Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have interpreted and applied the above statutes in cases involving claims for food or "room and board" expenses. In Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 127 Mich App 444, 448; 339 NW2d 205 (1983), rev'd 425 Mich 140 (1986), the plaintiffs' minor son suffered severe head trauma in an automobile accident. He resided with the plaintiffs and received care from nurse's aides.
.MCL 500.3107(1)(a).Griffith, 472 Mich. at 532 n. 8, 697 N.W.2d 895, quoting Manley v. DAIIE, 425 Mich. 140, 169, 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986) (Boyle, J., concurring in part). If the fact-finder concludes that a plaintiff incurred allowable expenses in receiving care from a family member, the fact-finder must also determine to what extent any claimed expense is a “reasonable charge[ ].”
See Reed v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 198 Mich.App. 443, 453, 499 N.W.2d 22 (1993) (“The reasonableness of the expenses incurred may be judged by comparison with rates charged by institutions.”), overruled by Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 472 Mich. 521, 540, 697 N.W.2d 895 (2005) (overruling the proposition that “room and board” and food provided during home care are allowable expenses); Manley, 127 Mich.App. at 455, 339 N.W.2d 205 (“[C]omparison to rates charged by institutions provides a valid method for determining whether the amount of an expense was reasonable ....”), rev'd 425 Mich. 140, 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986) (omitting any analysis or comment on the statement relevant here); Dunaj v. Harry Becker Co., 52 Mich.App. 354, 358–359, 217 N.W.2d 397 (1974) (holding in a workers' compensation case “that medical services provided by a claimant's wife are compensable to the same extent as they would be if the services had been rendered by someone other than the wife”). B. REASONABLE CHARGES IN THE MARKETPLACE
Three factors must be met for an item to be considered an "allowable expense" under the statute: (1) the charge must be reasonable; (2) the expense must be reasonably necessary; and (3) the expense must be incurred. Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 435 Mich. 33, 50; 457 N.W.2d 637 (1990), citing Manley v DAIIE, 425 Mich. 140, 169; 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986); Moghis v Citizens Ins Co ofAmerica, 187 Mich. App. 245, 247; 466 N.W.2d 290 (1991). The burden of proof regarding whether a particular expense is reasonable and necessary lies with the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding this statement, Appellant made no argument related to the legal basis for his contention in his brief and filed no reply to the arguments made by Allstate in its brief. At oral argument, however, Appellant's counsel candidly explained that while he did not address this issue in his brief, he relies upon Manley v. DAIIE, 425 Mich. 140, 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986), to support his argument. We address Manleybelow.
The plaintiff has provided no new argument and pointed to no new authority to change the Court's decision on this issue. Instead, the plaintiff cited only Manley v. DAIIE, 425 Mich. 140, 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986), and Juzba v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 283820, 2009 WL 794683 (Mich. App. Mar. 26, 2009), which the Court previously considered in denying the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Therefore, the plaintiff's argument that the only issue before the Court was a change in circumstances lacks merit.
(b) redetermination from time to time of the amounts properly allowable, based on a change in facts or circumstances after entry of the consent judgment or settlement agreement. Cf. Manley v DAIIE, 425 Mich 140, 157 (1986); Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich 476, 483-484 (2003). III.
We reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of future benefits. On remand, in accordance with Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch, 425 Mich 140; 388 NW2d 216 (1986), the jury must specifically determine what future benefits are reasonable and necessary given the facts and circumstances of the case. I. FACTS
Similarly, Plaintiff is entitled to present evidence that she incurred costs above $18.00 per hour since February 28, 2003. In its order requesting additional briefing on the issue of collateral estoppel, this Court suggested that Plaintiff might be entitled to partial summary judgment, citing language from the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion in Manley v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 425 Mich. 140, 157, 158-59, 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986) that a party may apply for a redetermination of benefits if it has evidence of a substantial change in the facts and circumstances warranting a redetermination, and it is neither a workable or sound rule of law to require relitigation of factual and legal issues that were previously decided. The distinction, however, between Manley and this case is that there, the trial judge entered a declaratory judgment establishing amounts payable in the future.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should not apply Griffith to the present request for room and board because the Griffith court only addressed a claim for food expenses and that if the Griffith court had determined that room and board expenses were not allowable, they would have addressed that issue. Plaintiff also suggest that this Court should continue to look to and apply Manley v. DAIIE, 425 Mich. 140 (1986). As noted below, the Griffith court did address this issue, albeit in a rhetorical manner because room and board expenses were not at issue in that case.