Opinion
11901-24
11-26-2024
NATE MANIKTALA & JAYA MANIKTALA, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Kathleen Kerrigan, Chief Judge.
This case for the redetermination of deficiencies is before the Court on respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, filed September 9, 2024 (Motion). By the Motion, respondent moves that this case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Petition was not filed within the period prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners oppose the Motion. For the reasons that follow, we must grant respondent's Motion and dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
Like all federal courts, this Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Ramey v. Commissioner, 156 T.C. 1, 11 (2021). We may exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. See § 7442; Ramey, 156 T.C. at 11. Where, as here, this Court's jurisdiction is duly challenged, our jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown by the party seeking to invoke that jurisdiction. See David Dung Le, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 268, 270 (2000), aff'd, 22 Fed.Appx. 837 (9th Cir. 2001); Romann v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 273, 280 (1998); Fehrs v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 346, 348 (1975). To meet this burden, the party "must establish affirmatively all facts giving rise to our jurisdiction." David Dung Le, M.D., Inc., 114 T.C. at 270.
All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
In a deficiency case, as here, our jurisdiction depends upon the issuance of a valid notice of deficiency and the timely filing of a petition. See §§ 6212 and 6213; Andrews v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1977); Hallmark Rsch. Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. 126, 130 & n.4 (2022) (collecting cases); see also Sanders v. Commissioner, No. 15143-22, 161 T.C., slip op. at 7-8 (Nov. 2, 2023) (holding that the Court will continue treating the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional in cases appealable to jurisdictions outside the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). Generally, a notice of deficiency will be deemed valid for this purpose if it is sent to the taxpayer's last known address by certified or registered mail. See § 6212(a) and (b); Yusko v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 806, 807 (1987). In order to be timely, a petition generally must be filed within 90 days (or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States) of the date on which the Commissioner mails a valid notice of deficiency. See § 6213(a); Estate of Cerrito v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 896, 898 (1980).
The notice of deficiency in this case is addressed to petitioners at an address within the United States, and there is no indication in the record that petitioners were outside the United States at or about the time when the notice was mailed. See Smith v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 48 (2013); Lewy v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 779 (1977). In any event, the Petition was not timely filed under either the 90- or 150-day period.
In his Motion, respondent asserts that the notice of deficiency upon which this case is based was sent by certified mail on December 20, 2023, to petitioners' last known address. A PS Form 3877 attached to the Motion establishes that respondent sent the notice of deficiency to petitioners by certified mail on December 20, 2023, to the address listed in the notice. That address is the same mailing address that petitioners listed in the Petition, and they have not disputed that this address was their last known address for purposes of section 6212. We thus take it as established for purposes of the Motion that the notice was so mailed.
A properly completed PS Form 3877 (or certified mail list) is direct evidence of both the fact and date of mailing and, in the absence of contrary evidence, is sufficient to establish proper mailing of the notice of deficiency. See Clough v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 183, 187-91 (2002); Stein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-378; see also Keado v. United States, 853 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1984); Coleman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 82, 91 (1990). The PS Form 3877 attached as Exhibit A to respondent's Motion appears to be properly completed and bears sufficient indicia of authenticity. Finding no evidence to the contrary, we accept that document as presumptive proof of its contents.
Because the notice of deficiency was mailed to petitioners' last known address on December 20, 2023, the last date to file a petition with this Court as to that notice was March 19, 2024, as stated therein. Petitioners electronically filed the Petition to commence this case on July 19, 2024. Consequently, the Petition was not filed within the period prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code, and this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Rule 22(d); Sanders v. Commissioner, 160 T.C. 563 (2023); Nutt v. Commissioner, 160 T.C. 470 (2023).
In their Objection to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, filed October 2, 2024, petitioners advance several arguments in opposition to the granting of respondent's Motion. First, petitioners argue that they never "personally received" the notice of deficiency, and that their tax consultant ultimately received the notice after the deadline to petition this Court for redetermination. However, it is well settled that section 6212 "does not require actual receipt of the mailing, and that a notice sent by certified mail to a taxpayer's last known address complies with the statutory requirements, even if it returned unclaimed." Pagonis v. United States, 575 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Yusko, 89 T.C. at 810 (collecting cases). As noted above, there is no dispute here that the notice of deficiency was sent by certified mail to petitioners' last known address.
Second, petitioners argue that the Court should apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in this case, citing the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199 (2022), and that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196, 205 (3d Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-1037, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2725 (U.S. June 24, 2024). Petitioners' reliance on Boechler is misplaced. Boechler was a collection due process case involving our jurisdiction under section 6330(d)(1). Conversely, this is a deficiency case, and our jurisdiction in such cases is governed by section 6213(a). See Hallmark Rsch. Collective, 159 T.C. at 165-66 (concluding that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Boechler does not apply to the 90-day period of section 6213(a)). Although the Third Circuit reached a different conclusion in Culp, 75 F.4th at 205 (holding that the deficiency deadline under section 6213(a) is nonjurisdictional), this case is presumably appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, see § 7482(b)(1). The Eighth Circuit has held that the deficiency deadline is jurisdictional. See Andrews v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d at 366. Also, in Sanders, 161 T.C., slip op. at 7-8, this Court thoroughly examined the Culp decision and held that we will continue treating the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional in cases appealable outside the Third Circuit. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to equitable tolling in the instant case.
In closing, while we are sympathetic to petitioners' circumstances, Congress has limited our jurisdiction in the deficiency context to those cases in which a petition is timely filed, and we have no authority to extend the deadline in section 6213(a). See Hallmark Rsch. Collective, 159 T.C. at 166-67; see also Axe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 256, 259 (1972) ("We have no authority to extend the period provided by law for filing a petition with the Tax Court whatever the equities of a particular case may be and regardless of the cause for its not being filed within the required period."). Nevertheless, we note that the dismissal of this case does not preclude petitioners from pursuing administrative resolution of the 2018 and 2019 tax liabilities directly with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Another remedy potentially available to petitioners, if feasible, is to pay the determined amounts and thereafter file claims for refund with the IRS. If those claims are denied (or not acted upon after six months), petitioners may file a suit for refund in the appropriate U.S. District Court or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. See McCormick v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 138, 142 n.5 (1970).
Upon due consideration of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that respondent's Motion is granted, and this case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Petition was not filed within the period prescribed by section 6213(a).