regardless of whether the lot is employer owned, maintained or exclusively used, is within the premises rule. See Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138, 550 A.2d 1278 (App.Div. 1988) ("In brief, the Supreme Court in Livingstone concluded that the 1979 amendment of N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, which imposed a more stringent definition of employment than had evolved from judicial construction of the going and coming rule, was not intended to overrule the body of case law which fixed the commencement of the day's employment at the time of arrival in the parking lot made available to employees by the employer. Thus, the Court held in Livingstone that employer ownership of the lot or even exclusive control thereover was not essential to a finding of compensability in the circumstances there — the principle of the parking lot cases continued to apply even if the employer had merely designated a section of the common area for its employees.

See Ibid.; Serrano v. Apple Container, 236 N.J. Super. 216, 220-21, 565 A.2d 417 (App.Div. 1989), certif.denied, 121 N.J. 591, 583 A.2d 298 (1990); Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138, 143, 550 A.2d 1278 (App.Div. 198 8); Plodzien v. Township of Edison Police Dep't, 228 N.J. Super. 129, 134, 549 A.2d 59 (App.Div. 1988); Mahon v. Reilly's Radio Cabs, Inc., 212 N.J. Super. 28, 33-35, 513 A.2d 367 (App.Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 79, 526 A.2d 159 (1987); Ohio Cas. Group v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 213 N.J. Super. 283, 287-89, 517 A.2d 166 (App.Div. 1986); Mangigian v. Franz Warner Assoc., Inc., 205 N.J. Super. 422, 427-28, 501 A.2d 179 (App.Div. 1985); Nebesne v. Crocetti, 194 N.J. Super. 278, 281, 476 A.2d 858 (App.Div. 1984). Citing these cases, respondent reasons that there is no coverage for petitioner's accident because it had "no control" over her while she drove home after completing her assigned task.

SeeEhrlich v. Strawbridge Clothier, 260 N.J. Super. 89, 90 (App.Div. 1992) (finding employer control where employee used exit "designated by" employer for "the exclusive use of its employees"), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 435 (1993); Serranov. Apple Container, 236 N.J. Super. 216, 218 (App.Div. 1989) (finding no employer control when it was "not disputed that [employer] did not dictate what means of egress [employee] should use, nor that there were a number of alternate ways to leave the plant and the complex"), certif. denied, 121 N.J. 591 (1990); New Jersey Mfrs.Ins. Co. v. Public Serv. Elec. Gas Co., 234 N.J. Super. 116, 118-19 (App.Div. 1989) (describing Livingstone as finding employer control by virtue of employer's "power to designate an otherwise under-used area of the parking lot for use by its employees"); Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138, 142 (App.Div. 198 8) (describing Livingstone as finding employer control of common areas when the employer had "designated a section of the common area for its employees"). In a pre-Livingstone case, Cressey, supra, 204 N.J. Super. at 343-44, the Appellate Division allowed compensation for an injury occurring on a loading dock adjacent to the employer's premises.

In holding the accident covered by the Act, we noted that "[t]he guiding principle in Livingstone, then, is that an employer provided parking lot to which an employee is assigned parking, regardless of whether the lot is employer owned, maintained, or exclusively used, is within the premises rule." Id. at 577 (citing Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138, 142 (App. Div. 1988) (employee injured in employer provided shuttle taking her from the work site to the employer designated parking lot was covered under Act)); see also Ehrlich v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 260 N.J. Super. 89, 90, 92 (App. Div. 1992) (employee injured on sidewalk after leaving work through the door designated for exclusive use of employees was covered under Act), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 435 (1993).

The status of being "in the same employ," to trigger the bar of § 8, refers to the alleged tortfeasor's role at the time and place of the accident, and not to the mere chance that although in the course of entirely personal conduct, he also happens to be an employee of the injured party's employer. Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138 (App.Div. 1988). The fact that a car accident occurs on the employer's property between two coemployees, and that injury to the employee who is in the course of his employment at the time is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, does not automatically mean that the injured employee's common law claim against the other is barred by § 8.

See Serrano, supra, 236 N.J. Super. at 221, 565 A.2d 417; N.J. Mfrs. Ins. v. Public Service, 234 N.J. Super. 116, 120, 560 A.2d 117 (App.Div.), certif. den., 118 N.J. 178, 570 A.2d 948 (1989); Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138, 143, 550 A.2d 1278 (App.Div. 198 8). "It is time to recognize that the `going and coming rule' has come and gone.

See Livingstone, 111 N.J. at 105, 106. We conclude, much as we did in N.J. Mfrs. Ins. v. Public Service, 234 N.J. Super. 116, 120 (App.Div. 1989), and Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138, 143 (App.Div. 1988), that Serrano "was beyond his employer's control in any relevant sense" when this accident occurred. It is time to recognize that the "going and coming rule" has come and gone.

Therefore, the place where the accident occurred was not, within the intent of N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, "under the control of the employer." There are significant similarities between this case and Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J. Super. 138 (App.Div. 1988). Manole and Carvellas were employed by the same employer in a shopping mall.