Manlius Center Road Corporation v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Cianchetti v. Burgio

    145 A.D.3d 1539 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)   Cited 12 times

    We have considered defendant's specific contentions, including those with respect to the unforeseeable nature of her medical condition, the number of patient visits to the chiropractic practice, and plaintiff's alleged lack of due diligence, and we conclude that they do not require a different result.Finally, contrary to defendant's further contention, the amount of damages is "supported by competent evidence and is within the range of the expert testimony" (Manlius Ctr. Rd. Corp. v. State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 685, 685, 370 N.Y.S.2d 750 ; cf. S.J. Kula, Inc. v. Carrier, 107 A.D.3d 1541, 1542, 967 N.Y.S.2d 804 ; see generally Matter of City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency [Alterm, Inc.], 20 A.D.3d 168, 170, 796 N.Y.S.2d 503 ).It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

  2. Donaloio v. State

    99 A.D.2d 335 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)   Cited 14 times

    Just compensation must be measured as of the date of taking, October 12, 1977, for that is the date the amount of damages became fixed ( Chester Litho, Inc. v Palisades Interstate Park Comm., 27 N.Y.2d 323; Wolfe v State of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 292). In measuring damages after a partial taking, it is not relevant when the condemnor plans to use the property taken, but rather what the condemnor acquires the right to do ( Manlius Center Rd. Corp. v State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 685). Accordingly, we find that claimants are entitled to damages in the sum of $193,000, based upon a before value of $246,500, as found by the trial court, and an after value of $53,500, as explained herein; said damages being broken down as $10,000 for the direct taking and $183,000 as consequential damages to the remainder.

  3. Lorig v. State

    58 A.D.2d 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)   Cited 7 times

    Nor do we find that the court erred in denying claimants' consequential damages as a result of the taking. The amount of damages to which the claimant is entitled as a result of an appropriation is to be measured and fixed as of the time of the taking (Wolfe v State of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 292) and "the damage must be evaluated on the basis of what the State has the right to do under the terms of the easement as appropriated" (Spinner v State of New York, 4 A.D.2d 987, 988; see, also, Wayside Nurseries v State of New York, 36 A.D.2d 212, affd on opn below 34 N.Y.2d 876; Manlius Center Rd. Corp. v State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 685). The terms of the easement assure claimants at least one access road and one complete set of utility lines across the area. Additionally, claimants are entitled to make any other use of their property within the easement so long as such use does not interfere with the operation and maintenance of the power transmission lines.

  4. Rugar Bay Corp. v. State

    54 A.D.2d 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)   Cited 3 times

    Thus, in the instant case the court's findings were well within the range of expert testimony (Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Martin, 52 A.D.2d 1002; cf. Howard v State of New York, 36 A.D.2d 993; contra Ekorb Assoc. v State of New York, 41 A.D.2d 794). However, even if the consequential damages awarded in this case were not within the range of testimony, they were supported by other evidence sufficiently explained by the court (Milsap v State of New York, 32 A.D.2d 586). The court viewed the property and some of the comparative sales in the general area. Claimant's appraiser stated, and the court agreed, that the State's drainage ditch would constitute a danger to small children and thus a deterrent to the sales of family residential units, which the testimony indicated was the use to which the property was to be put in the near future (Manlius Center Road Corp. v State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 685). The State alleges that the drainage ditch would have no more adverse effect than a pre-existing one on the premises and thus no consequential damage would result. The court rejected the State's posture in that regard by finding that the State's 50-foot-wide easement was a legally imposed drainage easement and that the pre-existing ditch was not.

  5. Kravec v. State of N.Y

    51 A.D.2d 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)   Cited 3 times

    Since the State's easement is exceedingly broad, any action by the claimant thereon might be deemed by the State to interfere with its rights. The easement in this case potentially denies claimant the right of access (cf. Matter of City of New York [Steinecke], 47 A.D.2d 644, 645). Damages are fixed and measured at the time of the taking (Chester Litho v Palisades Park Comm., 27 N.Y.2d 323, 325), and must be assessed on the basis of what the State has actually taken, whether or not it intends to use any or all of the property acquired (Wolfe v State of New York, supra, p 295; Wayside Nurseries v State of New York, supra; Manlius Center Road Corp. v State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 685). In view of the broad language of the easement, without an express grant of access in the reservation clause, the State has actually landlocked claimant's land and should award damages accordingly.

  6. Kupster Realty Corp. v. State

    93 Misc. 2d 843 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978)   Cited 6 times

    This is a consequence of the general rule that while eminent domain consequential damages arising from the State's use of the appropriated property will not be barred merely because of the futurity of such use (and the futurity of such damages), these damages must be reasonably probable and reasonably ascertainable. (See Manlius Center Rd. Corp. v State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 685, 686; 4A Nichols, Eminent Domain, ยง 14.241[3].) It would of course be improper speculation for this court to award damages arising from noise levels beyond those occurring in the reasonably foreseeable future and which could be predicted with reasonable certainty.