I can discern no other possible meaning of the phrase that makes sense and is consistent with the remainder of section 5(2) of the act. In Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281 (1928), the court, in interpreting the language of a statute, stated that "`[a]ny school district' is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include any school district and every school district in the State." Manley, 177 Ark. at 263 (emphasis supplied).
In all of these states, the clauses have been held to be absolutely mandatory upon legislatures.Kuhn v. Board of Education of Wellsburg, 4 W. Va. 499 (1871); Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281 (1928); In re Kindergarten Schools, 18 Colo. 234 (1893); In re School Code of 1919, 30 Del. 406, 108 A. 39 (1919); Fenton v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Ada County, 20 Idaho 392, 119 P. 41 (1911); People ex rel. Russell v. Graham, 301 Ill. 446, 134 N.E. 57 (1922); City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 488, 121 S.W. 411 (1909); Revell v. Annapolis, 81 Md. 1 (1895); Associated Schools of Independent Dist. No. 63 v. School Dist. No. 83, 122 Minn. 254, 142 N.W. 325 (1913); Evers v. Hudson, 36 Mont. 135, 92 P. 462 (1907); Pingry Corporation v. Township of Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 217 A.2d 868 (1966); Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923); Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 213, 197 A. 344 (1938); Moseley v. City of Dallas, Tex. Com. App., 17 S.W.2d 36 (1929); Board of Sup'rs of King and Queen County v. Cox, 155 Va. 687, 156 S.E. 755 (1931). They all have found the clause to make education a state, rather than local, responsibility.
We would do violence to the reasoning in the Graves Case, supra, and to the constitutional provisions as therein discussed and followed, if we here hold that the Legislature intended to grant the right of appeal to aggrieved taxpayers of district No. 62 only if an equal percentage or a sufficient number of the taxpayers of district No. 74 would join therein. Partly by suggestion in the brief, and partly by our own investigation, our attention is directed to the following cases from Arkansas, Minnesota, and South Dakota: School District No. 74 v. Board of Commissioners of Lincoln County, 9 S.D. 291, 68 N.W. 746; Appeal of Common School Districts Nos. 16, 45, and 94, Dakota County, 158 Minn. 317, 197 N.W. 742; Consolidated School District No. 2 v. Special School District No. 19, 179 Ark. 822, 18 S.W.2d 349; Beard et al. v. Albritton. 182 Ark. 538, 31 S.W.2d 959; In re Dahlgren, 134 Minn. 82, 158 N.W. 729, and Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281. These cases are not in point, as they do not deal with the right of appeal.
`Any school district' is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include any school district and every school district in the State." Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281. The questions argued by appellant have been settled by the above case. It is agreed in this case that the petition contains a majority of the qualified electors of both of said School Districts No. 1 and No. 50, but that it does not contain a majority of the qualified electors of School District No. 50. The law requires not that the petition shall contain a majority of each district, but that it shall contain a majority of the qualified electors residing in the territory to be affected.
At the outset, it may be said that it is the settled rule in this State that the statute creating the county board of education substituted the board for the County court, and only transferred the power to the board without repealing or in any way affecting the statutory procedure with respect to matters theretofore within the power of the county court with regard to the formation, changes, and the regulation of school districts. Mitchell v. School District No. 13, 153 Ark. 50, 239 S.W. 371; Acree v. Patterson, 153 Ark. 188, 240 S.W. 33; and Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281; Swift v. Common School District No. 8, 163 Ark. 150, 259 S.W. 375. It is earnestly insisted, however, that the act is a local or special act, and is therefore unconstitutional under the principles of law declared in Webb v. Adams, 180 Ark. 713, 23 S.W.2d 617.
We must determine the intention of the legislature from the language of the act itself, where it is unambiguous. Raines v. Bolick, 183 Ark. 832, 39 S.W.2d 3009; Tolleson v. McMillan, 192 Ark. 111, 90 S.W.2d 990; Miller v. Yell and Pope Bridge District, 175 Ark. 314, 299 S.W. 15; Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281. There is nothing unclear or ambiguous about language saying that when a bank deposit is made in a certain way and under such circumstances "such deposit and any additions thereto made by any of the persons named in the account shall become the property of such persons as joint tenants."
And such construction ought to be put upon it as will not suffer it to be eluded." Gill v. Sanders, 182 Ark. 453, 31 S.W.2d 748; Turner v. Ederington, 170 Ark. 1155, 282 S.W. 1000; Casey v. Smith, 185 Ark. 149, 46 S.W.2d 38; Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281; Indian Bayou Drainage District v. Dickie, 177 Ark. 728, 7 S.W.2d 794. We recently quoted with approval the following: "But, while the courts cannot add to, take from or change the language of a statute to give effect to any supposed intention of the Legislature, words and phrases may be altered and supplied when that is necessary to obviate repugnancy and inconsistency and to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature."
As we have already said, in construing statutes it is the duty of courts to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and to give effect to every part and section of the law. Miller v. Yell Polk Bridge Dist., 175 Ark. 314, 299 S.W. 15; Hall v. Cartwright, 179 Ark. 1082, 20 S.W.2d 124; McDaniel v. Ashworth, 137 Ark. 280, 209 S.W. 646; Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281; Ark. Tax Commission v. Crittenden County, 183 Ark. 738, 38 S.W.2d 318; Gill v. Saunders, 182 Ark. 453, 31 S.W.2d 748; McIlroy v. Fugitt, 182 Ark. 1017, 33 S.W.2d 719, 73 A.L.R. 723; McGinnis v. Gailey, 174 Ark. 1062, 298 S.W. 335; Summers v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 16, 160 Ark. 371, 254 S.W. 696; Miller v. Witcher, 160 Ark. 479, 254 S.W. 1063. It is next contended by the appellant that the borrowing power of a district is limited to next year's revenue.
The act last referred to confers power on the county board to transfer children from one school district to another, but the proviso referred to is "that none of the provisions of this act shall apply to school districts created by special act of a previous Legislature." It appears, however, that, in September, October and December, 1929, the county board had dissolved three other school districts in Van Buren County and "added," "annexed," or "attached" their territory to Choctaw Special, acting under authority of act 156 of the Acts of 1927, as construed by this court in Manley v. Moon., 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281. It therefore became a consolidated district, and lost its identity as a legislative district by special act. Camp v. Barr, 181 Ark. 939, 28 S.W.2d 1071; Special School District No. 60 v. Special School District No. 2, 181 Ark. 253, 25 S.W.2d 443. And this is true, even though the consolidated district took the name of the former district created by special act. Camp v. Barr, supra. Upon the consolidations Choctaw Special ceased to be the same district created by the special act and no longer came within the proviso of act 143 of 1927, above referred to. It necessarily follows that the county board had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, that the circuit court acquired the same jurisdiction on appeal, and that the motion to dismiss was properly overruled. It is next urged that the court should not have allowed the transfers because of the insufficiency of the evidence.
Act No. 156 of the Acts of 1927 is not in conflict with the foregoing section and was intended to be, and is, cumulative to that section of the Digest. Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 263, 6 S.W.2d 281. W. E. Flannegin signed the petition for the consolidation of District No. 29 with the Branch Special School District, and afterward, and before any petitions were filed with the county board, also signed a petition for the annexation of his district with the Charleston District. He gave as a reason for this action the frequent importunity of those circulating the petition for the consolidation with the Branch Special School District with the statement by them that there would not be any order made annexing District No. 29 to the Charleston District, and he had as well sign for the consolidation with the Branch District; that he preferred to be annexed to the Charleston District, but was induced to believe this could not be done, and therefore signed the petition for the consolidation.