Opinion
11-P-48
11-18-2011
LAUREN MANN-CHANEY v. PRIMEVEST FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., & others.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Lauren Mann-Chaney appeals from the denial of her motions to disqualify defendants' counsel for conflict of interest, for written findings, for application for default, and for default judgment. She also appeals from the allowance of defendants' motion to compel arbitration and to stay Superior Court proceedings.
Actually, Mann-Chaney's two motions seeking a default judgment were determined to be moot.
Briefly, an order compelling arbitration does not constitute a final order and is therefore not subject to interlocutory appeal. Old Rochester Regional Teacher's Club v. Old Rochester Regional Sch. Dist., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 118 (1984), Coughlan Constr. Co. v. Rockport, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 994, 995 (1987). See generally G. L. c. 251, § 18. Contrast G. L. c. 251, § 18(a) (1) (granting a right of interlocutory appeal from an order denying an application to compel arbitration). A final judgment has not entered here and Mann-Chaney is free to revisit any of these issues once a judgment does enter. Otherwise, Mann-Chaney makes no real argument that the order compelling arbitration was erroneously entered, although this argument will be available to her once the arbitration award has been confirmed.
Mann-Chaney argues that the denial of her motion to disqualify defendants' counsel was error. We do not agree and affirm the denial of the motion. Mann-Chaney cites to no case law to support her argument and provides only a partial recitation of the appropriate rules of professional conduct, omitting those portions that are dispositive of this issue. Defendants' counsel has made it clear that, at least to this juncture in the proceedings, the various defendants have knowingly consented to joint representation. The law requires no more. See Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.7 & comment 7, as amended, 430 Mass. 1301 (1999), & 1.8(g) 426 Mass. 1339 (1998).
The denial of the motion to disqualify defendants' counsel is affirmed, the remaining appeal is dismissed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Kafker, Trainor & Meade, JJ.),