The Government asserts, and Suburban does not dispute, that Suburban could have brought an action for breach of contract in the Court of Federal Claims. See Manhattan Sav. Bank v. United States, 214 Ct.Cl. 599, 557 F.2d 1388 (1977); Estabrook v. United States, 41 Fed.Cl. 283 (1998); Fairington Apartments v. United States, 7 Cl.Ct. 647 (1985). As the Government suggests, if Suburban were to obtain a judgment for breach of contract, the Court of Federal Claims could order payment of the insurance proceeds as a form of expectation damages, giving Suburban the benefits it expected to receive had the Government not breached the insurance contract.

Thus, once a party has made a promise, it is responsible to the obligee to ensure that performance will be satisfactory, even if the promising party obtains some third party to carry out its promise. See Gymco Constr. Co. v. Architectural Glass Windows, Inc., 884 F.2d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 1989); Manhattan Sav. Bank v. United States, 557 F.2d 1388, 1391 (Ct.Cl. 1977); Davidson v. Madison Corp., 177 N.E. 393, 394 (N.Y. 1931). Here, in accepting federal funds, New York State has promised that its programs will comply with the mandate of the Rehabilitation Act.

Accordingly, the tax assessment was not a borrowing, and it necessarily follows that the interest on the tax assessment is not "interest on borrowings." Although we need go no further because the language of the regulation is clear, Manhattan Savings Bank v. United States, 557 F.2d 1388, 1390 (Ct.Cl. 1977), the regulatory history supports our interpretation that DAR Section(s) 15-205.17 is limited strictly to "interest on borrowings." In the early drafts of this cost principle, prepared as part of Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) Section(s) 15-205.17, "interest (however represented)" was unallowable.