Opinion
1:21-CV-674 (BKS/DJS)
06-24-2021
URSULA MANGIR and ENES MANGIR, Plaintiffs, v. ELIZABETH MARIE WALSH, Defendant.
URSULA MANGIR ENES MANGIR Plaintiffs, Pro Se
URSULA MANGIR ENES MANGIR Plaintiffs, Pro Se
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
DANIEL J. STEWART UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent to the Court Plaintiffs' pro se Complaint. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. The Court has previously granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court will sua sponte review the sufficiency of the Complaint. Section 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, it is a court's responsibility to determine that a plaintiff may properly maintain his or her complaint before permitting the matter to proceed further.
The Complaint in this action was filed by using a form complaint for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Compl. The Complaint specifically avers that it is brought pursuant to section 1983. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiffs allege facts regarding the role of Defendant, a New York State Court Judge, in proceedings concerning ongoing family law matters in which Plaintiff Ursula Mangir is a party and over which Defendant is presiding. Id. at pp. 4-6.
Plaintiff Enes Mangir is Ursula Mangir's husband. See Mangir v. Pratico, 1:21-CV-665 (N.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 12, p. 36. There are no distinct factual allegations regarding him in this Complaint.
In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 judges enjoy absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in the performance of their duties. Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that “[j]udges enjoy absolute immunity from personal liability for ‘acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction'”) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). The Complaint specifically alleges that Defendant, in her judicial capacity, has refused to enforce other judicial orders and has violated Plaintiff's rights in the manner by which she has conducted judicial proceedings. Compl. at pp. 4-6. This conduct clearly relates to the official duties of a judge and so Plaintiffs' claims in this regard are barred by absolute immunity. Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d at 51; Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009) (“acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature”).
Thus, Plaintiffs cannot state cognizable claims against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiffs' Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this ReportRecommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 & 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).