More than once this court has been faced with a situation in which the passage of time made any remedy impossible. If we should consider this cause on its merits and disagree with the holding of the trial court, it is apparent no benefit to the plaintiff-appellant could result. Under such circumstances we have refused to entertain appeals in Olsen v. Martens, 244 Iowa 741, 742, 743, 57 N.W.2d 805, 806; Johnston v. Kirkville Independent School District, 240 Iowa 1328, 1329, 39 N.W.2d 287, 288; Humble v. Carter, 210 Iowa 551, 552, 231 N.W. 341; Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 954, 955, 221 N.W. 560, 561; Doidge v. Bruce, an Iowa case not reported in the Iowa Reports, 116 N.W. 726. Many other cases are cited and discussed in Manning v. Heath, supra, 206 Iowa at 954, 955, 956, 221 N.W. 560, 561. Nor is it material that no motion to dismiss has been made by the appellee. The record shows affirmatively that only a moot question is presented, and in such cases we decline to act.

" See also Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 221 N.W. 560; Humble v. Carter, 210 Iowa 551, 231 N.W. 341, in each of which we dismissed the appeal for the reason only moot questions were presented. However because courts favor trials and decisions upon the merits of causes and a third hearing is to be held we will consider appellants' assigned propositions.

" This decision was followed in Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 956, 221 N.W. 560, 561, which cites various authorities in support of the rule "that the appeal should be dismissed where the matter in controversy, such as the right of possession of real estate, has become moot by reason of the lapse of time, and there is nothing involved, except the matter of costs." We reaffirm that doctrine.

Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 133, 40 L.Ed. 293; Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 41 S.Ct. 522, 65 L.Ed. 990; Price v. Wilson, D.C.Mun.App., 32 A.2d 109; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1455. Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 221 N.W. 560; Kahnt v. Caldwell, 85 Colo. 496, 277 P. 471; Verner v. Tomlinson, Tex.Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 218; Sherrill v. Stewart, 196 Miss. 422, 17 So.2d 443; Ballew v. Arnett, 74 Ind. App. 321, 129 N.E. 18. It results that there is no occasion for us to discuss the admissibility of the proffered evidence of the alleged oral agreement or the constitutionality of the 1948 amendment to the Survivor's Testimony statute.

[2] We have repeatedly refused to decide a case merely to settle who shall pay the costs. Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 955, 956, 221 N.W. 560, and citations; Welton v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 208 Iowa 1401, 1404, 227 N.W. 332; Fish v. Sioux City, 210 Iowa 862, 232 N.W. 118. See also 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, section 1354a, page 1950.

3 Corpus Juris, 360, sec. 115. That a question raised will not be determined where the action has become moot is supported by the following Iowa cases: Cutcomp v. Utt, 60 Iowa 156, 14 N.W. 214; Berry v. City of Des Moines, 115 Iowa 44, 87 N.W. 747; McGovern v. McGovern, 192 Iowa 1196, 186 N.W. 60; McFarland v. McGhee, 199 Iowa 542, 202 N.W. 89; Thie v. Cons. Ind. School Dist., 200 Iowa 359, 204 N.W. 401; Richman v. Letts, 202 Iowa 973, 210 N.W. 93; Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 221 N.W. 560; Welton v. Highway Comm., 208 Iowa 1401, 227 N.W. 332; Gallarno v. Long, 214 Iowa 805, 243 N.W. 719. The foundation of appellant's claim that the lower court erred in striking the plea in abatement is based upon appellant's contention that the federal court entered an order enjoining the prosecution of claims of all kinds unless filed in the bankruptcy proceedings pending in the federal court, and upon the further ground that in bankruptcy proceedings under section 77B, claims based upon an action in tort can no longer be prosecuted in the state court, and that all such claims must now be filed and prosecuted in the bankruptcy proceedings.

We have repeatedly held that where a decision of the vital questions involved in an appeal could have no effect on the further proceedings of the lower court, the question thus becomes moot, and we have uniformly dismissed such appeals. Upton v. Gephart, 205 Iowa 235, 217 N.W. 630; McGrath v. District Court of Adams County, 205 Iowa 191, 217 N.W. 823; Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 221 N.Y.S. 560; Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 208 Iowa 1401, 227 N.W. 332; Iowa National Bank v. Raffensberger, 208 Iowa 1133, 224 N.W. 505; Fish v. City of Sioux City, 210 Iowa 862, 232 N.W. 118; Saner v. School Board Consolidated District of Keokuk County, 211 Iowa 1201, 235 N.W. 291. The plaintiff, by the last notice which is found to be in due form and in compliance with the statute, gives the lower court jurisdiction, and a decision by this court on the questions here involved could in no way affect or disturb the jurisdiction thus acquired by this last notice.

We will not settle questions which were involved in rights now no longer existing; and when, in a case pending in this court, rights cease to exist, the appeal will be dismissed.Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 954, 221 N.W. 560, 561 (1928) (citations omitted). The purchase of the mortgaged property at a sheriff's sale did not render moot the Hawkins' challenge to the validity of the foreclosure judgment.

Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude the validity of the summary judgment ruling is "a mere abstraction"; rather it involves "real, present questions, involving actual interests and rights of the parties." Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 954, 221 N.W. 560, 561 (1928) (citations omitted). We therefore turn to the merits of the appeal.

Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude the validity of the FED ruling is "a mere abstraction"; rather it involves "real, present questions, involving actual interests and rights of the parties. . . ." Manning v. Heath, 206 Iowa 952, 954, 221 N.W. 560, 561 (1928) (citations omitted). We therefore turn to the merits of the appeal.