Opinion
Case No. 2:00-cv-205.
April 24, 2001.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the opinion filed this date:
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motions for service of defendants Manning and Vanderwall (dockets #5 and #6) are denied as moot.
FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED that, for the same reasons the court dismisses the action, the court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); McGore v.Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997).
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court has granted plaintiff leave to proceedin forma pauperis without payment of an initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), the court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The court must read plaintiff'spro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the court will dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Robin Rick Manning, an inmate at the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility (LMF), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Deputy Director Dan Bolden, Regional Administrator Richard Johnson, Warden Wayne Stine, Deputy Warden Ken Gearin, Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth Epps, Inspector Lyle Rutter, Inspector Arden Mellberg, Michigan State Police Detective Jack Vanderwall, and unknown John and Jane Doe defendants.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that on March 7, 1990, he was incarcerated at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI) and worked in the prison factory. On this date, plaintiff, inmate Martin, and inmate Underwood, who all worked in the same department, were all placed in administrative segregation pending an investigation into an assault against a prison employee, Paul Wicklander. Plaintiff was mirandized on March 8, 1990, by the Michigan State Police, and was transferred to Riverside Correctional Facility (RCF). On March 13, 1990, the Notice of Intent against plaintiff was upheld following a hearing, and plaintiff was classified to administrative segregation pending the results of the ongoing investigation. Inmate Underwood was subsequently charged with the assault, and plaintiff was told by the security classification committee (SCC) that he was no longer under investigation by the Michigan State Police. However, the SCC also told plaintiff that he would continue to be held in administrative segregation until he was transferred out of RCF.
Plaintiff was transferred to Jackson State Prison and was placed in general population on June 1, 1990. Sometime after his transfer, plaintiff was called to a room with defendants Vanderwall and Mellberg. Plaintiff was asked to be a prosecution witness against inmate
Underwood, and told that if he refused, he would be placed in administrative segregation and would be held there indefinitely. Plaintiff refused and abruptly left the room. A notice of intent was written on plaintiff by defendant Mellberg on July 11, 1990, and plaintiff received a hearing on July 17, 1990. As a result, plaintiff was classified to administrative segregation. Inmate Underwood was convicted of the assault on Paul Wicklander on October 31, 1990.
Plaintiff alleges that on November 16, 1990, defendant Mellberg wrote a false misconduct on plaintiff for being an accomplice to the assault and battery of Paul Wicklander. Plaintiff claims that this misconduct was based on information provided by defendant Vanderwall. On December 7, 1990, plaintiff was found not guilty of the assault, but was found guilty of attempting to hide or destroy evidence and was sentenced to 30 days detention. On January 25, 1991, plaintiff was transferred to Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility (ICF), and on March 17, 1993, plaintiff was transferred to MBP. Plaintiff was incarcerated in administrative segregation during this time. On January 13, 1995, the MBP SCC submitted a recommendation that plaintiff be released to general population. This request was denied on January 27, 1995, by defendant Johnson. On February 7, 1995, plaintiff was formally classified to administrative segregation in relation to the December, 1990, misconduct ticket. Plaintiff was transferred to LMF on June 9, 1995. In 1995 and 1996, plaintiff filed lawsuits on defendants Bolden, Johnson, and Stine.
On March 11, 1996, LMF SCC submitted a recommendation that plaintiff be released from administrative segregation. This recommendation was denied by defendant Stine. On October 3, 1996, LMF SCC submitted a recommendation that plaintiff be released from administrative segregation. This recommendation was denied by Acting Warden Andrews. On October 24, 1996, LMF SCC submitted a recommendation that plaintiff be released from administrative segregation. Acting Warden Andrews submitted the request to defendant Bolden.
This request was ultimately denied by defendant Johnson. In April of 1997, the Cain v. MDOC lawsuit witness list was published, listing all inmates who were going to testify. Plaintiff's name was on the list. On November 7, 1997, LMF SCC submitted a recommendation that plaintiff be released from administrative segregation, which was denied by defendant Gearin without plaintiff having received an interview. Plaintiff filed a grievance on defendant Gearin. Resident Unit Manager (RUM) Gramm found that a mistake had been made and a new recommendation was submitted. On January 6, 1998, LMF SCC submitted a recommendation that plaintiff be released from administrative segregation, which was also denied by defendant Gearin. On February 3, 1998, plaintiff filed a grievance against defendant Gearin.
On December 14, 1998, LMF SCC submitted a recommendation to CFA (Correctional Facilities Administration) that plaintiff be approved for PROJECT RESTART, an alternative to administrative segregation which allows prisoners to get out of administrative segregation in 8 weeks if they successfully complete the program. This request was denied by CFA. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff filed a grievance against CFA. The response to this grievance indicated that plaintiff was denied the request for placement in PROJECT RESTART because of his alleged involvement in the assault of a prison employee.
On May 3, 1999, LMF SCC submitted a recommendation that plaintiff be released from administrative segregation, which was denied by defendant Rutter. On May 13, 1999, plaintiff filed a grievance on defendant Rutter for failing to interview plaintiff prior to the denial of release from administrative segregation. RUM Gramm reviewed the grievance with plaintiff and stated that because of plaintiff's alleged involvement in an assault on a prison employee, he was to be kept in administrative segregation.
On May 14, 1999, and May 21, 1999, plaintiff filed grievances against LMF administration for violations of the Cain v. MDOC case. In particular, plaintiff claims that administrative segregation inmates had been denied yard time, calendars, the right to order coats and gloves, and postage loans, which prevented them from communicating with Cain v. MDOC attorneys. On May 25, 1999, LMF SCC recommended that plaintiff be approved for PROJECT RESTART by CFA, but this recommendation was denied on November 2, 1999.
On November 30, 1999, plaintiff filed a grievance against defendants Bolden, Johnson, Stine, Gearin, and Rutter for retaliating against him by denying any recommendation that he be released from administrative segregation. On December 20, 1999, plaintiff filed a grievance against the LMF administration and the CFA for placing a "CFA hold" on plaintiff where he has only been accused of attempting to hide and/or destroy evidence, and the policy requires that inmates be held only where they have actually committed a serious assault.
On January 3, 2000, plaintiff filed a grievance against CFA for violating policy. On January 31, 2000, plaintiff filed a grievance against the LMF administration for misplacing or destroying a grievance against defendant Stine, which had been filed on January 30, 1996. On February 7, 2000, plaintiff filed a grievance against the LMF administration for violating the pack up procedure to prevent plaintiff from obtaining a legal footlocker for his excess legal property. On March 24, 2000, plaintiff filed a grievance against the CFA for violating the grievance policy. On April 23, 2000, defendant Stine retired. On May 3, 2000, LMF SCC submitted a recommendation that plaintiff be released from administrative segregation. Plaintiff received a hearing interview with defendant Epps, during which he claims that he was forced to agree to stay in Level V security, only accept a port or yard crew job, and to speak to a psychologist.
On July 28, 2000, plaintiff spoke with a psychologist and received an excellent mental health report. Plaintiff signed a waiver so that the psychologist's report could be submitted to defendant Epps. On August 16, 2000, defendant Epps denied the recommendation that plaintiff be released from administrative segregation.
Plaintiff claims that he was never provided notice or hearing on the original misconduct, which caused him to be placed in administrative segregation. In addition, plaintiff claims that other similarly situated inmates who are not litigious have been released from administrative segregation.
Plaintiff states that he is suing the defendants in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
II. Failure to state a claim
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint.Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff claims that defendants Mellberg and Vanderwall violated his rights by sanctioning plaintiff to administrative segregation on a notice of intent and false misconduct report in retaliation for plaintiff's refusal to testify against inmate Underwood, as well as for his participation in Cain v. MDOC. Plaintiff alleges that the false misconduct report was written and all adverse action took place on or before November 16, 1990. Plaintiff was found not guilty of the misconduct on December 7, 1990, but was found guilty of attempting to hide or destroy evidence. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations period. The United States Supreme Court has held that the limitations period for filing a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by applying the state's most analogous personal injury statute of limitations period. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); McSurely v. Hutchison, 823 F.2d 1002, 1005 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988). In Michigan, the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. MCL § 600.5805(8). See also Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Wayne Co. v. Carroll, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
Prior to April 1, 1994 Michigan recognized imprisonment as a legal disability which tolled the statute of limitations period otherwise applicable to legal actions. Under former MCL § 600.5851, persons imprisoned at the time a claim accrued had one year after removal of the disability (release from imprisonment) to bring their actions. However, effective April 1, 1994, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805 was amended. The amendment abolished imprisonment as a disability which would toll the accrual of the statute of limitations. However, for actions which accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment, April 1, 1994, the Michigan legislature extended the statute of limitations period to the greater of any other applicable statute of limitations period or until April 1, 1995. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5851(9).
Since plaintiff alleges that the conduct which forms the basis of his clams against defendants Mellberg and Vanderwall occurred on or prior to November 16, 1990, plaintiff had only until April 1, 1995, to file his cause of action. Plaintiff's complaint was received by the clerk's office on October 30, 2000, and is dated October 23, 2000. Plaintiff's clams against defendants Mellberg and Vanderwall are therefore barred by the statute of limitations period.
In addition, plaintiff's claims surrounding his formal reclassification to administrative segregation on February 7, 1995, are also barred by the statute of limitations. As noted above, the applicable statute of limitations is three years. Therefore, plaintiff had until February 7, 1998, to file a cause of action on these claims. However, as noted previously, plaintiff failed to file by this date.
Plaintiff claims that defendants' conduct in keeping him incarcerated in administrative segregation violates his right to equal protection. A claim that plaintiff was treated one way and everyone else was treated another way, by itself, is not sufficient to state an equal protection claim. Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 842 (1993). Rather, plaintiff must show that he was victimized by some suspect classification. Id. Absent some allegation or proof that the law was applied differently to plaintiff because of race, gender, age, or some other improper classification, no equal protection claim has been stated. See Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 194 (6th Cir. 1985) (Conte, J., concurring); see also Galbraith v. Northern Telecom. Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 282 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 945 (1992) (a person's conduct is legitimate for purpose of the equal protection clause even though it may have been mean-spirited, ill-considered, or other unjustifiable, objectionable, or unreasonable, so long as it was not motivated by class-based discrimination). Also, plaintiff has not alleged that he has been treated differently because he is a member of any protected class. Simply being a prisoner does not make plaintiff a member of a protected class. Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 480 (6th Cir. 1995) (to establish equal protection claim, inmate must prove that a racially discriminatory intent or purpose was a factor in the decision of the prison officials). Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendants' actions violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by keeping him in administrative segregation for ten years in reliance upon a false major misconduct report. The Supreme Court has held that a claim for declaratory relief and monetary damages, based upon allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decision maker that necessarily implies the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983 until the conviction has been overturned. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1589 (1997). The Court relied upon Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372-73 (1994), which held that "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [overturned]." Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646, 117 S.Ct. at 1588 (emphasis in original). Thus, where a prisoner's claim necessarily implies the invalidity of a misconduct conviction, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983. Id.; see also Bailey v. McCoy, No. 98-1746, 1999 WL 777351, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 1999) (collecting Sixth Circuit decisions applying Edwards to procedural due process challenges). As noted above, plaintiff claims that he is being held in administrative segregation because of a false misconduct, which has not been overturned. Therefore, this claim is properly dismissed.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court determines that plaintiff's action fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the court dismisses the action, the court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should plaintiff appeal this decision, the court will assess the $105 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $105 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.